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INTRODUCTION

I am legallyfreeto reveal embarrassinginformation
about
to
I
am
also
free
to
payment
negotiate
you. Generallyspeaking,
refrainfromexercising
a legalright.But ifI combinethetwo-offeringto remainsilentfora fee I am guiltyof a felony:blackmail.Why?
The so-calledparadoxofblackmail1
has garneredan extraorscholarlyattention.Contribudinarydegreeofinterdisciplinary
' Although
thereasonwhythe additionofa conditional
threatshouldmake a legal
difference
is obscure,thispuzzleis not,as a matterofstrictlogic,a paradox.See WendyJ.
TheForceofBlackmail'sCentralCase, 141 U Pa L Rev
Gordon,Truthand Consequences:
1741, 1742-43(1993). Nonetheless,following
convention,
we need not insistupon the
point.
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torsto the debatehave includedlaw professorsand judges,moral
however,it is
philosophersand economists.Despite manyefforts,
to observethat no consensushas emergedin
an understatement
theories.2Insupportof any one or combinationofthe proffered
to a symposiumdevotedto the subjecta
deed, in his afterword
few years ago, ProfessorJames Lindgren,the most intensely
contributor
to the debate,venturedthatthe blackmail
committed
paradoxremains"one ofthe mostelusive intellectualpuzzles in
all oflaw."3
This Articleproposesa new solutionto the puzzle. Specifically,it endeavorsboth to justifyblackmail'scriminalizationas
fullyconsistentwiththe centraltenetsofthe criminallaw and to
blackmailis propexplain why,and under what circumstances,
erlycriminalized.
The Articlebegins,in SectionI, by arguingthat no current
theoryadequatelyunravelsthe paradox.Each failsto accountfor
and substantialaspectsofprevailingblackmaillaw as
significant
well as widespreadintuitionsaboutwhatthe law shouldbe. Furthermore,SectionI seeks to demonstratethat the two predominant approachesto resolvingthe paradox(in additionto the specificanswers thus far proposed)are doomedto failure.Consequentialisttheories,whichturnupon the particularsocial consequences of blackmail,and deontologicaltheories,whichseek to
betweenthe conditional
identifythe objectivemoral difference
of
threatto performan act and the unconditionalperformance
that same act, will both always prove unable to distinguish
blackmailfrommuch behaviorthat is, and should remain,free
fromcriminalsanction.
SectionII developsand defendswhat I call the evidentiary
theoryof blackmail.It begins withthe propositionthat,consistentwithconsequentialistas well as retributivist
conceptionsof
the justifyingaim of the criminallaw, societymay criminalize
conductthattendsbothto cause harmand to be undertakenwith
wrongfulmotives.On this animatingsupposition,and because
societycould(and oftendoes) recognizeinjuryto reputationas le2 The fullestelaboration
ofthe puzzle,includingcritiquesofinitialefforts
to solveit,
appears in JamesLindgren,UnravelingtheParadox ofBlackmail,84 ColumL Rev 670
(1984). Otherespeciallynoteworthy
contributions
to the literatureincludeDouglas H.
Ginsburgand Paul Shechtman,
Blackmail:An EconomicAnalysisoftheLaw, 141 U Pa L
Rev 1849 (1993);RichardA. Posner,Blackmail,Privacy,and FreedomofContract,141 U
Pa L Rev 1817 (1993);JoelFeinberg,
HarmlessWrongdoing
240-58(Oxford1988);Richard
A. Epstein,Blackmail,Inc., 50 U Chi L Rev 553 (1983); Jeffrie
G. Murphy,
Blackmail:A
Preliminary
Inquiry,63 Monist156 (1980);and RobertNozick,Anarchy,
State,and Utopia
84-87(Basic Books1974).
141U Pa L Rev 1975,1975(1993).
3 JamesLindgren,
Blackmail:AnAfterword,
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gally cognizableharm, a legislaturecould unproblematically4
information
so longas
criminalizeall disclosuresofembarrassing
we could reasonablybelievethat mostpersonswho make such
disclosuresdo so withmorallyunacceptablemotives.But the oppositeis true:we knowthatpeoplerevealembarrassing
informationaboutothersforall typesofreasonsand,consequently,
outof
varyingmoralpostures-good,bad, and (arguably)neutral.The
about othdiversityofmotivesforrevealinghurtfulinformation
ers thus providesa sufficient
not
(if
necessary)explanationfor
society'srefusalto proscribeand punishall such revelations.To
be sure, the legislaturecould tryto tailor the offenseso as to
punishonlythosepersonswhodiscloseembarrassing
information
with,in Blackstone'sterm,"vitiouswill."5But in thateventthe
factfinder
a heftychallenge:how to determine
would confront
whetheranygivendefendant
actedwiththerequisitebad motive.
Ifthedefendant
the task wouldbe much
werea blackmailer,
easier. For reasonsto be explained,we can usuallyinferthatan
individualwhodisclosesembarrassing
information
onlyafterthe
personembarrassedby the disclosurefails to pay a requested
sum is drivenbymorallybad motivation
to makethatdisclosure.
The act ofblackmailthushas evidentiary
significance
only:it reveals something
aboutthe moralcharacterofthe actor'smotivationthatwe wouldbe less likelyto suspecthad he disclosedwithout firsthavingmade the conditionalthreat.Armedwiththat
(supposed)knowledge,
societycan punishthe blackmailerforthe
same reasonthatis sufficient
to punishthosewhoengagein unparadoxical,gardenvarietycrimes:because the actorcauses (or
threatens)harmwhileactingwithmorallyculpablemotives.
SectionIII simultaneously
tests and elaboratesthe evidentiarytheorybyanalyzinga rangeofvariationswithinand beyond
blackmail'sparadigmaticcase. This Sectionjustifiescriminalizing severaltypesofblackmailthatintuition(and, often,existing
law) suggestsshouldbe criminal,butthatone or moreprominent
theorieshave been unable to accountfor.It also explainswhy
severalotherclasses ofconductthatsharetheformalstructure
of
corecases ofblackmailshouldnotbe criminal.In so doing,this
Sectioninviteslawmakersto considerwhetherit wouldbe feasible toexcludesuchconductfromtheblackmailban.6
4 Unproblematically,
thatis, as faras criminaltheoryis concerned.
I hereput aside
considerations
strictly
exogenous
tothecriminallaw.
' William Blackstone,4 Commentaries *21.

6 Thisis notto demand
a perfect
identity
betweenthepositivelaw and themoralimportoftheevidentiary
theory.
Law is alwayssomewhatover-and/orunderinclusive
relativetothedictatesofitstheoretical
justifications.
See generally
JosephStory,1 Commen-
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SectionIV suggestssome broaderlessons ofthe evidentiary
theory.Afterall, the blackmailparadoxis notmerelya tantalizing intellectualpuzzle. The numberand statureofmindsit has
attractedbespeak a widelyheld beliefthat a solutionto this single conundrumwill bear broad and deep implications.As Lindgrenhas put it, simplyif dramatically:"The struggleto understand blackmailis a struggleforthe soul of the criminallaw."7
the
This Sectionofferssomethoughtsregardingwhatsignificance
evidentiarysolutionto the blackmailpuzzle mighthave forthe
fundamentalquestionsofcriminaltheory.Also,in an effort
both
to buttressthevalidityofthe evidentiary
theoryin its coreapplicationand to demonstrateits utilityoutsidethe contextofblackmail,I indicatehow the analysisdevelopedin SectionsII and III
mighthelp to resolveyet anotherof the great mysteriesof the
conditions.
law-the doctrineofunconstitutional
I.

EXISTING THEORIES:

A SURVEY AND CRITIQUE

The blackmailparadoxhas attractedan impressivearrayof
thinkersfroma wide rangeofdisciplines.For purposesofexposition and analysis (and followingLindgren),this Sectiondivides
theirtheoriesinto two broad groups.8SectionI.A examinessevofblackmailbyreference
eral theoriesthatjustifycriminalization
to the supposedlyadverse social consequencesthat could be expectedin a regimethat toleratedblackmail.SectionI.B investion the groundsthat
gates theoriesthat advocatecriminalization
blackmailis wrongin and ofitself.
Any satisfactory
theorymust accountforboth parts of the
blackmailpuzzle. First,it must explainwhetherand whyblackmail shouldbe made criminal.Second,ifit supportscriminalizationofblackmail,it mustexplainwhetherand whyunconditional
ofthe acts a blackmailermightthreatenshouldreperformance
mainlawful.Put otherwise,the theoryshouldprovidean account
and
oftheblackmailthreatthatbothjustifiesits criminalization9
? 7 (Little,Brown12thed 1877);FrederickSchauer,Playtarieson EquityJurisprudence
ingBy theRules31-34(Oxford1991).
Lindgren,141U Pa L Rev at 1975(citedin note3).
8 See Lindgren,
84 ColumL Rev at 680 (citedin note2). This is notquiteto label the
See, forexample,Gordon,
and thesecond"deontologists."
"consequentialists"
firstcategory
141 U Pa L Rev at 1741-46(citedin note 1) (applyingtheselabelsto the twocategories).
groundscould approveits
One who believesthat blackmailis wrongon deontological
to distinon consequentialist
grounds.In otherwords,it can be important
criminalization
ofgivenconductfromthe moral
guishthemoralbases ofclaimsaboutthe wrongfulness
forpunishingthat conduct.See notes 138-39and accompanying
bases ofjustifications
text.
9 Few theoriesdisputethatat least somesubstantialsubsetofthe presentoffenseof
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from
distinguishes
it, in a mannerrelevantto thatjustification,
the act upon whichthe threatis leveraged.By and large,the
the secondtask of
theoriesin the firstgrouppassablyperform
thethreatfromtheact. But theyfailto accomplish
distinguishing
thefirsttask-showingwhyblackmailshouldbe criminal.In contrast,severaltheoriesin thesecondgroupprovideseemingly
persuasive explanationsforblackmail'scriminalization,
but fail to
accountadequatelyforthedifference
betweenthe threatand the
act. No priortheoryperforms
bothjobs satisfactorily.10
A. The Social ConsequencesofBlackmail
This Section considers theories that justify blackmail's
criminalization
on the groundsthatdecriminalization
wouldproduceundesirablesocialconsequences.
1. Law and Economics:criminalizing
inefficient
conduct.
The principalpuzzle of blackmailis this: why is it (and
shouldit be) illegalto threatento do whatit is legal to do absent
In otherwords,blackmailis an exceptionto the gena threat?11
eral rule of law and moralsthat one may threatento exercise
one's rights.However,blackmailis also unusual in anotherrespect.Ex post,the successfulblackmailtransactionlookslike a
gardenvarietyvoluntaryexchange:the blackmail"victim"buys
blackmailis properly
madecriminal.
Thecontested
questions,then,concernthereasonfor
its criminalization
and the propercontours
ofthecrime.One exception
comesfromlibertarianism.See MurrayN. Rothbard,
1 Man,Economy,
and State 157 n 49 (Van Nostrand
1962)("[B]lackmail
wouldnotbe illegalin thefreesociety.Forblackmailis thereceiptof
moneyin exchangeforthe serviceofnotpublicizing
certaininformation
abouttheother
person.No violenceor threatof violenceto personor property
is involved.").
Because
Rothbard's
it need
conclusion
standsorfallsuponfamiliarlibertarian
premises,
however,
notbe addressedhere.
10Thisis notto saythata theory
is necessarily
infirm
unlessitslessonsprecisely
conformtoeitherpresentlaw orcommon
moralintuitions.
Rather,thetheorymustbe able to
explainoutcomeswe woulddeemproperuponconsideredreflection.
For a discussionof
this methodof "reflective
equilibrium,"
see JohnRawls, A Theoryof Justice48-51
(Belknap1971).Naturally,
the"burdenofpersuasion"
willfallmostheavilyonthosetheoriesthatdepartfromthestatusquo byarguingeitherthatblackmail(orsomesubstantial
subsetthereof)shouldbe madelegal,orthattheunconditional
performance
ofsomepresentlylegalactsshouldbe madecriminal.
" See, forexample,SidneyW. DeLong,Blackmailers,
BribeTakers,and theSecond
Paradox,141 U Pa L Rev 1663,1663(1993) (The criminalization
ofblackmailhas been
consideredparadoxicalbecause it wouldmake unlawfula threatto do something
the
threatener
has a legalrightto do.");Ginsburgand Shechtman,
141 U Pa L Rev at 1850,
1873(citedin note2); Gordon,141U Pa L Revat 1742(citedin note1); RonaldH. Coase,
The 1987McCorkleLecture:Blackmail,74 Va L Rev 655, 667 (1988);Feinberg,
Harmless
Wrongdoing
at 252 (citedin note2); GlanvilleL. Williams,Blackmail,1954 CrimL Rev
79, 162-63.
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to
the blackmailer'spromisenot to disclose certaininformation
whichthe blackmaileris privy.And, ex ante, the blackmailer's
unless the deal is consummated
threatto disclosetheinformation
looks just like any seller's threatto withholda good or service
unless the potentialbuyermeetsthe seller'sprice.But voluntary
transactionsare generallyfavoredin the law. A secondpuzzle of
blackmail,then,is this: Why is blackmail,in contrastto other
illegal?"2
voluntarytransactions,
Because economistsare greatbelieversin voluntarytransactions,this secondpuzzle has attractedsome of the most distinguishedmindsin the fieldof law and economics.Almostall"3favor continuingto criminalizeblackmail-at least in its paradigmatic case -ven while acknowledgingthat it is a voluntary
transaction.Unlike most othervoluntarytransactions,theyarThis Sectionpresents
gue, blackmailis economicallyinefficient.
this economicthesis and then offersthreereasons whyit is infirm.
a) The argument:blackmailproducesdeadweightloss. The central insight,associatedprincipallywithJudgeDouglas Ginsburg
and ProfessorRonald Coase, is simple: In an ordinarymarket
directransaction,
goods,servicesand/ormoneymovein different
tions.A gives $x to B, and B transfersgoody to A. Because the
partieswouldnot consummatethe deal unless each valued her
expectedend state higherthan her initial state,the transaction
mustmake bothpartiesbetteroff.And,all thingsbeingequal, it
increases net social welfare.In contrast,the objectiveand the
usual resultof a blackmailproposalis to redistributeeconomic
resourcesfromthe victim,A, to the blackmailer,B, withoutoth12 One answerto this puzzle woulddenythe premise.
Undera theorytracedto the
theconsumRobertNozick,theblackmailproposalis coerciveand,therefore,
philosopher
is nota "voluntary"
exchange.If the exchangeis notvolunmatedblackmailtransaction
coercesthevictim(and assumingthatcoercionis a primafatarybecausetheblackmailer
cie wrong),the coerciontheorybelongsto the secondcategory-thosethatjustifycriminalizationofblackmailas a wrongin itself.See SectionI.B.4. In anyevent,althoughadblackherentsofthe law and economicsapproachby and large approveofcriminalizing
See,
mail,fewifanyagreethatthedeal betweenblackmailerand victimis "involuntary."
forexample,Posner,141 U Pa L Rev at 1819 (citedin note2) ("One alternativeto ecofor
nomicanalysisin ... the blackmailcases is to playwiththe meaningof'voluntary,'
are absent;but
acts to thosein whichsevereconstraints
'voluntary'
examplebyconfining
GerardaBrown,Blackmailas PrivateJusJennifer
thisjust adds a layerofuncertainty.");
tice,141 U Pa L Rev 1935,1950 n 32 (1993) ("Thatthe blackmaileemaybe facedwitha
hardchoicebetweenthe consequencesofdisclosureand payingthe blackmailerdoes not
necessarilymaketheblackmailanymorecoercivethanthe choicefacingmanypartiesto
economictransactions.").
whollylegitimate
see JosephIsenbergh,BlackmailFromA to C, 141 U Pa L Rev
13 For one exception,
text).
1905(1993) (discussedat notes48-52and accompanying
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erwisechangingthestatusquo ante;B givesnothingofvalue toA.
exThe blackmailtransactionis thus a sterile redistributive
pracone,
for
the
costless
it is nota
change.Crucially,moreover,
ticeconsumestwotypesofresources.The blackmailerinvestsresourcesinto"diggingup the dirt,"and bothhe and his victiminis likelyto be inefficur transactioncosts. Blackmailtherefore
cient,producingdeadweightlosses and reducingoverall social
utility.Hence,Ginsburg,Coase, and othersconclude,it shouldbe
prohibited.'4

The firstprobblackmail:underinclusiveness.
b) Adventitious
lem withthe economicthesisis that it is based on a dubious,if
not manifestlyincorrect,premise.Were blackmail legal and
B would be transferring
someblackmailcontractsenforceable,
theact he threatens.Bethingofvalue toA-B's rightto perform
B is legallyfreeto revealA's
forethe transactionis completed,
B's blackmailproposaland
A's
to
accepting
By
spouse.
adultery
A buysB's promiseofsilence(along,
however,
tendering
payment,
and negaverylikely,withsuch tangiblethingsas photographs
tives).'5If bothB and A exchangesomethingof value, thenthe
existenceof transactioncosts (includingresourcesB investsto
valuableto offer
A) seemsirrelevant.The ecoprocuresomething
nomicthesisdoes not distinguishblackmailfromany othereconomicexchange.Put otherwise,"somethingdoes happen in a
ofproperty
rightsbetweenA and
blackmailbargain:a reframing
B."16

For the economicthesis to make sense, then,this "someobvious
thing"just cannotcount.However,it is notimmediately
preciselywhy not.'7For Ginsburgand ProfessorPaul Schechtman, the reason is that the above criticismmisconceivesthe
propertimeofcomparison.The key,theyargue,is to "viewthe
transactionat its outset,"whenB firstcontemplatesblackmail
and has yetto unearthdirton A: "No rationaleconomicplanner
" See, forexample,Coase, 74 Va L Rev at 673 (citedin note 11); Ginsburgand
141U Pa L Revat 1865(citedin note2).
Shechtman,
the questionto objectthatB's promiseis of no value on the
1 It wouldbe begging
Whether
groundsthat blackmailis illegal and blackmailcontractsare unenforceable.
thequestion.
blackmailshouldbe illegalis precisely
6 Isenbergh,
141U Pa L Revat 1920(citedin note13).
17 The reasonfornotcounting
thatB has no
it cannotbe derivedfromthesupposition
thatthe blackmailerwill not
intentto do as he threatens.If the victimhas confidence
carryouthis threatthen,as a practicalmatter,the promisemightwell be valueless.In
bluff.
If,instead,thevictimdoes
thevictimwillcall theblackmailer's
thatevent,however,
that
it can onlybe becausehe was notconfident
a deal withtheblackmailer,
consummate
promin whichcase thelatter's(legallyenforceable)
threatwas a bluff,
theblackmailer's
ise nottocarryouthisthreathas value.
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would toleratethe existenceof an industrydedicatedto digging
up dirt,at real resourcecost,and then reburyingit.""8In other
words,blackmailappears "nonallocative"
ifwe comparethe situation afterthe blackmailto that beforethe blackmailerbegan to
information.
ferretforembarrassing
But this responsehits an intractabledifficulty.
If the economicthesismustfocuson theblackmailer'sprojectbeforehe acquires the potentiallydamaging information,
it carnnot
justify
banningblackmailbased on infornationthat he happenedupon
ProfessorMike Hepworthhas distinguishedfour
adventitiously.
typesofblackmailbased on the mannerin whichthe damaging
is obtained:in "opportunistic
information
blackmail,"the blackstumblesuponinformation
mailerinnocently
he subsequentlyrealizes will serve as useful blackmail fodder;in "participant
blackmail,"he was a participantin the conductabout whichhe
later blackmailsthe victim;in "commercialresearchblackmail,"
in orderto blackthe blackmailerconsciouslyseeks information
mail his victim;and in "entrepreneurial
blackmail,"the blackmailerenticesa victimintoa compromising
situationforthe specificpurposeofproducingthe materialwithwhichhe can blackmail.'9Relyingon this vocabulary,Lindgrenobjectedyears ago
(in responseto Ginsburg'sthenunpublishedmanuscript)thatthe
economicapproach is substantiallyunderinclusivebecause it
cannotjustifyprohibitionof eitherparticipantor opportunistic
a largepercentageofall blackmail.
blackmail`0-likely
Note thatLindgren'sobjectionis notthat the potentialmagsmallerin cases of
nitudeof the deadweightloss is significantly
participantand opportunisticblackmail than Ginsburg and
Shechtmansuppose. It is true that in commercialresearchand
entrepreneurial
blackmail,the deadweightloss is measuredby
the sum of(1) theresourcesexpendedto discovertheinformation
and parand (2) the transactioncosts,whereas in opportunistic
ticipantblackmail,transactioncosts constitutethe entiredeadweightloss. Properlyunderstood,though,Lindgren'scriticismis
farmoreprofound.
Whentheblackmailerdoes notmake an independenteffortto dig up information-thatis, when the status
quo ante cannotbe identifiedas any pointpriorto whenhe communicatesthe blackmailproposalto his victim-thenthereis no
basis forcharacterizing
the completedtransactionas nonallocative. The transactioncosts,whatevertheymay be, are facilita18

Ginsburgand Shechtman,141U Pa L Rev at 1860(citedin note2).

19MikeHepworth,
Life73-77(Routledge
Blackmail:Publicityand Secrecyin Everyday

1975).
' Lindgren,
84 ColumL Rev at 694-95(citedin note2).
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tive,notdeadweight-andmirrortransactioncostspresentin ordinarybargainingsituations.2'
Instead of agreeingthat their theorycannot explain the
ofparticipantand opportunistic
criminalization
blackmail,Ginsburgand Shechtmanarguethatthetransaction
costsstilljustify
prohibiting
blackmailevenwhentheinformation
theblackmailer
threatensto disclose is adventitiously
obtained.In directresponseto Lindgren,
theyclaimthat
it is of no momentthat a particularB may have comeby
information
compromising
accidentally.ShouldA refuseto
pay him,B has no reasonto beginincurring
expenses,such
as are necessaryto securepublicationoftheinformation,
except insofaras he is lookingto futureopportunities
for
blackmail.The resourceshe expendsin orderto publishthe
information
to getcreditas thesourceofit)
(and presumably
are justifiedonlyfromhis ex ante perspectiveon the next
blackmailingopportunity-regardless
ofwhetherB sets out
to findit or waits forit again to comeknockingat his door.
Thus, assumingthat the firstblackmailopportunity
arrives
by accident,whenB asks forpaymentto suppresswhat he
knows,he has becomean entrepreneur
ofblackmail;forB
thento carryout his threatto revealthe information
is an
investment
decision,nota partoftheearlieraccident.22
This responsedoes not withstandscrutiny.First,and least
insofaras it assumes substantial costs to the
significantly,
blackmailer,the truthis morelikelythat "[t]hedirectcost to a
21As Pigouobserved,
bargainingitselfimposessocialcosts.See A.C. Pigou,The EconomicsofWelfare
200-03(Macmillan4thed 1932).Butbecausethereis no moreefficient
itis hardtoknowwhatto
wayofallocating
goodsand servicesthanbyprivatebargaining,
that
Thereis no wayto eliminatebargaining,
and thedeception
do withhis observation.
outthebabywiththebathwater.
See Coase,74 Va L Rev
throwing
comeswithit,without
a spePigou).Notably,whenit comesto proposing
at 671-73(citedin note11) (criticizing
ofblackmail,Ginsburgand Shechtmanappear to overlookthe factthat
cificdefinition
threats,and,
"involvesbluff,
commercial
settingsinherently
bargaining
evenin ordinary
a
to somedegree,deception."
Id at 672. Blackmail,in theirview,is a threatto perform
on thepartymakingthethreat.Ginsburg
no materialbenefit
lawfulactthatwouldconfer
141 U Pa L Rev at 1865 (citedin note2). A moment's
reveals
reflection
and Shechtman,
is overbroad,
forit encompassesevery"threat"
to holdoutfora betthatthisarticulation
terdeal in circumstances
to theoffer
nextbestoptionis inferior
wherethe"threatener's"
on thetable.(Forexample,it wouldmakean athlete'sthreatto sitouttheseasona crimiWouldtheconsequence
be thatteamscouldsignmostoftheirdraftchoicesfor
nal offense.
closeto theminimum
wage?)In short,no matterwhatmightbe said oftheir
something
the task they
and Shechtman's
definition
plainlydoes notaccomplish
theory,
Ginsburg's
thatis
bargaining
setforthemselves-namely,
to distinguish
blackmailfromtheordinary
to disciplinethemarket."Id at
exchangeeconomy
"actuallyrelieduponin a competitive
1849.
141U Pa L Revat 1875-76(citedin note2).
m Ginsburg
and Shechtman,
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blackmailerofactuallycarryingout his threatis ordinarilytrivto mail a photographor a document
ial; it takes almostno effort
to someone."23
Second,the claimthatB has no reasonto incurexpenses otherthan to bolsterhis reputationas a blackmaileris
dubious.IfA rejectsB's proposal,B mightcarryouthis threatout
of spite. And as Ginsburgand Shechtmanthemselvesacknowledge, there is "no reason in economictheoryto dishonor[B's]
preference
formakingA suffer."24
Mostsignificantly
(and thisis a sufficient
objection,evenifB
incursnontrivialcoststo carryout his threatand even ifhe does
so solely in order to strengthenhis reputationas a credible
threatener),
Ginsburgand Schectmanare wrongto concludethat
"[t]heresources[B] expends. . . are justifiedonlyfromhis ex ante
Rather,any
perspectiveon the nextblackmailingopportunity."25
expensesincurredmightwell be justifiedbytheblackmailer'sanThat Ginsburgand
ticipationofthe nextbargainingopportunity.
Shechtmanoverlookthisbasic pointis starklyillustratedbytheir
earlierargumentthat"B's onlypotentialgain . . . is in establishas someonewillingto incura costifnotobliged.
inghis credibility
But that is an asset only insofaras B is an entrepreneurof
blackmail,i.e., someonewho expectsto engage in similarfuture
Not at all. A reputationas someonewillingto
transactions."26
foregoa benefitor incur costs if not obligedis extraordinarily
business world.It allows one to sevaluable in the "legitimate"
cure a disproportionately
large share of the potentialbenefitsof
exchange.And, when it comes to exploitingthat reputation,it
whetherit was forgedas an adventishouldmake no difference
of
tiousblackmailer,or as a used car salesman,or as a distributor
favabeans.
It remainsto considerone otherrejoinderto Lindgren'scritique ofthe law and economictheory-a rejoinderthat does not
' StevenShavell,An EconomicAnalysisof Threatsand TheirIllegality:Blackmail,
and Robbery,141 U Pa L Rev 1877,1889 (1993). Shavellalso notesthat"[t]he
Extortion,
outhis threatprobablyinheresmainlyin any resulting
costto a blackmailerofcarrying
increasein theriskofhis beingcaughtand punished.But theblackmailercan usuallyreusingthemail or the telephone."Id. Shavell'spointis
anonymously,
veal his information
thanhe seemsto realize.The blackmailer'scostsofavoidingdetectionand
even stronger
are notrelevantwhendecidingwhetherblackmailshouldbe punishable.
punishment
24 Ginsburg
and Shechtman,141 U Pa L Rev at 1864 (cited in note 2) (emphasis
thattherationaleconomicplannercan ignoreB's
added).Theyproceedto argue,however,
on the groundsthat"somepotentialgains are notrewelfareinterestin actingspitefully
Id. But if
alizablebecausetheyare notas greatas thecostentailedin theiridentification."
B's pleasurein harmingA countsin thewelfarecalculus,thena realisticappraisalofthe
blackmailer
becomescritical.
bytheadventitious
costsincurred
5 Id at 1876(emphasisaltered).
' Id at 1865(emphasisadded).
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rely on transactioncosts. ProfessorSteven Shavell has agreed
blackmail
of participantand opportunistic
that the criminality
to
efforts
wasteful
discourage
"cannotbe explainedby a need to
Instead, he argues that if adventitious
obtain information."27
blackmailis notillegal,"potentialvictimswill exerciseexcessive
precautionsor reducetheirlevel of innocent,yet embarrassing,
activities"to preventbeingblackmailedby personswho chance
upondamaginginformation.28
This argument,however,will not work.Assumethat,were
blackmaillegalized,people would
participantand opportunistic
reduce the level of activitiesthat mightserve as a basis for
blackmail,and wouldincreaseprecautionsagainstbeingdiscoveredwhentheydo engagein such activities.Such an assumption
is an economicreason formakingblackmailillegal onlyif the
costsoftheseconsequencesoutweightheirsocialbenefits.Surely
thatis so ifwe acceptShavell'sinvitationto consideronlyinnocent activities.However,thereis no warrantforadoptingsuch a
narrowfocus.
As Shavell himselfrecognizes,threecategoriesof "embarrassing"activitiesmightserve as the basis forblackmail:(1)
purelyinnocentsociallyharmlessacts like "engagingin conventional sexual intercoursewith one's spouse, or even taking a
shower";(2) sociallyharmfulbut legal acts suchas adultery;and
surelywould
As to thesecondcategory-which
(3) criminalacts.29
concludesthat the social
be as numerousas the first30-Shavell
value oflegalizingblackmailis ambiguousbecauseit is uncertain
whether(a) the beneficialeffectofreducingsociallyundesirable
"wasteactivitieswouldoutweighthesumof(b) theblackmailer's
and (c) the victims'costs of
ful effortsto obtain information"
7 Shavell,141U Pa L Revat 1903(citedin note23).

28Id.

Id at 1897-99.
' One couldobjectthat,becauseeverybody
blackmail,
is vulnerableto firstcategory
its incidencewouldfarexceedthatofsecondcategoryblackmailin a worldwhereblackmail werelegalized.I do notthinkthisis the case. In mostinstancesof firstcategory
but to
notjust to revealinformation,
blackmail,the blackmailermustbe threatening,
Shavell'sexwillnotgetrich,to takeProfessor
publicizetangibleevidence.A blackmailer
thatthecouple
and coworkers
to tella marriedcouple'sneighbors
ample,bythreatening
must
the blackmailer
as Shavellrecognizes,
sexualintercourse;
engagesin conventional
photosoftheact. Id at 1897.But thiswillnotbe so easy,forlaws
threatento distribute
invasionswouldremainoperableevenundera regimeoflegal
(and norms)againstprivacy
fromsuchthreatswouldoftenbe too smallto
the potentialpayoff
blackmail.Moreover,
encouragethe practice.DespiteShavell'sexamples,the mostlikelysubjectoffirstcatethetargetofsocial
harmlessacts thatare nonetheless
goryblackmailmustbe innocent,
diminishin proporblackmailwould,therefore,
prejudice.The incidenceoffirstcategory
increases.
tionas generalsocialtolerance
2
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guardingagainst blackmail.3'We will considershortlywhether
such an ambivalentconclusionabout the overallconsequentialist
balance warrantsmuch supportfora generalizedban on blackadventimail.32But it is surelynotenoughtojustifycriminalizing
tious blackmail,forit is implausiblethat the balance would remain ambiguouswhenno resourceshave been expendedto obtain
in question.33
the information
Consequently,Shavell's "incentivebased" responseto Lindgrensucceeds at mostin justifyingconof adventitiousblackmailof innocentconduct
tinuedprohibition
thatsocietyhas no interestin discouraging.
the law
notwithstanding,
Therefore,Shavell's contributions
and economicsapproach still cannotjustifyprohibitingcondiabout sociallyundesirable34
tional threatsto reveal information
was obtainedwithoutcost.35
behaviorwheresuch information
3'

Id at 1899.

See notes38-42and accompanying
text.
of this argumentwouldconsumemore space than the
A completedemonstration
subjectwarrants,especiallysinceShavellneverexpresslydevelopsthecontrary
claim.In
simplified
form,theargumentassumesthat,in a regimewhereall blackmailis criminal,
the discounted
costofdetectionto a person,P, whoengagesin secondcategoryconductis
x. Werean exceptionto the blackmailban carvedout foradventitious
blackmail,P would
facean additionaldiscountedcostofdetection
ofy. Let n equal thecoststoP oftakingexand let m equal the coststo P offoregoing
tra precautionsto avoiddetection,
the second
blackmailis costlyforsociety,
categoryconduct.ForanygivenP, allowingadventitious
on
Shavell'sreasoning,
onlywhen(i) x ? n < x + y < m. (Ifx > n, P takes the precautionsreblackmailis legalized;ifn > x + y, P eschewsextrapregardlessofwhetheradventitious
blackmailis legalized;ifx + y > m,P choosesto forego
cautionsevenifadventitious
theactivityratherthantake additionalprecautions.)
Meanwhile,legalizingadventitious
blackmail incurspositivesocialvalue if(ii) x < m < x + y. Ifthe values fory are low,events(i)
and (ii) are bothfairlyunlikely.However,assumingthatthe benefitto societyfromany
the activityat issue is greaterthan the cost to societyfromany one P
one P foregoing
at costto himofn, event(i) wouldhave to be considerably
more
takingextraprecautions
blackmailofsecondcategoryconductto
commonthanevent(ii) forlegalizingadventitious
be a bad socialbargainon Shavell'sreasoning.This is notprovablyfalse,but seemssubstantiallyunlikely.
This argumentcan be illustratedbyconsidering
Shavell'sownexampleofthe typeof
activitythatmightformthebasis forsecondcategoryblackmail:"thewastefulbut notillegal spendingofchurchfundsby a minister."
Shavell,141 U Pa L Rev at 1898 (citedin
ofpermitting
note23). The beneficialeffects
blackmailin such cases is clear-to induce
Id at 1899.The principaladverseeffect
ministers"touse churchfundsmoreresponsibly."
to .. . avoidblackmail."Id. If,as Shavell
is "theeffort
expended[byprofligate
ministers]
asks us to suppose,"theministercan avoiddetection
ifhe goesto thetroubleofmakingall
purchaseswithcash insteadofhis creditcard,"id,howoftenwouldthethreatoflegalized
blackmail(overand abovethe threatofdetectionin a regimethatcriminaladventitious
ized adventitious
blackmail)inducesuchbehavior?
3 We willbracketthequestionofwhetherlaw and economics
justifiesthe prohibition
against blackmailbased on threatsto reveal sociallyundesirableand illegal behavior
is obtainedwithor withoutexpenditure
(wheretheinformation
ofresources).See Section
III.B.3.
in a recentarticlethatthe economicresponsesto Lindgren'schal3 Acknowledging
lenge have been inadequate,ProfessorRichardMcAdamshas proposeda "second-best"
32
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ofexternalities.
blackmail:theindeterminacy
c) Nonadventitious
analysis does not implythat the economicthesis
The foregoing
a ban on blackmailbased on information
succeedsin justifying
that is obtainedby the expenditureof resources,forthe fact(if
reducestheaggregatewealthofthe
true)thata giventransaction
actual partiestotheexchangedoes notprovethatthetransaction
to resusreducestheoverallwealthofsociety.As Shavell'seffort
participantand opporcitatethe economicthesisforprohibiting
economistsare as concernedwithextunisticblackmailreflects,
ternalitiesas theyare fondofvoluntaryexchanges.Accordingly,
if the threatand practiceof blackmailproducedpositiveexternalities (by encouragingsociallyusefulactivityor discouraging
blacksociallyharmfulbehavior),thena regimethat permitted
mail mightbe wealthmaximizingrelativeto a regimethatprohibitedit.
assessed
Indeed,JudgeRichardPosner has systematically
to evalublackmailin an effort
thevarioustypesofinformational
exhaustive
Adoptinga purportedly
ate this very possibility.36
blackmailer
that
a
acts
or
conditions
of
classification
seven-part
Posnerconcludesthat in noneofthe
mightthreatento reveal,37
economicdefenseof the criminalban againstadventitiousblackmail.See RichardH.
MeAdams,GroupNorms,Gossip,and Blackmail,144 U Pa L Rev2237,2266-92(1996).In
disblackmailproducesa suboptimal
MeAdams'sview,absentsocialnorms,adventitious
whilea blackmailban producesa sudiscovered
ofadventitiously
semination
information,
priHowever,he argues,normsfavoring
of suchinformation.
dissemination
peroptimal
disclosurecorrectthe forbetterthan normsfavoring
vacycorrectthe latterinefficiency
thanlegalizablackmailis moreefficient
ofadventitious
criminalization
mer.Therefore,
tion.
its consequencesare morefar-reaching
ThoughMcAdams'sargumentis intriguing,
] the
than he concedesand thanare acceptable.McAdamsclaimsonlyto "supplement[
economictheoryofblackmail."Id at 2287. See also id at 2267 n 82. In fact,his analysis
case againstblackmailrestsonthepremise
Theeconomic
footing.
restson a verydifferent
economiclosses.
conductthatresultsin deadweight
to criminalize
thatit is appropriate
blackmailcannotbe justifiedon thatprincithatmuchadventitious
McAdamsrecognizes
ofexcepting
difficulties
ple. Id at 2287. He also eschewsrelianceon any administrative
Id at 2270 n 93. Therefore,
blackmailfroma generalblackmailprohibition.
adventitious
forcriminalization
condition
is thatit is a sufficient
theunstatedpremiseofhis argument
ofinforsocialdistribution
wouldlikelyproducea more"efficient"
thata legalprohibition
mation.It followsthathis theorywouldtoleratean elaborateregimeof criminallaws
of
concealment
and prohibiting
mandatingdisclosureofcertaincategoriesofinformation
others.
141U Pa L Rev1817(citedin note2).
3 See Posner,
vic(1) criminalacts forwhichtheblackmailer's
categoriesare as follows:
37 Posner's
perhaps
criminalacts; (3) acts thatare wrongful,
timhas been punished;(2) undetected
was
(orhis principal)
actsofwhichtheblackmailer
(4) wrongful
butnotcriminal;
tortious,
violateany
censurableacts thatdo not,however,
or otherwise
thevictim;(5) disreputable
thatare a sourceofpotentialhumiliation;
actsorconditions
enforced
law; (6) involuntary
exceptthatthe victimdid notcommittheact for
and (7) anyofthefirstsix categories,
Id at 1820.
whichhe is beingblackmailed.
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that therewouldbe a countervailing
cases couldwe be confident
social benefit.On this basis, he agrees with the GinsburgShechtmanthesis that blackmailis on average wealth reducing
bythecriminallaw.38
shouldbe prohibited
and therefore
One potentialproblemwith Posner's approach arises from
thefactthathis taxonomyis notas exhaustiveas he suggests.He
providesno accountofthreatsto do anythingotherthan disclose
or of demands forsomethingotherthan pecuniary
information
is the questionablenatureof some of PosMore
troubling
gain.
ner's centralconclusions.For example,Posnerconcedesthat the
two"and "category
socialwelfareargumentsagainsthis "category
five"blackmail-threatsto reveal that a victimhas engaged eitherin a criminalact forwhichhe was notcaughtand punished
or in disreputableor immoralacts that do not violate any comHe is able to disfavorlemonlyenforcedlaw-are inconclusive.39
forms
of
"a
such
onlyby privileging
therefore,
blackmail,
galizing
againstthe expenditureofscarcepoliticalcapital on
presumption
inefficient"
an effortto change laws that are not demonstrably
intervention
againstgovernment
overa contrasting
"presumption
efficient."t0
in privateaffairsthatis notdemonstrably
candoris commendable,
his
AlthoughPosner'scharacteristic
argumentis doublyodd. First,it is tellingthat Posner'sanalysis
yieldsambivalentconclusionswithregardto thesetwocategories
of blackmail.Most people, I venture,would findcriminalizing
But it is even morepeculiarthat Posbothentirelyappropriate.4"
ner is so willingto see bothformsofblackmailcriminalizednotwithstandingthe ambivalence of his conclusions especially
ofthe distinction"betweenan anagivenhis explicitrecognition
I suspectthat
lyticalevaluationand a policyrecommendation."42
mostreaderswouldread his articleto supportthe verydifferent
conclusionthat the economiccase against blackmailcannotsurvive withoutmorerigorousempiricalworkand predictivemodel3 Id at 1818.
3
Id at 1827,1835.Posnerhad visitedsuchissuesbefore.See WilliamM. Landes and
ofLaw, 4 J Legal Stud 1, 42-43(1975) (conRichardA. Posner,ThePrivateEnforcement
a crime
sideringwhethera blackmailthreatto revealthattheblackmailvictimcommitted
mightincrease social utility-and thereforewarrantlegalization-byreducingother
crimes).
40 Posner,141 U Pa L Rev at 1827 (citedin note2). See also id at 1835 ("[O]nceagain,
the argumentforallowingblackmailis too speculativeto make a strongcase fordecriminalizingthisparticularformofextortion.").
41 As further
considerhis
evidenceofPosner'sdeparturefromcommonmoralintuition,
it shouldbe legalforB to threatentobeat himup
thatwhereA is an adulterer,
suggestion
unlesspaid ifthedata revealed"thatallowingsuchthreatswouldreducebreachesofthe
Id at 1835.
withthisbenefit."
at a costcommensurate
maritalobligation
42 Id at 1827.
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ling.Unlessand untilthelaw and economicsscholarscan demonstratemorepersuasivelythatblackmailreducessocial wealth,it
will remain diffilcult
to reconciletheir defenseof blackmail's
criminalization
withtheirmethodology's
scientific
and positivist
aspirations.
d) The unbridgedgap: whycriminalize?Even if nonadventitious blackmailwereshownto reducesocial wealth,and even if
the theory'sapparentfailureto cover adventitiousblackmail
could be rectifiedor excused,relianceon considerations
of economicefficiency
cannotexplainwhyblackmailis notmerelydisbutcriminalized.
couragedorevenprohibited,
Froma retributivist
perspective,
the premiseunderlying
the
economicargument-thateconomicinefficiency
is a sufficient
condition
forimposingcriminalpunishment-isanathema.Hence
ScottAltman'sobservation
thatthe economicjustification
forthe
criminalization
ofblackmailmustproveunsatisfactory
to "all but
the most committedconsequentialist."43
More significantly,
though,the premiseis falseevenforcommitted
consequentialists.
Because any utilitariancalculusmusttake intoaccountthe pain
sufferedby the individualwhose libertyand happinessis curtailed forthe greatergood of others,44utilitarianism
commands
that societyadopt the least restrictive
means of social control.
criminalizaSimilarly,underprinciplesofwealthmaximization,45
tioncan be justifiedonlyif its incremental
deterrent
effect
comparedwithothermeansofdeterrence
exceedsthe greatercostof
the criminallaw.46So on bothutilitarianand wealth
employing
ofblackmailcannotbe justimaximizing
grounds,criminalization
fiedunless the marginalbenefitof criminalsanction-relative,
as a matter
say, to makingblackmailagreementsunenforceable
law
is
the
ofcontract (as presently case) or makingblackmaila
tort-outweighthemarginalsocialcost.47
A Patchwork
ScottAltman,
ofBlackmail,141U Pa L Rev 1639,1656(1993).
Theory
" See generally
AnIntroduction
tothePrinciplesofMoralsand LegJeremy
Bentham,
islation165-74(Methuen1970)(originally
publishedin 1789).
4 Fora briefexplanation
ofthedifference
betweenutilitarianism
and wealthmaximization,see RichardA. Posner,Economic
AnalysisofLaw 12-17(Aspen5thed 1998).Very
roughly,
utilitariansseek to maximizehappiness,definedas the aggregation
ofprivate
seekto maximizeefficiency,
subjectivedesires;wealthmaximizers
definedas theassigningofproperty
rights(broadlyunderstood)
to thosewhovalue themmosthighlyas measuredbytheirwillingness
and abilityto payforthem,takingintoaccountthecostofany
particular
assignment.
" See, forexample,id at 242-50.
4 Whiletakingforgranted
thatblackmailis properly
criminalized,
Posnerhas exploredtherelatedquestionofwhyit is "punishedseverelyin comparison
withothernonviolentthefts."
Posner,141U Pa L Rev at 1836(citedin note2). Criminalizing
blackmail,
43
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The one proponentof the law and economicsthesis to have
Profesdemonstration,
even attemptedthe necessarycost-benefit
sor Joseph Isenbergh,has concludedthat the marginal social
benefitdoes notoutweighthe marginalsocial cost. Isenberghbegins by observingthat "A gains no real controlover disclosure
froman unenforceable
bargainwithB. And ifB cannotassure A
of any increasedcontrolover disclosure,B cannotextractmuch
has littlereason to investmuch effortin
fromA, and therefore
bargaining."48
Therefore,thereis likelyto be little(nonadventiIt
Posnertheorizes,
reducesitsoccurrence
bythreemechanisms.
(1) givestheblackmaileran incentivenotto revealthevictim'ssecretafterthevictim
tothepolice,whichmakessuchcomplaints
has complained
morelikelyand therefore
blackmailless likely;(2) makes it impossibleto conductblackmailin the open; (3)
preventstheblackmailerfromoffering
his victima legallyenforceable
promiseofsecrecy.
workindependently
Id at 1840.Posnerrecognizes
thatthelattertwoeffects
oftheseverity
ofthe penalty.He even notesthatincreasingpenaltiesmayactuallydecreasethe deterrentvalue ofthe secondeffect
becausewhenblackmailcannotbe conductedopenly,it is
mostlikelytobe conducted
byan intimateofthevictim;whenthevictimand blackmailer
and whenproofis less convincing,
are intimates,
proofoftheblackmailis moredifficult;
the likelihoodthatjuries will convictstandsin inverseproportion
to the severityofthe
Id.
punishment.
Thus,in Posner'sargument,
attachingseverepenaltiesto blackmailcan be justified
onlyto the extentthatthe firstallegedeffect-which
dependson Posner'sassertionthat
the'blackmailer,
oncecaught,usuallywillkeepmumin an effort
toobtainleniency,"
id at
1838-39-outweighsthe second.But whywouldthisbe? Even puttingaside skepticism
that"keepingmum"willbe a majorelementin a plea bargain,the dispositiveissue concernstheextentto whichthe attraction
ofleniencydependsuponthe severityofthe prescribedpenalty.AlthoughPosnerdoes notelaborateon his contention
that"[tihefirstefid at 1840,I supposeit is based on his assumpfectis enhancedby severepunishment,"
tionthatthedefendant's
is to purchasethe largestpossible
objectivein plea negotiations
reductionin sentence.If so, the likelihoodof reachinga successfulplea bargainis enhancedbylongerpotentialsentences:thelargerthepossiblepenalty,the greaterthe deal
in thelengthoftheactual
But ifthedefendant
is moreinterested
theprosecutor
can offer.
sentenceimposedthanin the magnitudeofthe difference
betweenthe actual and potential sentences,large penaltieson the bookscan reducethe prospectsforreachinga plea
and/orpsychological
constraints
on the amountof
insofaras thereexistanyinstitutional
can onlybe inducedto silence
timea prosecutor
can bargainaway.Andifthe defendant
ofsentence,the severity
oftheprescribed
bylargerelativereductions
penaltyis mostlyirrelevant.These are, ofcourse,highlysimplified
assumptions.Theynonethelesssuggest
concernsjustifycriminalizing
blackmailat all, the economicconsiderathat,ifefficiency
are as likelytoweighin favoroflenientpunishment
tionsPosneridentifies
as strict.
4 Isenbergh,141 U Pa L Rev at 1928 (citedin note13). See also Posner,141 U Pa L
Rev at 1841 (citedin note2) (notingthatthe thirdofhis proposedmechanismsbywhich
criminalization
detersblackmail"couldbe achievedwithoutcriminallaw simplyby makas a matterofcontractlaw"). This proposition
is
ing blackmailcontractsunenforceable
than Isenberghacknowledges.
slightlymoreproblematic
Makingblackmailagreements
deterpaymentwhenthe blackmaileris not a repeat
unenforceable
mightsubstantially
becausethevictimcouldnotbe surethattheblackmailerwouldremainsilent.
performer
case. Regardlessofwhetherthe contractis leBut repeatperformers
presenta different
the hypothetical
blackmailfirmthat mightarise were blackmaildegallyenforceable,
wouldfinda reputationfortrustworthiness
critical(the apparentironynotcriminalized
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tious)blackmailin a regimethatseeks to deterblackmailsimply
by makingblackmailagreementsunenforceable
as a matterof
contractlaw.49
Of course,it is possiblethattherewouldbe even less blackmail in a regimethatmade blackmailagreementsunenforceable
and barredblackmailthrough
thecriminallaw. Notingtherarity
ofblackmailin the case law, Posnerhas speculatedthatthe few
reportedcases accuratelyreflecta lowincidenceofthecrime.Anticipatingthat potentialvictimswouldrefuseto pay blackmail,
he surmises,a vast numberofwould-beblackmailerschoosenot
to risk the criminalpenalty.50
This is unpersuasive.It is more
likelythat blackmailis farmorefrequentthan the incidenceof
reportedcases suggests,and thatthe low rate ofprosecution
reofvictimsto pay. One wouldexflectsthesubstantialwillingness
rationalblackmailerto conceiveand propose
pectan economically
a blackmailpricelow enoughto reducesubstantiallythe probabilitythat his victimwill reportthe blackmailerto the police
ratherthanacceptthe deal. Thus,althoughthe socialcostofthe
blackmailprohibition
is apparentlylow (commensurate
withthe
ofprosecution
and conviction),
the deterrent
value of
infrequency
the criminalban is likelyto be as small or smaller.Because the
is to achievenotmaximumdegoal froman economicstandpoint
terrencebut optimal deterrence,it is hard to concludethat
blackmail'scriminalization
is a goodbuy.
Moreover,the economiccase againstcriminalization
maybe
fortheblackmailban mightbe positively
countereven stronger,
As Isenberghhas explained,
productive.
if blackmailis made a crime,A gains considerablecontrol
overdisclosurefromenteringintoa bargainwithB, because
the criminalexposureofa blackmailer,can
B, by incurring
now sell A a much higherlikelihoodof silence. . . . The
criminal prohibitionof blackmail, therefore,makes the

withstanding).
Such an entitywouldfindwaysto makeits guaranteeofsilencecredible.
stilldoesnotwarrantcriminalization,
Butthisobservation
forthereare otherwaysto discourageEpstein's"Blackmail,
Inc.' (discussedin SectionI.A.2below).Forinstance,in additionto makingblackmailcontractsvoid,the state could ban blackmailadvertising
withhold
thebenefits
and/or
ofincorporation
fromfirmsengagedin blackmailing.
4 This conclusion
is further
reinforced
whenwe re-examine
Posner'sthreeproposed
mechanisms
by whichcriminalization
detersblackmail.As notedabove,Posnerhimself
can be achievedwithout
recognizes
thatthethirdmechanism
criminalization.
See Posner,
141 U Pa L Rev at 1840-41(citedin note2). Dependinguponthedegreeofmoralcensure
couldas well.
toblackmail,
thesecondmechanism
attaching
50Id at 1841.
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blackmailbargainsenteredintoacross the thresholdofprohibitionhighlyenforceable.5'
And ifthe would-beblackmaileranticipatesthat a consummated
bargain will be meaningfully
enforceable,he is more likelyto
committheresourcesnecessaryto undertakethe activity.
In short,makingblackmaila criminaloffensemightdeter
some blackmail that would not be deterredin a regime that
merelymade theblackmailcontractsunenforceable.
But,ifso, its
deterrenteffectis likelyto be small. The ban mightbe moderately efficientor moderatelyinefficient.On the other hand,
blackmailmighteven increaseits incidence.In that
criminalizing
event,resortto the criminallaw is inefficient-maybe
substanthe proposition
tiallyso. Givensuch indeterminacy,
(necessaryto
the economicjustificationforcriminalization)that the expected
value ofcriminalizing
blackmailis positiveseemshighlydubious.
*

*

*

The foregoing
analysis supportsthreeconclusionsabout the
law and economicsargumenton blackmail.First,the economic
approachfails to justifyprohibitions
against adventitiousblackmail. Second,whetherothermajor formsof blackmailare truly
disadvantageouson law and economicsprinciplesis farfromcertain once one takes externalitiesintoproperaccount.Third,it is
unlikelythat the economicargumentwarrants resort to the
criminallaw. Acceptingthe firstand thirdofthese conclusions,
Isenberghhas arguedthatthe law can adequatelydeterany inefficiencyblackmailcauses simplyby makingcontractsof silence
enteredintobetweena blackmailerand his victimvoidand unenforceable,exceptforcontractsinvolvingadventitiousblackmail.52
But if the economicapproachto the blackmailpuzzle leads
ultimatelyto Isenbergh,thenwe should look elsewhereto solve
it. For althoughhe concludesconfidently
that"[t]hereis no other
way to explain the law of blackmail,"53
Isenbergh'sradical proposals to decriminalizecertaintypesofblackmailrevealthat the
economists'purportedexplanationis no justification.Beforewe
agree that commercialresearch, and even entrepreneurial,
blackmail should be freed fromthe criminallaw's grasp, we

5' Isenbergh,
141 U Pa L Rev at 1928(citedin note13).

in lightofthe difficulty
in ascertaining
whethergiveninformation
52 More precisely,
was costlesslyobtained,Isenberghwould,as a proxy,makeall contractsto remainsilent
if the partieskneweach otherbeforethe blackmailbargain.He wouldalso
enforceable
make an exceptionto that exceptionin cases wherethe blackmailcontractconcernssilenceaboutthecommission
oftortsorcrimes.Id at 1925-32.
53 Id at 1921.
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woulddo wellto searchforan accountmorein tunewithcurrent
law and commonintuition.
2. RichardEpstein:blackmailas the"hand-maiden
to
corruption
and deceit."
ProfessorRichardEpstein has proposeda different
consequentalistsolutionto the blackmailpuzzle. Althoughhimselfa
prominent
law and economicsscholar,Epstein'sspecificconcern
is notthe deadweighteconomiclosses thattroublePosner,Ginsburg,and Coase. Instead,Epsteinarguesthatblackmailis criminal because it has a necessarytendencyto induceotheracts of
theftand deception,
thecriminalization
ofwhichis whollyunpuzzling.5This difference
notwithstanding,
Epstein'stheorysuffers
fromsomeofthesame flawsas does theargumentfromeconomic
efficiency.
Epstein"begin[s]witha briefaccountofthe moraltheoryof
criminalresponsibility"55-to
wit,thatthereis no criminalliabilwithout
mens
rea
actus
reus. Blackmail,he concludes,
and
ity
for"[t]heelementofineasilysatisfiesthemensrea requirement,
But the actus reus retent is always presentin vivid form."56
quirementpresentsa problem.Onlythe threator use offorceor
and blackmail(ordinarily)
fraudcan satisfyit, Epsteinargues,57
One could"arguethatthe threatto discloseis
involvesneither.58
illegalpreciselybecause thedisclosureitself,ifmade,oughtto be
But this argumentfails,Epsteinconcludes,because it
illegal."59
"jettisonsthe basic theoryof criminalresponsibility
by holding
thatdeliberateacts,notinvolvingthe use offorceor fraud,may
themselvesbe regardedas criminal.'0
Epsteinmaintainsthatthe solutionto the blackmailpuzzle
appears whenone imaginesa worldin whichblackmailwerelegalized:
un5 Epstein,50 U Chi L Rev at 553 (citedin note2). Preciselywhythetraditional,
problematic,
crimesshouldbe criminalis notclearfromEpstein'sessay.As we will see,
withany plausiblejustification
however,Epstein'saccountofblackmailis incompatible
oftheactusreusand mensrea requirements)
interpretation
(beyondhisownidiosyncratic
ofcommon
law larcenyoffenses.
forthecriminalization
5 Id at 555.
56Id.
Id at 555-57.

Epsteinnotesthatblackmailcan containforceor fraud,as, forexample,whenthe
Id at 558.
threatensto discloseinformation
gleanedfromstolendocuments.
blackmailer
But in sucha case, makingblackmailcriminalpresentsno puzzle,for[i]t is easy to rewhenever
thedisclosureis itselfregardedas wronggardblackmailas a criminaloffense
ful."Id.
59Id at 560.
60Id.
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[T]herewouldthenbe an open and publicmarketfora new
set of social institutionsto exploitthe gains fromthis new
formof legal activity.Blackmail,Inc. could with impunity
place advertisements
in the newspaperoffering
to acquirefor
withthe capacityto degrade or
top dollar any information
humiliatepersonsin the eyes of theirfamiliesor business
associates.6"
The existenceofBlackmail,Inc. wouldproduceat least twoundesirable consequences,Epstein claims. First, the greaterprevalenceofblackmailwouldlead to moreblackmailvictimsand, consequently,greaterincidencesof theftand fraudby victimsdesperate to obtain the fundsnecessaryto pay the blackmailer.62
] that its abilSecond,because Blackmail,Inc. would"recognizeE
ity to extractfuturepaymentsfrom[the victim]depends upon
[the thirdpartyto whomthe disclosurewould be made] being
kept in the dark,"it would "instruct[the victim]in the proper
way to arrangehis affairsin orderto keep the disclosuresfrom
In short,Epsteinconcludes,"[b]lackmailis made a
beingmade."63
crimenotonlybecause ofwhatit is, but because ofwhatit necesand desarilyleads to.... [I]t is the handmaidento corruption
ceit."'
Epstein's conclusion,however,does not follow from his
analysis. The real thrustofBlackmail,Inc. is that blackmailis
properlymade a crimenot because of "what it is," but onlybecause ofits consequences.Epstein'sassertionthatforceand fraud
exhaustthe concernsofthe criminallaw necessarilyentails that
criminalization
of blackmailwould be impermissible
(giventhat
blackmail does not itselfconstitutefraud or force)but for the
fraudulentconductit engenders.In otherwords,Epstein'stheory
providesnotonlythatthe systemicconsequenceshe identifiesare
sufficient
forimpositionofcriminalliabilityas a generalmatter,
but also that thoseconsequencesconstitutea necessarycondition
forimpositionofcriminalliabilityin the particularcase ofblackmail. Were this true,the properscope ofthe crimeofblackmail
wouldbe substantiallynarrowerthan it is at present.Consider,
forexample,a blackmailproposalin whichthe blackmailerdemands sexual favorsforthe nondisclosureof embarrassinginformation
thatthevictimhas no moralobligationto divulge(such
as her own illegitimatebirth).This formofblackmailwouldnei6
62
63
64

Id at 562.

Id at 564.
Id.
Id at 566.
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therinducethe victimto engagein theftor fraudnorencourage
that societyhas a legitimateinterestin deterany "deception"
ring.UnderEpstein'sreasoning,it shouldnotbe criminalized.65
A secondproblemwith Epstein's theoryis that the claim
uponwhichit rests-thatforceand frauddemarcatethecriminal
law's properreach-is extremelydubious.Even aside from'vicand drug use,
timless"offensessuch as gambling,prostitution,
ofwhichis notoriously
criminalization
suspecton liberalprinciples, the state makes numerousactivitiescriminalthat appear
notto involveeitherforceor fraud.These offensescovera wide
rangeofconductfromstatutory
rape to indecentexposureto larcenyby stealth.Conceivably,
Epsteincouldrespondeitherby arofforceand fraudsufficiently
ticulatingconceptions
expansiveto
activitiesorbyexplainingwhyit is
encompassall oftheforegoing
morallyunjustifiable
forthe stateto makesuchconductcriminal.
But he has notdoneso.
Finally,the internallogic of Epstein'stheoryis fundamentallyflawed.Epsteinmaintains(1) thatthe "basic,""moral"theoryof criminallaw holds that acts not involvingforceor fraud
maynotthemselvesbe criminalized,
and (2) thatactionsthatinduceforceand fraudmayalso be criminalized.66
This secondprinis
More profoundly,
these
ciple frustratingly
underdeveloped.67
twoprinciplesare not compatible:claim(2) emptiesclaim (1) of
moralcontent.
anymeaningful
forthe state to
Epstein claims that it is morallywrongful
nonfraudulent
actions.
punishpeopleforengagingin nonforceful,
This assertionmustrest on reasons,even thoughEpstein does
notstatewhattheyare. Those reasonswillbe eitherdeontological or consequentialist
in nature.A deontologic
reasonwouldbe
thatpeoplehave a moralrightto be freefrompunishment
bythe
stateforactionsnotinvolvingforceor fraud,no matterwhatthe
consequences.But Epstein'ssecondprincipleis inconsistent
with
thisjustification-itallowsthe stateto punishacts outsidethese
areas, iftheylead to forceor fraud.So claim(1) mustreston consequentialistreasons.But ifEpsteinallowssuch reasons,his ar5 Unless,that is, the practicaldifficulties
in exceptingsuch cases froma general
blackmailban wouldbe insurmountable
or too costly-a contention
Epsteindoes not
make.
Epstein,50 U Chi L Revat 555,565-66(citedin note2).
67 Consider,
forinstance,thepricingand marketing
strategies
ofmajorsneakermanufacturers.
Thoughwe mightnothavepredicted
it ex ante,we nowknowthatkidsroband
kill forotherkids'sneakersand forthe moneywithwhichto buysneakers.UnderEpstein'sprinciple,
we couldmakeit a criminaloffense
forNiketo advertisein innercitiesor
to priceAirJordansfaroutofthecomfortable
reachoftheaveragelow-income
adolescent
male.Andthestandardsbywhichtomeasurewhether
weshouldare notat all apparent.
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ticulationof "the moraltheoryof crminal responsibility"
seems
too narrow:in principle,anythingthat leads to the same typesof
consequencesas acts offorceand fraudcould be made crminal.
This conclusioncouldbe avoided,I think,onlyby adoptinga consequentialistmoraltheoryin whichacts offorceand fraudconstitute the essential,irreducibleunits of measurement.Why this
shouldbe, though,is a mystery.
Unfortunately,
Epsteinprovides
no explanationhimself.It follows,then,that Epstein's assertion
that "deliberateacts, notinvolvingthe use offorceor fraudmay
[not]themselvesbe regardedas criminal"'8must be understood
eitheras a descriptiveclaim (in whichcase, as we have seen, it
wouldbe false) or as a rule ofprudence;it is not a statementof
politicomoralobligation.
In sum, Epstein's theoryfails for three reasons. First, it
wouldleave a significant
subsetofblackmail-that whichneither
inducesthevictimto engagein theftor fraudnorencouragesany
deception-uncriminalizable.
Second,it restson the questionable
moralprinciplethatforceor fraudshouldbe necessaryconditions
forcriminalization.
Third,and fatally,were Epstein nonetheless
correctthatforceor fraudshouldbe necessaryconditionsforimposingcriminalpunishment,
his furtherclaim that it is morally
justifiableto criminalizeconductthat is not itselfforcefulor
ifthatconductencouragesotheracts offorceor fraud,
fraudulent,
cannotbe sustained.
3. Jeffrie
Murphy:blackmailencouragesinvasions
ofprivacy.
A thirdtheory,proposedby ProfessorJeifrieMurphy,69
exhibits similaritiesto both of the approaches already discussed.
Like Epstein,Murphyfocuseson the antisocialconductthat legalizing blackmail might encourage. Like proponentsof the
deadweightloss hypothesis,
Murphyseems principallydrivento
explain and justifythe distinction
betweenblackmailand "other
hardeconomictransactions."70
Like bothearlierapproaches,however,Murphy'stheoryis substantiallyunderinclusiveand rests
on contestablepremises.
Murphyproceedsin three steps. He begins with twin assumptionsaboutthemoralunderpinnings
ofthe criminallaw:
The firstis that immorality
shouldbe a necessarycondition
forcriminalization
but not a sufficient
condition.The second
6
69
70

Epstein,50 U Chi L Rev at 560 (citedin note2).
See Murphy,
63 Monist156(citedin note2).
Id at 156.
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in
is that utilitarianconsiderations,
thoughunsatisfactory
are a reasonablebasis
theconceptofimmorality,
explicating
on whichto answerthe question"Whichof all immoralactionsshouldbe criminalized?"71
He thenassertsthat blackmailand hard economictransactions
immoral(and immoralforthe same rea"are bothintrinsically
son-e.g., takingan unfairadvantageof the victim'svulnerabilsupport
ity)."'2Third,he explainsthat utilitarianconsiderations
the blackmailofpersonswhoare notpublicfig(1) criminalizing
ures,becauselegalizedblackmailwouldcreatea newincentiveto
and (2) notcriminalizing
invadetheprivacyofaveragepersons,73
is no apparentway to
there
because
hard economictransactions,
linesbetweenimmoral
sensibleand enforceable
drawobjectively
and moraltransactions.74
One problemwithMurphy'stheoryshouldbe apparent.As
Lindgrenhas pointedout,Murphy'stheorycannotjustifycrimiblackmail,because anyinand opportunistic
nalizingparticipant
vasionsofprivacysuch formsofblackmailoccasionwouldbe unaffected
byblackmaillaws.75Thereis, however,a fargreaterdifficulty:
Murphy'stheorycannotsurviveon a bare assertionthat
blackmailis immoralbecause it takes unfairadvantageofa vic-

71
72

Id at 163.

Id.

Notingthatsubstantialeconomic
incentives
to invadetheprivacyof"publicfigures"
alreadyexist,Murphywouldgenerallypermitblackmailofsuchfiguresat ratesthatdo
notexceedthemarketpricefortheinformation
in question.However,
becauseconcealing
embarrassing
information
aboutsomepublicfigurescan be harmful
into thelegitimate
terestsofa democratic
citizenry,
Murphywouldbar eventhe"marketprice"blackmailof
"publicofficials."
Id at 164-65.
74 Id at 163-66.
75 Lindgren,
84 ColumL Revat 690 (citedin note2). Lindgren
levelsthreeothercriticismsat Murphy's
to Lindgren:(1) Murphy
theory.
According
errsbyassumingthereis no
marketforembarrassing
information
aboutprivateindividuals:
credit
spouses,employers,
agencies,and potentialbusinessassociatesare all interested
in detailsaboutnonpublic
figures;(2) Murphy's
proposedexceptionformarketpriceblackmailis unconvincing
and
morallyunacceptable;
and (3) thereis muchembarrassing
information
aboutpublicofficialstheconcealment
ofwhichappearsmorallyunproblematic.
Id at 692-94.
These latterthreeobjectionsdo notcut as sharplyas Lindgrenbelieves.First,that
thereis somemarketforembarrassing
information
aboutprivateindividualsseemsirrelevant.Murphycouldrespondthatblackmailshouldbe criminalso as notto increase
theexistingincentives
substantially
forprivacyinvasion.Second,intuitions
aboutmarket
priceblackmailare morediversethanLindgrenassumes.See SectionIII.B.2. Third,Murphyconcedesthatsomeembarrassing
information
is notrelevantto
aboutpublicofficials
the public,but suggeststhathereline-drawing
difficulties
weighin favorofthe rulehe
crafts.Murphy,
63 Monistat 164 (citedin note2). Lindgrenprovides
nocompelling
reason
to disagreewithMurphy's
judgmenton thispoint.
73
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Considerthe example Murphyoffersof a
tim's vulnerability.76
paradigmatic"hardeconomictransaction":
I knowthat your son, whomyou love more than anything
else in the world,is dyingofleukemia.I also knowtwoother
things:(1) that he is a greatbaseball fan who would love to
have a baseball autographedby Babe Ruth to cheer him
duringhis finaldays and (2) that$6,000is all the moneyyou
have in the world.Now I happen to own the last such baseball available in the world,and I will make you a proposition-namely,to sell youthisbaseball for$6,000.77
That does soundhard.And let us agree thatit is immoralas
well. But Murphydoes not claim that the baseball ownerhas a
moralobligationto give the baseball to the dyingboy.Presumably the owneris morallyfreeto sell it to the boy'sparentsfora
in
therewouldseemto be circumstances
"fair"price.Additionally,
whichotherdispositionsof the baseball would also be immoral
such as droppingit in thePacificOcean.
because "unfair,"
This has several consequencesforMurphy'stheoryofblackmail. First,ifthe baseball owneris morallyfreeto sell his propertyfora fairprice,the blackmailershouldbe too,whetherthat
price is set by the "market"or by anothermeans. That is, "the
moralityofthe criminallaw'78 would seem to forbidcriminalizablackmail."Second,ifit
tionofwhat mightbe termed"fair-price
mightbe immoralforthe baseball ownerto refuseto deal with
the boy'sparents,it mightbe immoralforsomeonein possession
of embarrassinginformation
to reveal it instead of becominga
blackmailer.
These last objectionsare telling.Murphyis most readily
groupedamongthose who wouldjustifycriminalizingblackmail
on consequentialgrounds,for he emphasizes the ways that
blackmaillaws can encourageor discourageinvasionsofprivacy.
And yet he explicitlypremiseshis theoryon bothdeontological
the mostrevealingaspect of
and utilitarianconcerns.Ultimately,
his theorylies in its unexamineddeontologicalbasis. That the
blackmailproposalis "unfair"-letalone whyit is unfair-is far
inquiry"reinobvious.Murphy's"preliminary
fromtransparently
76 In fairness,
Murphydoes not say that"takingan unfairadvantageofthe victim's
vulnerability"
constitutes
the whole of the immorality
of blackmailand hard economic
he saysonlythatit is an exampleoftheirimmorality.
transactions;
Murphy,63 Monistat
im163 (citedin note2). But ifthereare otherwaysin whichblackmailis "intrinsically
moral,"id,Murphydoesnothintat whattheymaybe.
77 Id at 156-57.
78 Id at 163.
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forcesthe need to studycarefullythe argumentsforblackmail's
intrinsicimmorality;
blackmail'swrongfulness
cannotbe blithely
assumed.
B. Blackmailas an InherentWrong:OfUnconditional
Actsand
Conditional
Threats
As demonstrated,
the consequentialisttheoriessufferfrom
variousanalyticalfaults.Beyondthat,theyfaileven to approximate commonintuitionsregardingwhat'swrongwithblackmail.
It should be no surprise,therefore,
that many othertheorists
criminalbestartfromtheassumptionthatblackmailis properly
moralwrong.Theirchallengeis to
cause it is a nonconsequential
explain why the threatis wrongin a way that eitherdistinofthe act
guishesthethreatfromthe unconditional
performance
ofthe act
threatenedor explainswhyunconditional
performance
threatenedshouldalso be criminal.This Sectionconsidersfour
efforts
to answerthischallenge.
verydifferent
1. Feinbergand Gorr:thewrongful
act.
In Harmless Wrongdoing,Professor
JoelFeinbergadvancesa
complexand nuancedargumentthat,at its core,arguesthatthe
ofthe moralityofthe act that
moralityofblackmailis a function
the blackmailerthreatensor offers.79
Underthisview,the keyis
to determinewhetherunconditionalperformanceof the act
threatenedor offered
Ifso,
bytheblackmailerwouldbe wrongful.
blackmailis likewisewrongful,80
and wrongful
to that same degree. Because blackmail,as a species of theft,is also harmcausing,it is consistentwithliberalprinciplesto make it crimiifneitherthe act threatenednortheact ofnal. Correspondingly,
feredis wrongful,
then the conditionalblackmailproposition
is
also notwrongful
and maynotbe madecriminal.
Two illustrations
are helpful.Because it is clearlywrongful
notto reporttheidentity
ofsomeonewhohas committed
a felony,
therewouldbe nothingpuzzlingor problematic
about criminalizing the conditionaloffernot to reporta crime.(That society
mightopt not to criminalizeunconditionalperformance
of the
7 Feinberg,
HarmlessWrongdoing
at 240-58(citedin note2). Feinbergspeaksofacts
"threatened"
and"offered"
in recognition
ofthefactthatblackmailis alwaysa doubleconditionalproposition
oftheform:
if-xtheny; and ifx then-y,wherethefirststatement
is a
'threat"and thesecondis an "offer."
' Although
he recognizes
numerouscases of"justified
blackmail,"
id at 258-74,Feinbergpresentsthemas piecemealexceptions,
not as examplessheddingany lighton the
natureofthepuzzle.
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act is irrelevant,accordingto Feinberg;it is
underlying
wrongful
enough that societycould reasonablydecide to impose either
In contrast,Feinbergargues,a percriminalor civilsanctions.8")
son who comesto learn ofanother'sadulterywill oftenhave neithera moraldutyto reveal that factnor a moraldutyto remain
silent.Consequently,societycould notjustifiablyimpose a legal
obligation,criminalor civil,uponpersonseitherto discloseor not
to disclosethe commissionof adultery.It follows,Feinbergconblackmailproposal-call it "adulcludes,that the corresponding
teryblackmail"-shouldbe decriminalized.82
Giventhat adulteryblackmailmightwell be a modal case of
the crime,Feinberg'sconclusionis startling.Michael Gorr has
triedto salvage Feinberg'sbasic approachby showingwhyit actually supportsthe morallyintuitiveconclusionthat adultery
blackmail is properlycriminalized.83
Gorr begins by asserting,
contraryto Feinberg,that everyact likelyto arise in situations
involvingblackmailis eithermorallyobligatoryor morallyprohibited.He agrees that societyshouldnotimposea legal dutyeitherto discloseor not to discloseadultery,but bases his conclusionon epistemicuncertainty:
we maynotknowwhetherthe consequences of such a disclosurewould be morallybeneficialor
wouldcause unnecessarymisery,84
and we maylack necessaryinformation
"aboutthe priordistribution
ofmoralrightsand duties
amongthe related parties."5But forthese considerations,
Gorr
argues,
therewouldbe a morallyconclusivereason forimposingon
third-party
observersa legal requirement
eitherto reportthe
occurrenceof adultery or (depending upon the circumstances) to refrainfromreportingits occurrence.It follows
that,in the absence of such concerns,therewould also be a
morallyconclusivereason forprohibiting
the corresponding
blackmailproposalssincethesewouldconstituteattemptsto
81 In a similarvein,Professor
ArthurGoodhartyearsearliersought,bydistinguishing
betweenmoraland immoralliberties,
to downplaythelawfulnessofthe act a blackmailer
threatensto perform.
See ArthurL. Goodhart,
Essays in Jurisprudence
and theCommon
Law 175-89(Cambridge1931).He concludedthatit is blackmailwhentheact threatened,
thoughlawful,is immoral.Unfortunately,
Goodhart'sconception
ofimmorallibertiesappearsmuchlikeJusticeStewart'sconception
ofobscenity-although
he mayhave known
it whenhe saw it,he did notprovidethe toolsnecessaryforothersto drawthe difficult
lines.See Jacobellisv Ohio,378 US 184,197(1964) (Stewartconcurring).
82 Feinberg,
HarmlessWrongdoing
at 246-49(citedin note2).
8' See MichaelGorr,Liberalismand theParadoxofBlackmail,21 Phil & Pub Aff43
(1992).
Id at 55.
Id at 56, quotingFeinberg,
HarmlessWrongdoing
at 248 (citedin note2).
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to
acquire some of the adulterer'sassets eitherby offering
concealwhatoughtmorallyto be disclosedor bythreatening
to disclosewhat oughtmorallyto be concealed.But, ex hydo serveto inhibitus from
pothesi,althoughsuchdifficulties
imposingdutieswithrespectto the meredisclosureor nondisclosureoftheadulterer'sactivities,theydo notpreventus
fromimposingdutiesnot to engage in the blackmailingof
suchpersons.86
The cruxofGorr'sclaimappearsto be thatFeinbergerrsby
focusingseriatimon each leg ofthe doubleconditionalthatconstitutesa blackmailproposal.We mightnot knowwhichofthe
two acts-the one threatenedor the one offered-wouldbe immoral,but we do knowthatone ofthemmustbe. Consequently,
derivesneitherfromthe act
adulteryblackmail'swrongfulness
threatenednor fromthe act offered(because eithermightbe
a
butfromtheblackmailer'scommunicating
morallypermissible),
threatthatwill commithim to eitherdivulgingor remainingsilent,dependingon his victim'sresponse.Adulteryblackmailis
takes an unthen,because the blackmailerknowingly
wrongful,
an immoralact.
justifiableriskofcommitting
But thisis surelywrong.Even acceptingforthe sake ofargumentGorr'sdubiousassumptionthat one ofthe optionsmust
course
be-from a God's eye perspective-themorallyobligatory
ofaction,thefactthatthe adulteryblackmailercommitsherself,
at the momentofherthreat,to riskingan immoralact does not
entailthattakingthatriskis itselfan immoralact. RecallGorr's
claim that the effectsof disclosureare
moral-consequentialist
or imposmaybe difficult
morallyrelevantand thatthoseeffects
discloserhersibleto predict.It followsthateventhe prospective
selfmightnotknowwhetherhermoraldutyis to discloseor not
to disclose.And if we do notbelievethat an actorknowswhere
hermoraldutylies,it makesno sense to holdher morallyculpable forriskingviolationof that duty.Otherwise,any decisiononemightuse in a morallyuncertainsituationmakingstrategy
fromflippinga coin to delegatingthe choiceto a thirdpartywouldbe morallyequivalentto blackmail.Because Gorrprovides
to salvage Feinberg's
no reasonforbelievingthisis so," his effort
thesisfails.88
' Gorr,21 Phil& PubAffat 56-57(citedin note83).
decithata cointoss is the morallypreferable
At least one theoristhas intimated
forthoseforcedto choosebetweenharmsin cases of moraluncersionmaking
strategy
tainty.See JohnM. Taurek,Should theNumbersCount?,6 Phil & Pub Aff293, 303
(1977).
' SomethreadsofGorr'sanalysisdo hinttowarda departurefromFeinberg'sbelief
87
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2. Lindgrenand Fletcher:thewrongful
threat.
At theoppositepolefromFeinbergand GorrstandProfessors
James Lindgrenand GeorgeFletcher.Whereas the formerpair
contendthatthe blackmailproposalis morallyequivalentto the
the latter argue-for vastly different
act threatenedor offered,
reasons-that the keyto the blackmailpuzzle inheresentirelyin
ofthethreat.
the wrongfulness
In a highlyinfluential1984 article,Lindgrenclaimedto solve
the blackmailpuzzle by observingthat the blackmailthreatdiffersfromordinaryand legitimatethreats,suchas a threat"tosell
to someoneelse unless the buyer agrees to pay the price demanded,"in that onlythe formerinvolvesusing forone's gain
leveragethatproperlybelongsto another(forexample,the adulterer'sspouse).89What makes the blackmailer'sconductdistinct
fromlegitimatethreats,and therefore
wrongful,
Lindgrenargues,
"is thathe interposeshimselfparasiticallyin an actual or potendirectinterest.What
tial disputein whichhe lacks a sufficiently
righthas he to makemoneybysettlingotherpeople'sclaims?"'
At the heart ofblackmail,then,is the triangularnatureof
the transaction,and particularlythis disjunctionbetween
the blackmailer'spersonal benefitand the interestsof the
thirdparties whose leverage he uses. In effect,the blackmailer attemptsto gain an advantage in returnfor suppressing someone else's actual or potentialinterest.The
blackmaileris negotiatingforhis own gain with someone
else's leverageor bargainingchips.9"
Lindgren'sapproachhas been subjectedto extensivecriticism that need not be repeatedhere in full.92
While Lindgren's
theoryenjoysclaims to rough-thoughsurelynot perfect93-deact and the conditionalthreatare morallyequivalent.If Gorr
that the unconditional
means to claim that an "attemptto acquire some of the adulterer'sassets" is itselfa
wrongful
act thatmakesthe blackmailproposalmorallyworsethanthe acts threatened
hisargument
and offered,
Leo Katz's (discussedin SectionI.B.3) and suffers
approximates
fromthesamefailings.
89 Lindgren,
84 ColumL Revat 701 (citedin note2).
90Id at 702.
91Id.
Leo Katz,Blackmailand OtherFormsofArm-Twisting,
9 See, forexample,
141 U Pa
L Rev 1567,1580-81(1993);DeLong,141 U Pa L Rev at 1681-88(citedin note11); Walter
Blockand David Gordon,Blackmail,Extortionand Free Speech:A Replyto Posner,Epstein,Nozickand Lindgren,19 LoyolaLA L Rev 37, 51-54(1985).
forexample,a threatbyNazis to marchin Skokieunlessthe town'sresi9 Consider,
dentsbuythemoffwitha largecash payment.I assume thatthisis blackmail.If so, the
Nazis are merelyleveraging
theirownconstitutional
rights,whichtheyare threatening
to
exerciseas an instrument
of crueltytowardsthe town'smanyHolocaustsurvivors.(It
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scriptiveaccuracy,its normativeappeal is extremelyweak, as
Lindgrenhimselfhas conceded,'because he providesno reason
whyusingsomeoneelse's leverageforindividualgain shouldbe
unlawful,let alone criminal.Furthermore,
ifthe use ofsuch leverage or "chips"is wrongful,
it is not clear whysquanderinganother'schips-by neitherthreatening
normakinga givendisclosure-is notlikewisewrongful
and thusproperly
criminal.95
WhereasLindgren'stheoryamountsto an insightful
descriptionin futilesearchofa normative
rationale,Fletcherrelieson a
novel and explicittheoryof crimeand punishment.'The core
concernofthe criminallaw, he ventures,is to deterand negate
conditionsof dominanceand subordination.97
If so, thereis no
reasonto criminalizethe meredisclosureofembarrassinginformation.Once undertaken,the disclosureis overand done with.
The blackmailthreatto disclosethe same information
is another
story.Preciselybecause of"theprospectofrepeateddemands,"98
blackmailtendsto createa continuing
relationship
ofdominance
and submission.In consequence,blackmail"is notan anomalous
crimebut rathera paradigmforunderstanding
both criminal
and punishment."99
wrongdoing
Thoughprovocative,
Fletcher'stheoryrunsintoa hostofdifficulties.Maybethe least troublingdifficulty
concernsFletcher's
foundationaltheoryof crimeand punishment.As Fletcheracnotall crimes-homicideis an obviousexample apknowledges,
peartoimplicaterelationships
ofdominanceand subordination.'"
Second,even if negatingdominanceis offundamental,
perhaps defining,
importanceto the criminallaw, Fletcher'stheory
is underinclusive.
In responseto the objection"thatif the aftermath of the alleged blackmailis the determinative
factor,"the
crimeshouldbe defined"as thesecondact ofblackmail,"Fletcher
emphasizesthat "therelationshipof dominanceand subordinationcomesintobeingas a resultofthe victim'smakingthe first
paymentor engagingin the firstcoercedact ofsubmission.The
couldbe arguedthatthe Nazis are reallyleveragingthe informational
interestsof the
public-within
orwithoutSkokie-thatmightwishtoviewthemarch.But thisis a forced
and artificial
construction.
The publiccouldnotcompeltheNazis to marchiftheychose
notto,norcouldtheNazis be viewedas havingevena weakmoralobligation
to march.)
See Lindgren,
141U Pa L Revat 1988(citedin note3).
9 See Isenbergh,
141U Pa L Revat 1917n 35 (citedin note13).
GeorgeP. Fletcher,
Blackmail:TheParadigmaticCrime,141U Pa L Rev 1617,1618
(1993).
Id at 1629-35.
Id at 1626.
Id at 1617.
'??Idat 1635.

This content downloaded from 130.91.146.35 on Wed, 8 Oct 2014 19:25:29 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

1998]

TakingMotivesSeriously

825

dominanceconsistsin the knowledgethat the victimis now fair
game forrepeateddemands.Dominance and subordinationare
Whilethis may be so, Fletcher'stheory
states of anticipation."'01
insofaras it cannotjustifycriminalizing
remainsunderinclusive
blackmailproposalsthat do not reasonablycreate apprehension
ofrepeateddemands.Considera judicial nomineewho has committed some minor indiscretionin his past-say he smoked
marijuana, and inhaled-for whichhe is not ashamed but the
disclosureofwhichhe (rightly)fearsmightdoomhis nomination.
Assume that BlackmailerapproachesNomineeon the eve of the
voteand threatensto disclosehis priordruguse to
confirmation
the Senate unlessNomineepays $10,000. If he does notfeardisNomineemay accede to the declosure afterhis confirmation,
mand without initiating a submissive relationship. Under
Fletcherestheory,Blackmailer'sconductshould not be criminalized-a conclusioncontraryto prevailinglaw as well as, I would
suspect,to commonmoralintuition.
The thirdproblemwithFletcher'sargumentis the mostprofound.Properly,Fletcherdoes not aver that a relationshipof
dominanceand subordinationis sufficientto justifycriminal
punishment.Afterall, innumerablerelationships-parentand
child,employerand employee,teacherand student,etc.-xhibit
yetraise no suspicionin
aspectsofdominanceand subordination,
the eyes of the law. Indeed, some such relationships such as
prisonguard and inmate-are productsofthe criminallaw. The
conditionfor
existenceof such a dynamiccannotbe a sufficient
As one of Fletcher'scriticsobjected,"It mustbe
criminalization.
that the blackmailer'sactions are somehow
the case, therefore,
Fletcherappears to agree
wrongand unjustified."'02
intrinsically
it has any critical
but
not
believe
does
with this observation,
force:
Many wordsand expressionsat hand expresswhatis wrong
withblackmail.In fact,too manythingsare wrongwithit.
Blackmailrepresentscoercionof the victim,exploitationof
thevictim'sweakness,and tradingunfairlyin assets or chips
that belongto others.It representsan undesirableand abuIt leads to the waste of
sive formofprivatelaw enforcement.
resourcesso faras blackmailersare inducedto collectinformationthattheyare willingto suppressfora fee.'03

'' Id at 1637-38.
02Id at 1636-37(notingobjectionraisedbyStephenLatham).
103Id.
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In short,Fletcherseems to suggest,of course blackmailis wrong
and unjustified.
But Fletcher'slitanyofblackmairsevils cannotdo the work
he expectsofit preciselybecause each (loaded) observationis so
hotlycontested.What makes blackmail"coercive"or "exploitative"in a morallymeaningful
sense?Whyis tradingon another's
chips "unfair"?What moral significance
should we attributeto
thefact,iftrue,that,on balance,blackmailwastesresources?As
this Section endeavorsto demonstrate,these are challenging
to theoriesthat elicit,but do not conquestions.Mere reference
vincinglyresolve,themcannotanswerwhat Fletcherseems to
is thecrucialquestionforhis theory:whataboutthe
acknowledge
blackmailer's
actionscreatesa wrongfultypeofdominance?
3. Katz: thepunishment
puzzle.
A middlegroundbetweenthe poles definedby Feinbergand
Gorron theone handand Lindgrenand Fletcheron theotherhas
been carvedout by Leo Katz in his imaginativecontribution
to
the blackmaildebate." In contrastto Feinbergand Gorr,Katz
assertsthatblackmailis morallyworsethan the act threatened.
UnlikeLindgrenand Fletcher,Katz denies that the act threatened mightbe a moralright.Instead,he insiststhat the act a
blackmailerleveragesintohis threatis (1) a moralwrong,and (2)
a relativelyminorone at that.105
He thus restatesthe blackmail
puzzle as follows:'If revealingthe infidelitiesis only a minor
thenhow can the takingofmoneywhich the victim
immorality,
prefersto thatminorimmorality
be anything
morethana minor
immorality
Moregenerally,
itself?"1?`
giventhat a blackmailproposal consistsof two analyticallydistinctelements-the blackmailer'sthreatenedact and his attemptto securethe victim'sresources-whyshouldit be assignedthe greatermoraland legal
censurethatattachesto thelatterelementalone?
Katz respondsto thisquestionbyintroducing,
and proposing
to resolve,what he calls the "punishment
puzzle,"a conundrum
he illustrateswiththefollowing
hypothetical:
Smithytheburglar
breaks into Bartleby'shouse to commitlarceny.Inside, he demands that Bartlebydivulgethe combinationto his safe and
threatensto beat Bartlebysenseless if he does not comply.
" See Katz,141U Pa L Rev 1567(citedin note92).
"See, forexample,id at 1597(The blackmailer
putsthevictimto a choicebetweena
theft(orsomeothercriminal
encroachment)
and someother,minorwrong.... To be sure,
thewrongmustnotbe toominor.... Butit neednot-and thisis thecrucialpoint-be an
immorality
thatcomesanywhere
closetobeingcriminal.").
"Id at 1598(emphasisaltered).
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Bartlebydeclaresthat he cannotbear to part with the items in
his safe (whichhave onlysentimentalvalue) and regretsthat he
will have to submitto the beating.SmithybattersBartlebysavagely and leaves. WhenLouie the burglarbreaks intoBartleby's
house the nextnight,the identicalscenariotranspires-withone
exception.Justas Louie is about to strikeBartleby,he noticesa
scrap of paper containing the safe's combination.Despite
Bartleby'splea that he wouldratherbe pummeledthan lose his
goods,Louie opensthesafeand leaves withthe contents.'07
The law, of course,would punish Smithythe batterermore
severelythan Louie the thief,and Katz approves.The criminal
law, he argues,shouldnottake accountofa victim'sidiosyncratic
preferences.
Whereasvictimsare concernedsolelywithharm,the
law is concernedwiththe defendant'sculpability,ofwhichharm
is but a minoringredient.'08
Hence "thelesson ofthe punishment
puzzle":"whenthedefendant
has thevictimchoosebetweeneither
of twoimmoralities
whichhe mustendure,thegravityof thedefendant'swrongdoing
is to bejudged by what he actuallydid (or
soughtto achieve),notbywhathe threatenedto do."'09Smithyis
punishedmore severelythan Louie because batteryis morally
worse than theft.For the same reason, the law rightlyviews
blackmailin lightof what the blackmailerintendsto do-take
moneyfromone whodoes notwantto partwithit. Thus,to Katz,
blackmailis a formof robbery-a graver offensethan the act
threatened."'
For all the witand insightofKatz's effort,
it failsto solvethe
blackmail puzzle. Katz simplyasserts that the act the blackmailerthreatensis immoral.However,as Lindgrenhas objected,
"thismerelyassumes away the paradox,whichis in partthat often what the blackmailerthreatensto do is a moral right.""'
While Lindgren'sclaim that the threatenedact is oftenmoral
demandsqualification
(because the act's moralstatus is farmore
complexand contingent
than he recognizes"2),his generalpoint
stillholds:whetherthe act threatenedis a moralrightor a moral
wrong(or somethingelse) cannotbe simplyassumed withoutargument."13
at 1582-83.
Id at 1590.

07Id
1

'"Id at 1598.
""Id at 1599.
"'Lindgren,141U Pa L Revat 1977(citedin note3).

"'See

Section II.

Even if Katz is correctthatthe act threatenedis wrongful,
his further
contention
that the threatis less wrongful
than what the blackmailer"actuallydid (or soughtto
achieve)"is unpersuasive.See textaccompanying
notes188-91.We need a moredeveloped
113
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4. Nozick:blackmailas coercion.
All ofthenonconsequentialists
are drivento explainwhythe
blackmailthreatis a moralwrong.In addition,each ofthe theorists so far discussedconsidersthe moral status of the acts a
blackmailermightthreaten.The finaltheoryhere addressedwhichderivesfromProfessorRobertNozick'sseminal studyof
coercion14-doesnot. This oversightis significant.Instead of
solving the blackmail puzzle, the coercion thesis further
betweentheconditional
threat
themoralrelationship
complicates
(or offer)that constitutesblackmail and the unconditional
oftheact threatened(oroffered).
performance
Nozick'smostfamiliarremarkson blackmailappear in his
1974 classic,Anarchy,State,and Utopia,duringa briefexploraMost voluntary
tion of the conceptof "productiveexchange."115
in the sense that theymake both
transactionsare "productive"
partiesbetteroff.Nozickproposesthat an exchangebetweenA
underthefollowing
circumstances:
(1) A is
and B is unproductive
thanifhe had nothing
no betteroffas a resultofthe transaction
to do withB; and (2) ifB's partofthe transactionconsistssolely
ofabstainingfromperforming
someaction,x,B didnotproposeto
x solelyto sellA his abstention.116
perform
Blackmail,he notes,is
one exampleofan unproductive
exchange."7
Ifthisdiscussionis to be read as an argumentforblackmail's
twoproblemsarise. First,it presentsan inaccucriminalization,
rate descriptionof blackmail:the victimmay preferthat the
blackmailerexists.ImaginethatAdultererdumpsMistress,who
then decidesto reveal theiraffairto Wife.However,an advertisementforBlackmail,Inc. causes her to reconsider.Although
she wouldliketo hurtherex-lover,a possiblewindfallis also attractive.She sells herlovelettersto theprofessionals
whoin turn
sell themtoAdulterer.
Adulterer's
acceptanceoftheblackmailoftheorythanKatz providesto understand
whytheblackmailer's
attemptto securehis vicis necessarily
tim'sresources
morewrongful
thantheactthreatened.
'Althoughtracedto Nozick,thisbasic approachhas beenelaboratedbyothers.See,
forexample,Altman,141U Pa L Revat 1640-51(citedin note43).
15Nozick,Anarchy,State, and Utopia at 84-87 (cited in note 2).

"'Id at 84-85.GorrarticulatesNozick'sdefinition
in similarterms.See MichaelGorr,

Nozick's ArgumentAgainst Blackmail, 58 Personalist 187, 188 (1977). The principal dif-

ference
betweenGorr'sdefinition
and thatpresented
in thetextis thatGorrdoesnotpresentthesecondcriterion
as a conditional.
UnderGorr'sdefinition,
it is a sinequa nonof
an unproductive
exchangethatone ofthe partiessells forbearance
froman act; in other
is notpartofthetransaction,
words,ifforbearance
thetransaction
cannotbe unproductive.Nozickdoesnotaddressthispointexplicitly.
As note127 indicates,however,
I think
Gorr'sis notthebetterview.
1'7Nozick,
Anarchy,
State,and Utopiaat 85-86(citedin note2).
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feris arguablyconclusiveevidencethathe is betteroffbecause of
This blackmailtransactionis not unproducthe blackmailer.'18
tive.
Second, assumingthat the blackmaildeal is unproductive,
the questionremainswhyit shouldbe illegal,let alone criminal.
to disfavorsuchtransactions.But,as
We expectconsequentialists
we have seen, not even the law and economicstheoristshave
crediblyjustifiedblackmail'scriminalization.How Nozick could
findsuch a justification,compatiblewith his libertarianism,is
hard to fathom.As Gorrhas argued,"thereasons whichNozick
offers
forprohibiting
'unproductive'
exchangescouldnotplausibly
be made to coherewiththe principlesthatare generallytakento
underliea libertariansociety."119
as to inThis is a powerfulobjection.Indeed,it is so forceful
in
Nozick
is
fact
whether
that
us
to
unproarguing
vite
question
ductiveexchangesare ipso factocriminalizable.Unfortunately,
Nozickis notentirelyclear on thispoint.Carefulattentionto the
structureof his argument,however,suggeststhat he does not
ofan exchangeis sufflmean to argue thatthe unproductiveness
cientforthe stateto makeit criminal.
funcThe productiveexchangetest serves a very different
tion.Assumean actionwouldviolatethe naturalrightsofothers
or, in Nozick's terms,would cross a moral boundary.May the
state prohibitthe action,Nozick asks, or may it only require
those who undertakeit to compensateindividualswhose rights
If the latter,how does one set the proper
are therebyviolated?120
level?Ideally,the state shouldreplicatethe market
compensation
pricefortheboundarycrossing-thatis, the priceuponwhichthe
personsthreatenedbythe conductand the personwho wishesto
""Nozickrespondsto this problemas follows:"To statethe pointexactlyin orderto
it wouldrequire."Id at 85 n * (citedin
excludesuchcomplications
is notworththeeffort
note 2). PerhapsNozickmeans to agree that the blackmailagreementin such circumstancesis not"unproductive."
The further
thatsuchinstancesshouldbe lawimplication
fulwouldmakethisa profound
concession,
deeplyinconsistent
withprevailinglaw. More
probably,
Nozickmeansthathe couldrecraft
his testforunproductive
exchangesso as to
makethedeal betweenAdulterer
and Blackmail,Inc. unproductive
bydefinition.
But the
difficulty
injustifying
blackmail'scriminalization
wouldbe exacerbated.
"9See Gorr,58 Personalistat 187 (citedin note 116). See also Murphy,63 Monistat
158 (citedin note2) (observingthatNozickarguesthat"blackmailshouldbe prohibited
becauseit is an unproductive
economicexchange"and criticizing
Nozickforfailingto provide any argumentforthe proposition
"thatunproductive
economicexchangesare immoral").
' Nozick,Anarchy,State,and Utopiaat 57 (citedin note 2). In the vocabularyfaGuidoCalabresiand A. DouglasMelamed,maythestate
mouslyintroduced
byProfessors
or liabilityrulesfortheprotection
ofrights?See GuidoCalabresiand A.
employproperty
DouglasMelamed,Property
Rules,LiabilityRules,and Inalienability:
One ViewoftheCathedral,85 HarvL Rev 1089(1972).
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engagein it wouldagreein a voluntary
transaction.
However,the
likelyexistenceof a transactionalsurplus(wherethe minimum
priceacceptableto the selleris less than the maximumpriceacceptableto thebuyer)makesit impossibleto ascertainthe hypotheticalmarketprice.Andit wouldbe unfairto allowtheboundary crosserto appropriateall the benefitsof the exchangeby
the"seller"oftherightin an amount(less thanthe
compensating
marketprice)necessaryto keep him on the same indifference
curve.The impossibility
ofidentifying
a faircompensation
price
withoutex antebargainingbetweenthepartiesis, forNozick,one
argumentforallowingthe state to prohibitconductthat would
cause or riska boundarycrossing.'2'However,Nozickcontinues,
when the state does prohibitconductthat risks crossingthe
moral boundaryof another,it should usually compensatethe
partywhoselibertyis thusinfringed.'22
Againthequestionarises
ofhowmuchto pay.Justenough,Nozickanswers,to keephimon
the same indifference
curvehe wouldoccupywerehe not disadvantagedbytheprohibition.'23
In thiscase, thatis, the statemay
appropriatethe entiretransactionalsurplus.Why?Because the
exchangeis "unproductive."
For presentpurposes,whethertheforegoing
argumentis cogentis unimportant.
Whatis important
is thattheproductive
exchangetest is onlya tool fordetermining
how muchcompensationis due an individualwhoseriskyconductthe stateprohibits.
Whether
the stateis justifiedin prohibiting
particularconductis
a whollyseparatequestion.'24
In short,notonlyis the productive
exchangetest an implausiblebasis formakingblackmailcriminal, but Nozickshouldno longerbe read to contendotherwise.
This is not to claim,though,that he has nothingto say about
blackmail'scriminalization.
But we mustlookelsewhereto find
it.
The definition
ofan unproductive
exchangeNozickoffersin
Anarchy,
State,and Utopiacloselytracksthetestofcoercionthat
he offeredsome years earlierwhen he argued(roughly)that a
proposalis coerciveifit is properly
deemeda "threat"ratherthan
an "offer."'25
A proposalis a threatifit makestherecipientworse
'21Nozick,
Anarchy,
State,and Utopiaat 63-65(citedin note2).

'2Id at 78-85.

">Id at 86-87.For preliminary
remarksregarding
Nozick'snotionof"disadvantage,"
see id at 82-83.
24See id at 67 n *.
' RobertNozick,Coercion,in SidneyMorgenbesser,
PatrickSuppes, and Morton
White,eds,Philosophy,
Science,and Method:Essays in HonorofErnestNagel 440, 447
(St. Martin's1969).

This content downloaded from 130.91.146.35 on Wed, 8 Oct 2014 19:25:29 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

1998]

TakingMotives
Seriously

831

offrelativeto his expectedbaseline,where"[t]heterm'expected'
is meant to shiftbetweenor straddlepredictedand morallyrequired.""6Insofaras we are seekinga justificationforcriminalizingblackmail,thisapproachseemsmorepromising.'27
Although
therelationshipbetweenfreedomand coercionmaynotbe easy to
the two conceptsplainly stand in
articulatewith precision,'28
roughopposition:generally,one whois coercedis at least to that
forone who values humanfreedom(as
extentunfree.Therefore,
Nozickdoes),coercionis primafaciewrongful.'29
So ifa blackmail
proposalis coercive,thereis goodreasonto believethatit should
be made illegal.'30
On inspection,though,Nozick's"coercion"thesis proves no
moresatisfactory
than the "unproductive
exchange"rationaleat
solvingblackmail'sparadox. First, it is unclear whethermost
126Id.
" In mostcases,thetestsforcoercionand unproductive
exchangecomeout the same.
if and only if the proposalthat
That is, a consummatedexchangeis "unproductive"
launchedtheexchangewas a "threat."Such is thecase, forexample,withthe illustration
toelucidatethesecondcriterion
Nozickoffers
ofan unproductive
exchange:
Ifyournext-door
neighbor
planstoerecta certainstructure
on his land,whichhe has
a rightto do,youmightbe betteroffifhe didn'texistat all.... Yet purchasinghis
abstentionfromproceedingwithhis plans will be a productive
exchange.Suppose,
however,thatthe neighborhas no desireto erectthe structure
on the land; he formulateshis plan and informs
youofit solelyin orderto sell youhis abstentionfrom
it. Such an exchangewouldnotbe a productive
one; it merelygivesyou relieffrom
ofan exchangeto get rethatwouldnotthreatenifnotforthe possibility
something
lieffromit.
Nozick,Anarchy,State,and Utopiaat 84-85(citedin note2). As Nozick'slast sentence
suggests,theproposalleadingup to thehypothesized
unproductive
exchangeis a threatbecauseit is coercive-notan offer.
But the equivalencebetweencoercionand unproductive
exchangesdoes not always
hold.Imaginethatyourcoworker
announcesthathis daughteris sellingGirlScoutcookies and thathe willbe takingorders.You subscribeforfourboxesofThinMintsat $2.50
perbox.Although
you'dprefer
the$10 tothecookies,youestimatethatto declinetheoffer
mightcause yousomereputational
harm,and youvalue thecookiesand the preservation
ofyourreputation
morehighlythan $10 plus a possibleslightdiminution
ofyouroffice
thatyourcostatus.This is plainlyan unproductive
exchange-youwouldhave preferred
workerhad nevermentionedhis daughterand the cookies.But the offerto sell you Girl
Scoutcookiesis nota threat(because it doesn'tputyouworseoffthanyourexpectedor
morallydeservedbaselines).
See, forexample,Nozick,Coercionat 440 (citedin note125).
See Altman,141U Pa L Rev at 1641(citedin note43).
'" NotethatNozick'sshiftfromviewingblackmailas unproductive
(bad consequences)
to viewingit as coercive(wrongful)
justifiesplacinghimin SectionI.B ratherthanwith
in I.A. Not surprisingly,
the consequentialists
Nozick'sexcursuson "unproductive
exin characterizing
his positionon
changes"has caused othercommentators
difficulty
blackmail.See Gordon,141 U Pa L Rev at 1758,1772 n 137 (citedin note1) (wondering
or consequentialist);
whetherNozick'sblackmailargumentis deontological
KathleenM.
Sullivan,Unconstitutional
Conditions,102 Harv L Rev 1413, 1447 n 140, 1449 n 145
(1989) (notingboththatNozickhas "usedutilitariangroundsto defendtheban on blackofnegativeliberty").
mail"and thathistheory"reflects
conceptions
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blackmailproposalscountas threatsunderNozick'sdefimntion.
As noted,the "expectedbaseline"uponwhichNozick'stheorydeNozick
pends is a functionofempiricaland moral components.
proposesthat the normaland morallyrequiredcourseof events
that whentheydo not,the latter
usually coincideand, further,
This being the
ordinarilytakes precedenceover the former."3'
case, it becomesessentialto knowwhetherthe "victim"of the
gardenvarietyblackmailproposalhas a moralrightto nondisclothequestion,in other
sure.Rightsand dutiesbeingcorrelative,132
words,is whethertheblackmailerhas a moraldutyto remainsiAs we have seen,thisis a trickyquestion.Nozick'sanalylent.'33
sis providesno answer.
Worse,no simplecategoricalanswercan resolvethe puzzle.
If the answeris no-the blackmailerdoes nothave a moralduty
to remain silent-then blackmailis not coerciveand Nozick
it. If the answeris yes,then,if
leaves us no basis forprohibiting
makingblackmailcriminal,he
Nozickhas succeededin justifying
the same solutionas
has done so onlyby advancingeffectively
has Feinberg:ifa blackmailproposalis coerciveonlybecausethe
ofcriminalizing
thenthe propriety
is wrongful,
act "threatened"
blackmailturnsentirelyon the moralityof the act threatened.
And thisresolutionofthe puzzle raises the questionwhyunconofthe acts leveragedintoblackmailproposditionalperformance
als shouldremainlawful.Afterall, otherinstancesofcriminalcoillegal acts; just as the law
ercionrepresentthreatsto perform
prohibitsthe gunmanfromcoercinghis victim("yourmoneyor
yourlife"),so too does it forbidhis shootingthe victimwithout
even havingvoiceda threat.In short,if Nozick'sproposedsolution (blackmailis criminalbecause it is coercive)is correct,it
thepuzzle-why shouldit be a legal rightto
merelyreformulates
whatit is illegaltothreaten?-without
resolvingit.
perform
C. Summary
The failureofthe theoriesassessed in SectionL.Asuggests
thatwe cannotexplainand justifyblackmail'scriminalization
by
at 449-51(citedin note125).
1'Nozick,Coercion
thepoint
(thatdoesnotundermine
at least.Foran arguedqualification
'"Ordinarily,
in thebody),see DavidLyons,TheCorrelativity
ofRightsand Duties,4 Nous45 (1970).
not
'"As KathleenSullivanhas concluded,'coercion. . . is inevitablynormative,
about
embodiesa conclusion
It necessarily
or psychological.
empirical,
merelydescriptive,
it imposeson choice."
ofa proposal,notmerelythedegreeofconstraint
thewrongfulness
Sullivan,102 HarvL Revat 1443(citedin note130).See also id at 1448-50& n 142 (disofthebaseNozick'sand others'definitions
underlying
judgments
cussingthenormative
linefrom
whichcoerciveproposalsare measured).
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attendingonlyto its supposedsocial consequences.Anysatisfactoryresolutionofthe blackmailpuzzle mustacknowledgeand exofthe blackmailthreat.The failure
plain themoralwrongfulness
of the theoriesassessed in Section I.B demonstrates:first,that
thereis a moral difference
betweenblackmailand the uncondiof the act threatenedor offered(that is, we
tional performance
cannotestablishthemoralcharacterofa blackmailproposalsimthe moral status of the act upon which
ply by firstdetermining
is
the blackmail predicated);and second,thatone cannotexplain
thismoraldifference
bytreatingtheconditionalthreator offeras
a morallyaggravatingfactor.One should thus question the
dominantassumptionofthislattergroupoftheories-thatwe alis morally
readyknowthatthe conditionalblackmailproposition
ofthe act threatened,and
worsethan unconditional
performance
thatit remainsonlyto explainwhy.SectionII is animatedby the
suspicionthatblackmailremainspuzzlingbecause we have yetto
understandhowthethreatand the act differ.
II.

A PROPOSED SOLUTION

Those inclinedtowardtwo-partcategorization
could propose
numerousways to dividethe universeof blackmailtheories.As
betweendeontologiwe have seen, the well-rehearseddistinction
cal and consequentialist
moraltheorysuggestsa divisionbetween
those scholarswho urge that blackmailis criminalbecause it is
wrongin itselfand those who focuson the its allegedlyadverse
it couldbe revealingto distinsocial consequences.Alternatively,
based on the particularquestiontheyappear
guishcontributions
devisedto answer.Mosttheoristsviewtheblackmailpuzzle principallyas a challengeto understandwhythis conditionalthreat
fromall otherthreatsto perto performa legal act is different
formlegal acts; others propose to explain how this voluntary
fromothervoluntarytransactions.Yet a third
transactiondiffers
possible classificationwould track the familiardistinctionbeand top-downmodesofanalysis.Whereassome
tweenbottom-up
writersattemptfirstto understandblackmailas a social phenomenonand onlythento explainwhysomepurportedly
peculiar
featureofthe practicemakes it a fitsubjectforthe criminallaw,
othersstartwithan explicittheoreticalmodelofthe criminallaw
and thenseek to locateblackmailwithinthemodel.
This Sectionproceedsin the lattermode. Section II.A enumeratesthree independentconditionsthat mightconstituteat
least prima facie justificationfor criminalizingparticularconduct. SectionII.B demonstratesthat one of these threecriteria
justifies criminalizing"central case" blackmail-defined as a
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blackmailer'sthreatto discloseembarrassinginformation
about
his victimunlessthe victimpays hima specifiedsum. This demonstrationconstitutes
whatI have called the evidentiary
theory.
Section I.C summarizesthe evidentiarytheoryand answers
blackmail'stwoprincipalpuzzles.It explainswhyblackmailis an
exceptionto twogeneralrules:thatit shouldbe legal to threaten
whatit is legal to do, and thatvoluntarytransactionsshouldbe
lawful.
A. CriteriaofCriminalization
If we are to determine,
in otherthanad hocfashion,whether
it is justifiableto make blackmailcriminal,we will firstneed
standards or rules detailing when society may legitimately
threatencriminalpunishment.
This Sectionsets forththreecriteria that independently
mightexplain and justifywhen society
maycriminalizegivenconduct.It thenelaboratesupontheonethe notionthat a liberalsocietymay criminalizemorallyblamebasis
worthy,
harm-causing
conduct-thatprovidesthe strongest
formakingblackmailcriminal.
1. Generaljustifying
aims.
If a criterion
and
ofcriminalization
is notto be freestanding
it shouldreston an understanding
ofwhatH.L.A. Hart
arbitrary,
termedthe "generaljustifying
ofpunishaim" ofthe institution
ment.'34
aims.'35
A
By commonconsensus,thereare twojustifying
consequentialist
theoryjustifiespunishmentas a means to reduce sociallyundesirablebehaviorthroughsuch mechanismsas
A retributivist
deterrence,incapacitation,and rehabilitation.'36
in contrast,
on deontological
theory,
justifiespunishment
grounds
retribution
by the inherentrightnessofinflicting
upon a wrongdoer.'37A pointcommonly
overlookedis that a consequentialist
' H.L.A.Hart,Punishment
and Responsibility
8-11(Oxford1968).
'"See, forexample,id at 8-13;KentGreenawalt,
Punishment,
in SanfordH. Kadish,
ed, 4 Encyclopediaof Crimeand Justice1336, 1336-38(Macmillan1983); GeorgeP.
Fletcher,
Rethinking
CriminalLaw 414-20(Little,Brown1978); HerbertL. Packer,The
Limitsof the CriminalSanction35-61 (Stanford1968); JohnRawls, Two Conceptsof
Rules,64 PhilRev3, 4-5(1955).
'" Mostcontemporary
theorists
espousea consequentialist
justifying
aim.Fora classic
elaborationand defense,see Packer,LimitsoftheCriminalSanctionat 39-61(citedin
note135).
contemporary
advocateofthis positionis Professor
Michael
"'The mostprominent
in Ferdinand
Moore.See, forexample,MichaelS. Moore,TheMoralWorth
ofRetribution,
Schoeman,ed, Responsibility,
Character,
and theEmotions(Cambridge1987).Unfortunately,thecommonformulation
ofretributivism
as thetheorythat"[w]eare justifiedin
punishingbecauseand onlybecauseoffenders
deserveit,"id at 181,speaksonlyto the
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justifyingaim can itselfbe the productofeitheroftwo radically
opposed ethical theories,dependingupon what contentis ascribedto the notionof"sociallyundesirablebehavior."If the behaviorsoughtto be reducedis deemedundesirablebecause it is
thoughtto effecta net diminutionin social welfare,thenthejustification
is, at root,utilitarian.But it is a mistaketo assertthat
the nonretributive
justifyingaim of punishmentis inherently
"utilitarianin nature."'38One who justifies the institutionof
criminalpunishmenton consequentialistratherthan retributive
groundsmightbe seekingto preventacts believedto be wrongin
In thisway,one could,as a matterofpolitical thethemselves.'39
defendpunishmentforconsequentialist
ory,consistently
reasons
moraltheory.'40
as servinga deontologic
2. Threecriteriaofcriminalization.
The foregoingbriefreview suggeststhree principalfactors
aim ofpunishment
that,dependinguponthe particularjustifying
adopted,would be especiallyrelevantin determiningwhether

in anygivencase, notto thejustification
fortheinjustification
forimposingpunishment
ofpunishment.
of'moralculpabilstitution
See also id at 181 n 1 (adoptinga conception
ity"that'does notpresupposethattheact doneis morallybad, onlythatit is legallyproforcreatinga systemof criminallaws backedby threatof
hibited").As a justification
punishment,
thenotionthatpersonswhobreakthoselaws deserveto be punishedwould
be circular.Nonetheless,beliefin the intrinsicmoralworth-orperhapsduty,see id at
jusbad" actionsplainlyimpliesa retributivist
182-of punishing
individualsfor"morally
forcriminalization
as wellas forpunishment.
tification
Indeed,Moorehimselfconceivesof
and a justification
aim ofcriminalpunishment
retributivism
as botha generaljustifying
in a givencase. See, forexample,MichaelS. Moore,Justifying
Retribuforits imposition
tivism,27 IsraelL Rev 15, 16-17(1993).
"3See,forexample,RichardJ. Bonnie,et al, eds, CriminalLaw 2 (Foundation1997)
theviewthat"punishment
is threatened
and imposedin orderto achievebene(describing
in nature").
ficialsocialconsequences"
as "utilitarian
fortheinstitution
ofhuman,as distinct
13 Thiswas St. ThomasAquinas'sjustification
fromdivine,law. Sincesomepersons
are foundto be depraved,and proneto vice,and noteasilyamenableto words,it was
fromevilbyforceand fear,in orderthat,at least,
necessaryforsuchto be restrained
and leave othersin peace, and that theythemtheymightdesistfromevil-doing,
whathithselves,bybeinghabituatedin thisway,mightbe broughtto do willingly
which
ertotheydidfromfear,and thusbecomevirtuous.Now thiskindoftraining,
is thedisciplineoflaws.
fearofpunishment,
compelsthrough
insofaras we speak
St. ThomasAquinas,Summa TheologicaI-II, Q 95, Art1. Therefore,
ofonlytwogeneraljustifying
aims,it seems preferableto termthem"consequentialist"
see Fletcher,
CriminalLaw at 415 (citedin note135),saving
and "retributive,"
Rethinking
theories.
theutilitarianlabelforoneofthetwobroadspeciesofconsequentialist
if one holdsa strongKantianbelief
inconsistent
140This positionmightbe internally
See
the rightactionforfearof punishment.
thatthereis no moralvalue in performing
ImmanuelKant,Grounding
ofMorals399-401(Hackett1993) (origifortheMetaphysics
nallypublishedin 1785).Butthisis nota necessaryview.
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shouldbe made criminal:(1) whetherthe
particularconduct141
in
conductis utilityreducing;(2) whethertheconductis wrongful
itself;and (3) whethercommissionof the conductis morally
This is notto say,though,thatthepresenceofany
blameworthy.
one ofthe thesefactorsalone permitsa liberalsocietyto impose
crminalsanctions.As we have seen,a consistentutilitariantheorymustaccountforthe costs of tryingto prohibitundesirable
conduct.Also,a rule that wouldauthorizecriminalpunishment
orblameworthy
foranywrongful
conductwouldproveunbearably
intrusive.It seemsnecessary,therefore,
to qualifythe secondand
thirdfactorswithsome formofharmprinciplein orderto limit
theirreach.
These qualificationslead to threeindependentprima facie
criteriaforwhena liberalsocietymayemploythe criminallawcriteriathatshouldappearas fairlyobvious(ifnotlogicallynecessary) derivationsfromthe standardproposedjustifyingaims.
Conductmaybe madecriminalif:
(1) it is likelyin theaggregateto yieldnetadversesocialconsequences(takingintoaccountthecostsimposedbythe criminal
ban itself);
harmand (b)
(2) it (a) tendsto cause or threatenidentifiable
in
or
is morallywrongful itself;
harm,
(3) it tendsboth(a) to cause or threatenidentifiable
actor.
and (b) to be undertaken
bya morallyblameworthy
These threecriteriaare not identical.Althoughmuchconduct (considerthe mala in se offensesof the commonlaw) will
satisfyall three,each justifiessomeuse ofthe criminallaw that
betweenthe second
the otherscannot.The practicaldifferences
and thirdcriteria,on the one hand, and the firston the other,
it is irreleshouldbe apparent:forpurposesofthe firstcriterion,
vant whetherthe conductthat is a candidateforbeing made
criminalis wrongfulon deontologicgroundsor is ordinarily
And alin the absenceofa criminalprohibition.'42
blameworthy
"'"Conduct"here and throughout
broadlyto connoteany deshouldbe understood
results,and mentalstates.
circumstances,
ofaction,attendant
scribablecombination
of the
in accordancewithcondition(1), commission
conductis criminalized
'42After
insofaras it reflectsthe knowing
morallyblameworthy
proscribed
conductis ordinarily
violationofa validcriminallaw. See, forexample,HenryM. Hart,Jr.,The Aimsofthe
goes
CriminalLaw, 23 Law & ContempProb401, 416 (1958) ("[I]fthe actorknowingly
thatthe riskhe is takingis excessive,even
counterto a valid legislativedetermination
basis formoralconthoughhe himselfdoes notbelieveit to be, thereis an independent
general
in thisdeliberatedefianceoflaw.").Forthisreason,a consequentialist
demnation
whichrequires
aim can coexistwiththe retributive
principleof distribution,
justifying
onlybe metedout to the morallyguilty.See H.L.A. Hart,Punishment
thatpunishment
at 9 (citedin note134). See also Rawls,64 Phil Rev at 4-13 (citedin
and Responsibility
note 135); S.I. Benn,An Approach to theProblemsofPunishment,33 Phil 325 (1958).
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thoughthe secondand thirdcriteriademandsomeharm,neither
requiresthatthe expectedharmoutweighexpectedbenefits.The
distinctionbetweenthe second and thirdcriteriaturns on the
claimthatan actoris notblameworthy
forengagingin a wrongful
actionif,forexample,he lacks information
criticalto determinng
or acts out of a bona fideand reasonablejudgits wrongfulness
ment(albeit one a majorityof societydeems mistaken)that his
act is morallyjustified.For example,a legislatorwho concludes
that euthanasiais morallywrongbut also believesthat,in practice,the euthanizerrarelyacts in a morallyblameworthy
fashion
could vote to criminalizethe conductin accordwiththe second
but notthethird.Conversely,
criterion
an actorwhocauses harm
forreasonsthatare notjustifiedis deservingofblame regardless
ofwhetherthe act is deemedwrongful
in itself.To use a familiar
example,if someonekills an assailant in a situationwherethe
use ofdeadlyforceis justifiedbecause necessaryforself-defense,
but thekilleris unawareofthe necessity,the killingis justifiably
made criminalunderthe thirdcriterion
but notthesecond.'43
3. The thirdcriterion:
definingterms.
Provisionallyaccepting the foregoingcriteria invites the
question whetherblackmail (howeverdefined)satisfiesany of
ofthetheoriescanvassedin SectionI suggest
them.Mycriticisms
that blackmailis not likelyto satisfyeitherthe firstor the second. It is unclear,onceone takes accountofthe costsimposedby
the criminalban itself,whetherany substantial categoryof
blackmailyieldsnet adverse social consequences;and it seems
extremelylikelythat a large subset of presentlycriminalized
conduct-adventitiousblackmail-does not. Also, effortsto explain whytheblackmailact is wrongful
appear unable to answer
the questionsofwhetherand whythe act threatenedis likewise
wrongful.Consequently,this Section endeavors to show that
blackmailis properly
criminalbecause it satisfiesthe thirdcritewill bothexplainwhyblackmail
rion.A successfuldemonstration
is criminal and amount to a conditionaljustification-conditioned,that is, on the validityofthe claim that it is permissible
forthe state to criminalizeconductbecause it is morallyblameworthyand harm-causing.'"Because the argumentto followwill
A Theoryof
debateoverthis issue, comparePaul H. Robinson,
'For an interesting
forCriminalLiability,23 UCLA L Rev 266
Justification:
SocietalHarmas a Prerequisite
(1975), withGeorgeP. Fletcher,The RightDeed forthe WrongReason:A Replyto Mr.
Robinson,23 UCLA L Rev293 (1975).
we
4"Because this solutionto the blackmailpuzzle will rest on the thirdcriterion,
general
or consequentialist
need not at this timeexpresslyaffirmeithera retributivist
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necessarilydependon the particularcontentascribedto "harm"
some explicationof these notoriand "moralblameworthiness,"
ouslyambiguoustermsis in order.
In legal,as in common,parlance,"harm"can connoteinjury
to an almostlimitlessvarietyof interests.A cursoryreviewof
existingcrimesindicatesthat the law does recognizeas "harm"
(homicide,rape,
injuriesto,amongotherthings,bodilyintegrity
battery),psychicor emotionalwell-being(assault, stalking,hate
interests(theft,vandalism,
property
speech,childpornography),
trespass),publicinstitutionsand processes(treason,briberyof
insidertrading),and publicmorals(prostitution,
publicofficials,
question,however,
druguse, gambling).The important
obscenity,
whattypesofharmsmaya liberalsocietyrelyon to
is normative:
This is an extraordinarily
justifylimitingindividualliberty?'45
challengingquestion,raisingissues ofkindand degreethathave
theoristsof the criminal
bedeviledsome of our mostprominent
developed,foundationalanswer to this
law.'46If a thoroughly
questionwerenecessaryin orderto resolvetheblackmailpuzzle,
we wouldbe in fora longdigressionindeed.Happily,suchan acthatblackmail
countis not needed.As we willsee, mycontention
fitswellwithinthe existinglegal
satisfiesthe harmrequirement
landscapeand is unlikely,I think,to strainour intuitions.For
shouldbe self-evident.
ofthethirdcriterion
foundations
aim.The retributivist
justifying
couldalso be comBut I assumethat(withone caveatnotedbelow)the thirdcriterion
that focusesnot
expansiveconsequentialism-one
groundedin a sufficiently
fortably
oftheconductat issue,butalso on,forexample,thepotential
solelyon theconsequences
harmto the"socialfabric'causedbyfailuretopunishthosewhoengagein suchconduct,
and speciallydefutureharmsthatmightbe avertedbyincapacitating
and theconcrete
to cause harm.Indeed,reasons
one whohas exhibiteda potentialpredisposition
terring
justifying-aim
suspicionthatmostself-proclaimed
suchas thesehavefueledlong-running
See, forexample,Greggv Georgia,
are reallydisguisedconsequentialists.
retributivists
and ResponsiH.L.A.Hart,Punishment
428 US 153,23741 (1976)(Marshalldissenting);
thatsocietycan bestserve
bilityat 9 (citedin note134).Foran extendedrecentargument
decisionsin accordwiththe community's
all punishment
utilitarianaimsby structuring
ofDesofdesert,see Paul H. Robinsonand JohnM. Darley,The Utility
moraljudgments
ert,91 NwU L Rev453 (1997).
we mustbe
premises,
restson retributivist
The caveat:insofaras thethirdcriterion
ininsofaras it restson a consequentialist
withactualmoralblameworthiness;
concerned
ofmoralblameworthia sharedmoraluniverse,it is theperception
terestin constructing
nessthatmatters.
Lujan?OfCitizenSuits,"Injuries,'and
What'sStandingAfter
146 See Cass R. Sunstein,
focus
thenotionthattheshifting
ArticleIII, 91 MichL Rev 163,188-91(1992) (criticizing
a changefroma
from"legalinjury'to "injuryin fact"effected
in standingjurisprudence
that"thereal questionis whatharms
questionoflaw to a questionoffact,and observing
thatpeopleperceiveas suchoughttobejudiciallycognizable").
Feinberg'sdisofthisquestionis foundin Professor
exploration
146Themostthorough'
tinguishedfourvolumeworkcollectivelytitled The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law. See
Joel Feinberg,Harm to Others (Oxford 1984); Offenseto Others (Oxford 1985); Harm to

(Oxford1988).
1986);HarmlessWrongdoing
Self(Oxford
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presentpurposes,then,it should be sufficientto observethat
whethera claimed injurycounts as a "harm"with which the
criminallaw will be concerned"is a productoflegal conventions
and nothingelse."147
is also a nebulous concept.Al"Moral blameworthiness"
cannotbe fullyeluthoughall the factorsofwhichit is a function
cidated in this space, a few guidepostscan be marked.In the
easiest case, an individual's conduct is morallyblameworthy
whenhis objectiveis to inflictharm-such as whenhe acts out of
malice (in the lay sense) or spite. But this does not exhaustthe
subject.The averagethief,afterall, steals notin orderto impose
a loss on his victim,but forthe purposeof obtaininga gain for
himself.Yet this conduct,too, appears blameworthy-evenabit.148The categoryof "morallyblameworsent a law prohibiting
mustbe broadenoughto includethe conthy"conduct,therefore,
scious willingnessto cause harmwithoutadequate moraljustification,wherethe amountand qualityofjustificationrequiredis
commensuratewiththe magnitudeofharm caused. Similarly,it
should includethe consciouswillingnessto risk harm to others
withoutadequate moraljustification.(Consider drag racers on
when his
publicroads.) Lastly,an actoris morallyblameworthy
failureto appreciatetheriskshe
conductreflectsan unjustifiable
creates.'49Puttingaside questionsconcerningthe moral blameworthinessof negligentharm-causingconduct(whichthe blackmail puzzle does not implicate),we can articulatemoralblameworthinessin termsoftheactor'smotivationsforacting.Thus (as
a firstand roughpass), an actorhas "morallybad motives"-50
he acts withthe
and is therefore
morallyblameworthy"5'-when
knowledgethat his conductwill cause, threaten,or riskharmto
others,unless:(1) he actuallybelievesthathis actionwillproduce
147
Sunstein,91 MichL Rev at 190 (citedin note145) (discussingthe"actualinjury"rein standingdoctrine).
quirement
"8Seenote142.
149 See ModelPenal Code ? 2.02 (ALI 1962) (defining
levels).
culpability
" In ethics,"wrongful"
is sometimeslimitedto acts,whereas'bad' is appliedto an acan act. See, forexample,WilliamK Frankena,Ethics 8-9
tor'smotivesin perforning
1963);JeromeHall, GeneralPrinciplesofCriminalLaw 141 (Bobbs-Merrill
(Prentice-Hall
acts"and "badmo1947). Followingthisusage,thisArticlespeaks generallyof"wrongful
whetherornotit is wrongful.
tives."A "badact"is one thatis badlymotivated,
motiveswithoutbeingmorallyblamean actormay have blameworthy
"6'Arguably,
worthyhimself,if he lacks moralagency.Because the law presupposesthat peopleare
does not bear upon whetherto make particularconduct
moralagents,this qualification
greaterrelevanceat thepunishment
criminal.Foran argumentthatit shouldbe afforded
theMorallyBlameless:Restage thanpresentlaw allows,see PeterArenella,Convicting
39 UCLA L Rev 1511
assessingtheRelationshipBetweenLegal and MoralAccountability,
(1992).
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cause ofhis action;
moregoodthanevil;(2) thatbeliefis a but-for
and (3) the standards the actor employsfor measuringand
evaluating"evil"and "good"in this case are defensibleunder
commonmoralstandards.
Blackmail:OfHarmand Bad Motive
B. Criminalizing
Withthesepreliminaries
outoftheway,we have reachedthe
cause cognizable
criticalquestions:(a) does blackmail(ordinarily)
harborbad moharm?and (b) does the blackmailer(ordinarily)
tives?"52
1. A directapproach.
To somereaders,"yes"is the obviousanswerto bothofthese
questions.ProfessorWendyGordonhas opinedthat "the deontologiccase against blackmailseems clear. One persondeliberately seeks to harm anotherto serve her own ends-to exact
moneyor otheradvantage and does so in a contextwhereshe
forher act."153
The task,though,
has no conceivablejustification
is to explainhow we knowthe blackmailerseeks to cause harm
withoutadequatejustification.
and elaborateexplanaProfessorGordonoffersa thoughtful
I
but
one
that
ultimatelypersuades.Inverting
not, think,
tion,
Gordonproposesto demthe familiardoctrineofdoubleeffect,"M
of a blackmailer'smotivesby relying
onstratethe wrongfulness
whichholdsthat"when
on her so-calleddoctrineofsingleeffect,
have little
one's directintentis to do harm,beneficialside-effects
Under this principle,Gordon
or no deontological
significance."155
concludes,
the blackmailerviolates deontologicalconstraintsif he
threatensdisclosurein orderto obtainmoneyor otheradvantagebecause his intentis directedto the money,not to
152Regardlessof whether
restson consequenthe thirdcriterion
forcriminalization
see note144,it cannotrequirethattheconductexamjustifications,
tialistor retributive
inedalwayscause (or threaten)harmand be undertakenwithbad motives.Such a reAlthoughone or anothermore
quirementwouldmakeex ante line drawingimpossible.
scrutiny,
mightappearmoreapt on further
"ordinarily"
servesas a satprecisequalifiers
to rethatit notbe understood
qualification
the important
isfactory
placeholder-with
quirethatharmor bad motivesoccur"moreoftenthannot."Thereis no a priorireason
when"only,"say,40 percentof
whymakingcertainconductcriminalmustbe improper
withbad motives.
givenconductis undertaken
' Gordon,
141U Pa L Revat 1758(citedin note1).
to do an act
'"The doctrineofdoubleeffectprovidesthatit is "morallypermissible
iftheyare outweighed
bythegood,so longas theharmsare
thathas bad consequences
Id at 1763.
intended."
notdirectly
'mId at 1764-65.
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that
of]thedisclosureorbeneficialside-effects
the [lawfulness
be
These
the
factors
are
thus
outside
latter
might produced.
intentof the blackmailerin the same way the killingof civilians is outside the intent of the strategicbomber: if
wereeliminatedor if
blackmail'spurportedbeneficialeffects
civilianswere protected,the actorswouldgo forward.Since
the blackmailer'send is harm,the act is not redeemableby
the possibilitythat some componentof the means he uses
mightbe lawfulor beneficial.'56
The greatestproblemwiththisanalysisis Gordon'sassertion
that "the blackmailer'send is harm." What does this mean?
Surelynot thathis motiveis to cause harm,forpresumablythe
average blackmailer'smotive,like that of the garden variety
thief,is merelyto obtain a personal benefit.Perhaps Gordon
means thatblackmailis wrongonlybecause the blackmailerhas
his victim.157
But so what? Without
no interestin benefitting
more,Gordonseems merelyto describea narrowself-interest
most observerswould already ascribe to the blackmailereven
withoutthe benefitofher doctrineofsingleeffect.Moreover,her
doctrinedoes notexplainwhythe criminallaw shouldcare about
such self-interest.
Consequently,two questions remain. First, the question
Gordonaddressesbut does notadequatelyanswer:in whatwayis
a blackmailer'smotivebad? Second,a questionGordonoverlooks:
how does the blackmailer'smotivedifferfromthat ofthe person
withoutfirsttryingto sell his
who disclosesharmfulinformation
silence?I proposeto answerthesequestionsbytacklingthe latter
one first,believingthatwe can best understandwhyblackmailis
criminalizedby examiningwhetherour thirdcriterionof crimiofthe unconditional
disclosure
nalizationjustifiescriminalization
of information
likely to be injurious to the reputationof another.'58
'"Id at 1765-66.

objection:
Gordonconsidersa "libertarian"
buyerwouldbe delightedto obtaingoodswithoutpaying,and an ordi[A]nordinary
narysellerwouldbe delightedto obtainmoneywithoutgivingup goods.If so, the
partiesto the commercialtransactionhave the "real"or directintentof extracting
moneyorotheradvantage-justliketheblackmailer.
that,as an empiricalmatter,mostpeoplevalue
proposing
Id at 1770.Notso,shecounters,
ofthe buyeror seller'sactivitythat
in exchange."Take away the component
reciprocity
benefitsothers,and she will findthe activityless attractive;if so, thenunderthe DSE
test,partofthe'real'or directintentis toexchangeand nottoextract."Id at 1771.
'"It will be apparentthat we are enteringthroughthe firstdoor-attackingthe
on blackmailas an exceptionto therulethatit shouldbe leblackmailpuzzlebyfocusing
gal to threatenwhatit is legal to do, ratherthanas an exceptionto the rule thatvolun157
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2. Detour:criminalizing
theunconditional
disclosure.
The thirdcriterion,
recall,requiresthat the conducttends
harmand to be undertaken
bothto cause or threatenidentifiable
actor.Plainly,the simpledisclosureof
by a morallyblameworthy
information
likelyto injure another'sreputationsatisfiesthe
harmrequirement
(at least whenthe claimedinjuryis ofa sufficientlysubstantialdegreeas to warrantsociety'sprotection159).
is clearlyother-regarding
harm.Moreover,
Injuryto reputation
it
is a harm that has long been legally cognizable--civilly
and
criminally-underboth commonand statutorylaw.Y60
At this
whetherthedisclosureis true
stageoftheinquiry,it is irrelevant
or false;eithercan cause real harm.161It is likewiseimmaterial
whetherdisclosurecauses greateraggregatebenefitthan aggregate harm,as may occurwhen an adulterer'sinfidelity
is disclosedto thewrongedspouseor whenan embezzler'soffenses
are
disclosedto his businessassociates.A weighingofharmsversus
to criminalizethe conduct
benefitswouldbe essentialto an effort
in accordwiththefirstcriterion
articulatedabove,whichrequires
thatthe conductyieldsnet adversesocial consequences.162
But it
tarytransactions
shouldbe legal.See introduction
to SectionII. In Gorr'sestimation,
mosttheorists
have . .. tendedto supposethatthereis nothing
especiallyproblematicaboutthefactthatwe permit
blackmailers
todo whattheythreaten,
and thatall
is how,in lightofthis,it couldevermakesenseto prothatreallyneedsexplaining
hibitthe threatsthemselves.
My contention,
however,is thatthis is preciselythe
wrongwaytoviewthematterandthatthekeyto resolving
theparadoxofblackmail
(and to meetingsomeoftheotherimportant
objectionsto its continued
criminalizaare giventhe libertyto do the acts that
tion)is to determine
just whyblackmailers
theythreaten.
of
Gorr,21 Phil & Pub Affat 44 (citedin note83). Despitetherightness
and importance
thata givenact and its corresponding
this insight,Gorr'sargument
blackmailproposal
are morallyequivalentfailsforreasonsalreadyassayed.See notes83-88and accompanyingtext.
9Consistentwiththemaximde minimisnoncuratlex,themildlyinsulting
or indiscreettattleofeveryday
discoursedoesnotcount.See Restatement
(Second)ofTorts? 559
is defamatory
ifit tendsso toharmthereputation
(1977)("Acommunication
ofanotheras
tolowerhimin theestimation
or to deterthirdpersonsfromassociating
ofthecommunity
ordealingwithhim.")(emphasisadded).
1"See GertzvRobertWelch,
Inc,418 US 323,341-46(1974).See also id at 341 (stating
that"theindividual'srightto theprotection
ofhis goodname'reflects
no morethanour
basic conceptoftheessentialdignity
and worthofeveryhumanbeing-a conceptat the
rootofanydecentsystemoforderedliberty'"),
quotingRosenblattv Baer,383 US 75, 92
(1966) (Stewartconcurring).
161 See generally
Garrisonv Louisiana,379 US 64, 72 (1964) (acknowledging
general
that'a man'sforgotten
"abhorrence
or themisconduct
misconduct,
ofa relation,
in which
shouldbe wantonly
the publichad no interest,
rakedup, and publishedto theworld,on
the groundofits beingtrue') (emphasisomitted),
quotingThomasCursonHansard,ed,
69 Parliamentary
Debates 1230 (Hansard3d series 1843) (remarksof Lord Campbell);
BruceW. Sanford,
Libeland Privacy? 6.1 at 201 (PrenticeHall 1991& Supp 1997).
'62See Section II.A.2.
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of using the thirdcriterion
has no bearingon the permissibility
disclosurescrimi(or the second)to make reputation-threatening
to repeat,the "harm"connal. For purposesofthe thirdcriterion,
ditionrequiresonlythat the conductat issue causes or threatens
identifiableharm,notthat the aggregationof all possibleharms
ofsocialwelfare.
and benefitsyieldsa netdiminution
however-that
The secondrequirementofthe thirdcriterion,
harmful
information
of
be ordinarily
the disclosure reputationally
undertakenwithbad motives-is not satisfied.Doubtless some
disclosuresare malicious or unjustified.But many others are
made withgood motives-to protecta potentialvictimof a con
man or to providepresumablyhelpfuland deservedinformation
to a benightedspouse,forexample.It seems unlikelythatthe instances in whichpersonsdisclose reputationallyharmfulinforlarge
mationwithmorallybad motivesconstitutea sufficiently
harmfuldisclosuresto warrantcrimisubsetofall reputationally
nalizationunderthethirdcriterion.163
There is no reason,however,that an explicitdescriptionof
ofthe conductto
motivationcannotbe importedintoa definition
be criminalized.This beingso, conductdescribedas "themorally
disclosureofinformation
likelyto harmthe reputablameworthy
tionofanother"couldbe made criminalconsistentwiththe third
criterion(where, if necessary to satisfynotice requirements,
is furtherdefinedconsistentwith my
"moralblameworthiness"
earlier discussion).In fact,throughthe law of criminallibel,
many states have prohibitedpreciselythat: by the time of the
SupremeCourt's1964 decisionin Garrisonv Louisiana," a majorityof states had constitutionalor statutoryprovisionsthat
made trutha defenseto a criminallibel prosecutiononlywhen
"publishedwithgoodmotivesand forjustifiableends.""lThe Supreme Court's holdingin Garrisonthat the First Amendment
anybut the knowingor reckless
prohibitsstatesfromprosecuting
libel
to publicaffairshas led to
when
the
relates
falsehood
alleged
judicial invalidationof several such statutes166and to desuetude
But neitherGarrisonnorthe prospectthat the
ofmanyothers.167
Court may expand it to prohibitcriminallibel prosecutionsfor
1'6

14379

cognizableharm.See note159.
ep in mindthatmostgossipingdoesnotinflict
US 64 (1964).

at 70-72& n 7. Althoughcriminallibelwas generally
justifiedas a meansto prohad expresslycontectagainstbreachesofthe peace, see id at 67-68,somejurisdictions
ceivedofthe offenseas a means to guardagainstinjuryto the libeledparty.See, forexample,GardnervArizona,15 Ariz403, 139 P 474,476-77(1914).
'"See, forexample,Montana v Helfrich,277 Mont452, 922 P2d 1159, 1161 (1996)
(citingcases).
167 See, for
example,Tollettv UnitedStates,485 F2d 1087,1094(8thCir 1973).
16Id
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is
statementsabsentproofoffalsity"6
anymaliciouslydefamatory
constraints
germaneto thepresentinquiry,forFirstAmendment
are externalto thecriminallaw proper.As faras criminaltheory
disclosureofharmfulinformation,
theunconditional
is concerned,
made criminal;the morallywrongwithoutmore,is notproperly
fuldisclosureis.
threat.
3. Bad motiveand theconditional
responseto Gorr'ssugThis discussionoffersone sufficient
gestionthat we need 'to determinejust why blackmailersare
the likeligiventhe libertyto do the acts thattheythreaten":'69
hoodthat such personsact withgoodmotivesseems too highto
justifya criminalban. But it does notdirectlyexplainthe criminalizationof blackmail.In orderto solve that puzzle we might
firstexaminehowa statethatcriminalizesthedisclosureofrepuwithmalice or withoutjustificatationallyharmfulinformation
Because it is protionmightprovethosefactorsin a givencase.170
to obtaindirectevidenceof an actor'smental
foundlydifficult
task.
thisis a challenging
state,"7'
mightbe provablein a varietyof
In theory,bad motivation
or
himselfin conversation
manners.Admissionsbythedefendant
privatewritingswouldbe the best evidence.In certaincircumstances,perhaps,the statemightbe able to relyon the factthat
How about
the defendantmade the disclosureanonymously.172
to remainsilentfora fee
evidencethat the accusedhad offered
leftthisquestionopen.See 379 US at 72 n 8. A decade
'The GarrisonCourtexplicitly
mayeverbe subpublications
truthful
later,the Courtagain refusedto decide"whether
Amendwiththe First and Fourteenth
jected to civilor criminalliabilityconsistently
Corpv Cohn,420 US 469,491 (1975).
ments."CoxBroadcasting
"'See note 158.

'70Manycriminal
thisproblemby
thecommonlaw,mitigated
libelstatutes,following
379 US at 70 n 7
affirmative
defenses.See Garrison,
makinggoodmotiveandjustification
or perButa simpleallocationoftheburdensofproduction
stateprovisions).
(cataloguing
becausethestatemustbe
cannoteliminateall difficulty
suasion(orboth)tothedefendant
invokesthe defense.Furevidenceofbad motiveifthe defendant
preparedto introduce
bad
thestateoftenhas theburdenofproving
in criminalslanderprosecutions
thermore,
motive.See, forexample,Californiav Faber,29 Cal App 2d Supp 751, 77 P2d 921, 923
(1938).
7' See Kimberlin
v Quinlan,6 F3d 789,809 & n 11 (DC Cir 1993) (Edwardsdissent515 US 321 (1995); Ginsburgand Shechtman,141 U Pa L
ing),vacatedand remanded,
Revat 1864(citedin note2).
'See

Pennsylvania v Foley, 292 Pa 277, 141 A 50, 51-52 (1928) (affirmingconviction

ofa . . . defamatory
communications
"thesendingofanonymous
understatuteprohibiting
material"show
of defamatory
publications
. . . nature,"and explainingthatanonymous
ofheartand a desireto do personalinjurythatthe Legislatureor the
sucha malignity
as to be
are so farmaliciousor negligent
holdthatsuchpublications
courtsmayproperly
unjustifiable").
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priorto makingthe disclosure?Does thistendto showthe requisiteblameworthiness?
Surelyit is probative.Consider,forexample,a criminallibel
prosecution(in a jurisdictionwhereblackmailis legal) involving
defendant's
(D's) disclosureofa husband's(H's) infidelities
to his
wife(W). Here,D's prior(unaccepted)offerto refrain,fora payment of $1,000, fromdisclosingthe adulteryis circumstantial
evidencethat,whenhe proceededto revealH's secrets,D was not
motivatedby loyaltyto W, or by an interestin achievingsome
measureofcorrective
justice,or by devotionto The Truth.A reasonable factfinder
could suspectthat,had any ofthese interests
motivatedD, he wouldnothave offered
to sell H his silence.This
is notjust a covertway of givingeffectto the factfinder's
own
ethicalbeliefthatD should nothave offered
to remainsilentfor
truethatpeoplevalue goodsand
individualgain. It is empirically
interestsin diverseand incommensurable
ways and, relatedly,
thatmostpeoplehave internalizeda normagainstcommodifying
certain types of nonmaterialinterestsand obligations.'73
It is
therefore
reasonableto assume that mostpeople who recognize
a givencourseofacmorallypersuasivegroundsforundertaking
tionwouldnotofferto sell abstentionfromit forpersonalgain.'74
At the same time,assuminga relativeinfrequency
of unbridled
malice,manypeople who make a givendisclosurewithmorally
motiveswouldrefrainfrommakingthe disclosureif
blameworthy
For these two reasons,the probability
that a morally
paid off.'75
bad disclosureofadulteryoccurredafterthe discloserhad offered
to remainsilentfora fee is greaterthan the probabilitythat a
morallygoodadulterydisclosureoccurredsubsequentto such an
offer.It followsthat a priorconditionalofferof silenceis probato W,the defendant
tiveevidencethat,in revealingH's infidelity
acted withthe morallybad motivesnecessaryto make his action
"'For a thoughtful
elaborationoftheseclaims,see Cass R. Sunstein,Incommensurabilityand Valuationin Law, 92 MichL Rev 779,782-812(1994).
1'7 Thisis an empirical
claim.Whethersocietyshouldemploythecriminallaw forpuris a decidedly
normsofvalue incommensurability
posesofreinforcing
or even prescribing
separatequestion.See id at 790-93.Preciselybecause so manypeoplealreadydo act in
it
and resistanttowholesalecommodification,
ofvalue incommensurability
waysreflective
In other
is a questionwe neednotresolvein orderto explainblackmail'scriminalization.
in accordancewiththethirdproposedcriterion
ofcriminaliwords,we are stillproceeding
zation,notthesecond.
in whichthe ac175Recall thatmorallybad motivesare not limitedto circumstances
ofharmtoH
tor'spurposeis to harmH, butincludecases in whichhe actswithknowledge
withoutactuallyharboringmotivesthat wouldamountto adequate moraljustification.
D did notrevealthe harmfulinformation
forthe purposeofinjuringH. D
Verypossibly,
he felthe wouldsufferbyfailingto
mayhave actedmerelyto avoidtheloss ofreputation
carryouthis threat.
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(taken with knowledgeof the harm it would cause) morally
blameworthy."76
That the conditionalthreatis probativeevidencemakingit
morelikelythatthe particulardisclosureofadulterywas morally
is important,
but it is not yet what we need to
blameworthy
know.The criticalquestionis: how likely?Althoughit wouldbe
foolishto hopeformuchprecisionhere,straightforward
applicationofprobability
theorymightallow us to hazard a veryrough
estimate.As Bayes's Rule teaches,the odds thatthe post-threat
disclosureis morallyblameworthy
are the productof the odds
thatanygivendisclosureofadulteryis morallyblameworthy
and
the evidentialvalue, or probativeweight,of the conditionalofFor the reasonsjust discussed,the offer's
fer.177
probativeweight
is likelyto be fairlyhigh.That is, theconditional
threatprobably
makesit significantly
morelikelythatthedisclosurewas morally
Absentany reason to suspectthat onlyan insigblameworthy.
ofall disclosuresofadulteryare badly
smallpercentage
nificantly
the
motivated,it seems fairto concludethat it is "ordinarily"'78
of
aftera conditional
case thatthe disclosure adulteryoccurring
offer
ofsilenceis morallyblameworthy.179
all thingsbeingequal, does notmeanit es'76Tobe sure,thattheofferis probative,
thatD lackedmorallygoodmotiveswhenengagingin thedisclotablishestheproposition
by
sure.The assumedempiricalfactthatthereexistindividualswhowouldbe motivated
wouldbe
reasonsweretheyto exposean adultererand nonetheless
morallypermissible
cannotbe ironinference
entailsthattheevidentiary
willingtoremainsilentforpayment
clad. Indeed,we can wellimaginecases in whichit is quiteplausiblethatthe defendant
For example,D mighttella compelling
lackedbad motiveswhenexposingH's infidelity.
withWand a pressingneedforfunds(say,D's childneedsan
storyofbothhis friendship
withhis discovery
ofHis adultery.
emergency
operation)arisingin suddencoincidence
to blackmail
Lackinganyothersourceofincome,D decides,afterpainfulsoul-searching,
D proceedsto spillthe
neededfunds.WhenH rejectsD's offer,
H toobtainthedesperately
beansto W,believingas he had all alongthatWhad a strongmoralclaimto theinformahis moralduty.In this
tion,and evenfeelingsomewhatrelievedto be 'freed"to perform
only!-D lacks bad motiveswhenengagingin his harmscenario-and by hypothesis
his unsuccessful
blackmailproposal.But thisconclunotwithstanding
causingdisclosure,
wouldview
sionhas no bearingon thepivotalquestionofwhethera reasonablefactfinder
blackmailthreatas makingit morelikelythatD possessedbad motives.
theunsuccessful
oftheinnotdeducingthem,and the strength
We are speakingofinferring
bad motives,
ofcircumstances.
Afterall, if"[l]ifeis
ference
uponthetotality
depends,hereas elsewhere,
Samuel Butler,The
conclusions
frominsufficient
premises,"
the artofdrawingsufficient
Note-Books
ofSamuel Butler11 (MitchellKennerly1913) (HenryFestingJones,ed), no
law.
less is thecriminal
177Bayes'sRule provides
oddsare equal to the prioroddstimesthe
thattheposterior
see Bernard
to Bayesianprobability,
ratio.Fora particularly
lucidintroduction
likelihood
Evidence:EvaluatingForensicSciencein the
Robertsonand G.A. Vignaux,Interpreting
Courtroom
ch 2 (Wiley1995).
"78See note 152.

withan examplebased on conservative
assumpcan be supported
'7Thisconclusion
thata disWhereP(B I0) = theprobability
discussion.
withtheforegoing
tionsconsistent
thata disoffer,
P(G I0) = theprobability
closureis morallybad givena priorconditional
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Insofaras these assumptionshold true more generally,a
state could,consistentwiththe thirdcriterionofcriminalization,
make it a crimeintentionally
to discloseinformation
harmfulto
the reputationofanotherafterhavingfirstoffered
to remainsilent fora fee."8Because it is ordinarily,and uncontroversially,
illegal to threatenwhat it is illegal to do, the state could also
make it a crimeto threatento discloseinformation
harmfulto anotherafterfirsthavingoffered
to remainsilentonlyifpaid. That,
ofcourse,is blackmail."8'
Having reached blackmail in this roundaboutmanner,we
are positionedto offera conceptualdefinitionof the offense:'82
closureis morallygoodgivena priorconditional
offer,
P(O I B) = theprobability
ofa prior
conditionaloffergiventhat the disclosurewas made with morallybad motives,and
P(O IG) = theprobability
ofa priorconditional
offer
givena disclosuremadewithmorally
goodmotives,Bayes'sRule providesas follows:
[P(B 10) /P(G IO)] = [P(B) /P(G)] * [P(O IB) /P(O IG)]
(1)
Assumenow that the backgroundprobability
that a disclosureof adulteryis made
withbad motivesis .2,thattheprobability
thata disclosuremadewithgoodmotiveswas
made aftera conditional
offerof silenceis .1, and that the probability
that a disclosure
made withbad motiveswas made aftera conditionalofferofsilenceis .6. On these(concededlyunverifiable)
the probability
assumptions,
thatan adulterydisclosuremade after
a conditional
offer
ofsilenceis morallyblameworthy
can be determined
as follows:
[P(B I O) /P(G IO)] = (.2 /.8) * (.6 /.1)
(2)
[P(B IO) /P(G IO)] = 1.5
(3)
P(B I10) = 1.5 * (1 - P(B I10))

(4)

P(B I0)= .6
(5)
Whateverthe"actual"numbersmightbe (in somecontrivedly
empiricalsense),social
actorsare likelyto suspectthat thisfigureis quite high,forthe modernmind'sstrong
forunivocal,linearnarrativeis antagonisticto the psychologically
preference
morecomplextales (as in note176) thatthrowtheevidentiary
inference
intoquestion.See Richard
K Sherwin,Law Frames:HistoricalTruthand NarrativeNecessity
in a CriminalCase, 47
Stan L Rev 39, 40 (1994). Andinsofaras we mightpreferto groundthe thirdcriterion
of
criminalization
in a consequentialist
(ratherthanretributivist)
generaljustifying
aim concernedwithsocialreinforcement
ofmoralnorms,it is theperception,
notthereality,ofthe
incidenceofmorallyblameworthy
motivesthatmatters.See note144.
'This is notto say thatsuch conductshouldbe criminal.Each ofthe threecriteria
providesonlyprimafaciejustification
forcriminalizing
conduct;nonedemandsit. A legislature could choosenot to criminalizereputation-threatening
disclosuresundertaken
withmorallybad motivesif it concludesthat such disclosuresadvance social welfare.
Moreover,otherlegal norms,includinga constitutional
guarantee,mightmandatenoncriminalization.
As notedearlier,the SupremeCourthas alreadyconstruedthe First
Amendment
to prohibitcriminalpunishment
oftrue speechregardingmattersofpublic
interest.See note168.
181
It shouldmake no difference
whetherthe state choosesto enact the firstoffense.
Imaginethatthe statehad criminalized
boththe act and the threatand thendecidedto
repeal the firstforpracticalreasons(perhapsbecause it was deemedtoo vague, or too
likelyto chillwell-intentioned
disclosures).Thereis no reasonthatit shouldhave to repeal thesecondas well.
182 In describing
thedefinition
as conceptual,I meanto emphasizethatI do notintend
hereto proposea legal definition.
The definition
in the textdoes notcorrelateperfectly
withblackmailas law and commonparlancepresently
defineit.Moretothepoint,I do not
suggestthatthisdefinition
shouldbe codified.I takeit thatthefirststepwhendrafting
a

This content downloaded from 130.91.146.35 on Wed, 8 Oct 2014 19:25:29 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

848

ofChicagoLaw Review
The University

[65:795

blackmailis a conditionalthreatby B to harmA undercircumcould inferwithconfistancesin whicha reasonablefactfinder
forpurposesofcriminalization
that ifB carried
dence sufficient
out his threathe would be engagingin harm-causingconduct
that B would lack morallyadewithbad motives-specifically,
quate reasons forknowinglycausing harm-yet in which the
moralcharacterofB's motiveswouldhave been opaque had he
blackmail
acted withouthavingmade the threat.Put otherwise,
a legal but harmfulact under
is a conditionalthreatto perform
circumstances
wherethethreatitselfprovidesreasonformaking
the act criminalby suggestingthatthe actorwouldbe inflicting
harmknowingly
and withoutgoodmotives.183
C. Summary:ResolvingthePuzzles
1. The principalpuzzle:whytheact is legal and the
threatillegal.
The foregoingdiscussion and proposeddefinitionshould
make clear whythe threatis illegal and the unconditional
pernot.
As
of
act
is
theorists
have
formance the threatened
many
betweenthe two.But, contrary
noted,thereis a moraldifference
that difference
is not that the threatis
to prevailingopinion,"M
factor.In theusual cases, merely
somehowa morallyaggravating
doingan act thathas been leveragedintoa blackmailproposalis
in two senses-it is not clearlyrightor
morallyindeterminate
data
wrongitself,and, all else beingequal, it carriesinsufficient
to supporta secureinference
aboutthemoralcharacteroftheacundertaken
tor'smotives.The threat,however,is presumptively
forbad motives.Insofaras we can explain why blackmailis
criminalonlyin accordwiththe thirdcriterionof criminaliza-

criminallaw is toidentify,
as closelyas possible,thetruecontours
oftheconductwe wish
The set oflegalrulesconsisting
to proscribe.
ofbothelementsand defenses,
craftedin responseto thatunderstanding,
willinevitably
be bothover-and underinclusive
in relation
to the underlying
conductthat societywouldideallywantto deterand punish.In this
way,the legal definition
willbe a productof,butunlikelyidenticalwith,the conceptual
definition.
183It
followsthat,wherepracticable,
the stateshouldexceptfromthe blackmailban
(throughoffenseelementsor affirmative
defenses)conditionalthreatsas to whichthe
likelihood
ofbad motivesifundertaken
can be expected,
ex ante,to be particularly
weak.
See SectionIII.
184
that
See, forexample,Katz, 141 U Pa L Rev at 1595(citedin note92) (concluding
theblackmailer's
"accommodation
ofthevictim'spreferences
[byproposing,
and agreeing,
to remainsilentfora fee]aggravatesratherthanimproves
his moralposition");
Altman,
141U Pa L Revat 1657(citedin note43).
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tion-whichturnson the mentalstate and motivationsofthe actor-the blackmailthreathas onlyevidentiary
significance.185
ProfessorWesley Hohfeld'sdistinctionbetween "operative"
and "evidential"factsprovidesa usefulvehicleforunderstanding
this bedrockpoint.Accordingto Hohfeld,"[o]perative,constitutive,causal, or 'dispositive'factsare those which . . . sufficeto
In contrast,"[a]n evidentialfactis one
changelegal relations."186
which,on beingascertained,affordssome logicalbasis-not conclusive-for inferring
some otherfact. . .. eithera constitutive
fact or an intermediateevidentialfact."187
Plainly, the blackmailer'sconditionalthreatis an operativefactunderthe existing
law ofblackmail.Indeed,to ask whyblackmailis a crimewhile
the act threatenedis not is really onlyto inquire into whythe
threatis an operativelegal fact.Ordinarily,a factis operative
under the criminallaw because it has pre-legalconstitutiveor
causal significance.
That the deceased was a human beingis an
operativefact under the law of homicide,forexample,because
somethingof independentimportanceturns on the fact that it
was a person(ratherthan,say, a chickenor a tomatoplant) that
was killed. The evidentiarytheoryof blackmailrecognizesthat
the blackmailthreatis notthistypeofoperativefact.Fundamentally,the conditionalthreatis not "operative"at all, but evidential-it "affordssome logical basis (not conclusive)forinferring
some other fact," namely, that the threatenerhad morally
blameworthymotives.In short,forpurposes of explainingthe
surprisingconjunctionthat it is illegal to make a blackmail
threatwhileit is legal to engage in the conductthreatened,the
actor'sbad motivation,
notthe threatitself,is properlyviewedas
"operative."
Not onlyis the threatto discloseembarrassinginformation
not necessarilymorallyworsethan the unconditionaldisclosure
ofinformation
absentthe threat,but it may well be that a given
"86To
denyany categoricalmoraldifference
betweenwrongful
disclosureofdamaging
abouta personand blackmailing
himoverthe same information
is
personalinformation
notto assertthatthe criminallaw need punishthe behaviorswithequal severityif the
state choosesto criminalizethemboth.Decidinghow muchpunishment
to meteout for
particularoffensesinvolvesdifferent
considerations
than does determining
whetherto
criminalizeparticularconduct.Althoughan exploration
ofthe former
questionis wellbethatthetwovarietiesofconductdiffer
yondthescopeofthisArticle,it is worthobserving
in potentiallyrelevantways. For example,Fletcheris surelyrightto emphasizethat
blackmailis particularly
harmfulbecause it is usuallya repeataffair(althoughhis conclusionthatblackmailis therefore
a "paradigmatic"
crimeseemsa nonsequitur).Fletcher,
141 U Pa L Revat 1626(citedin note96).
SomeFundamentalLegal Conceptions
as Appliedin Ju"8WesleyNewcombHohfeld,
dicialReasoning,23 Yale L J 16,25 (1913).
187Id

at 27.
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discloserofinformation
acts witheven greatermoralblameworthinessthan does the ordinaryblackmailer.Considerthe case of
Charles AugustusMilverton,the masterblackmailerconcocted
bySirArthurConanDoyle.188
Milverton's
method
is as follows:He allowsit to be knownthathe is preparedto
pay veryhighsums forletterswhichcompromise
peopleof
wealthand position.. . . Everything
whichis in the market
goes to Milverton,
and thereare hundredsin thisgreatcity
who turnwhiteat his name. No one knowswherehis grip
mayfall,forhe is fartoorichand cunningtoworkfromhand
to mouth.He willholda cardbackforyearsin orderto play
it at themomentwhenthestakeis bestworthwinning."89
Reasoningthatone cannot"comparetheruffian
whoin hotblood
bludgeonshis mate withthis man,who methodically
and at his
leisuretorturesthe soul and wringsthenervesin orderto add to
his alreadyswollenmoney-bags,"
SherlockHolmesdeemsMilverton"theworstmanin London."'190
Maybeso,butMilverton
couldbe worsestill.Imaginethathe
is as cunningand ruthlessas Conan Doylerepresents,
but that
he is motivatedby somethingotherthanmoney.Alreadyrichas
Croesus,Milvertonacquires information
not to blackmailbut
merelyto reveal,forhe takes greaterpleasurein causing pain
and suffering
thanin aggregating
further
wealth.This Milverton
wouldneverconsideroffering
his victima choiceofharms;he will
discloseeverybit of embarrassingand discrediting
information
he obtains-at the momentmostdamagingto its subject.To be
sure,thisMilverton
is a less likelycharacterthan ConanDoyle's
because spite is a less commonand less all-consuming
motive
than avarice"9'(and because, unlikeblackmail,the enterpriseof
revealinginformation
is not likelyto be self-financing).
But is
thereany doubtthatthe "MasterFink"-who "methodically
and
at his leisuretorturesthe soul and wringsthenerves"in order to
torturethe soul and wringthe nerves-could more fairlylay
claimto thetitle"theworstman in London"thancouldthe MasterBlackmailer?

"See ArthurConanDoyle,TheAdventure
ofCharlesAugustusMilverton,
in 1 SherlockHolmes:TheComplete
Novelsand Stories791 (Bantam1986).Milverton
is discussed
in Hepworth,
Blackmailat 46-47(citedin note19).
89 Doyle,
Adventures
ofCharlesAugustusMilverton
at 792.
9Id.
191 It is partially
forthisreasonthattheevidentiary
inference
is probative.
See textacnotes174-75.
companying
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All this suggests that, First Amendmentconsiderations
disclosureofharmfulinformation
aside, themorallyblameworthy
could be made criminal.However,because the state wouldhave
to provethatthe defendanthad a bad motive,successfulprosecutionswouldbe rare. At the same time,adoptionof such a crime
wouldimposemanycosts-forexample,it wouldwaste resources
in failedprosecutions,
chillthe disclosureofsociallyusefulfacts,
and likelysow disrespectforthe law. Moreover,when the state
did successfully
prosecute,it wouldlikelydo so on the strengthof
evidencethatthe defendanthad firstattemptedto blackmailthe
victim-in whicheventa prosecutionforthe crimeof blackmail
wouldbe available anyway.For all these reasons,a decisionnot
to enactsuch a law seems,at the least,prudent.
2. The secondarypuzzle:distinguishing
other
voluntarytransactions.
The answer to the secondblackmailpuzzle shouldbe clear
now,too.The law and economicsscholarshave tendedto suppose
that blackmailis a voluntaryexchangebetweenthe blackmailer
and victimbut have concludedthat the practiceis nonetheless
properlymade criminal(at least in its paradigmaticform)because ofthe costsit imposeson otherpersonswho are notparties
to the transaction(includingsocietyat large).'92The evidentiary
theorydemonstrates
thatthispremiseis mistaken.Whilenotdenyingthatblackmailmightharmthirdparties,it insiststhatthe
blackmailtransactionis notvoluntaryin thefirstplace.
As ProfessorKathleenSullivan has cogentlyexplained,coercion 'is inevitablynormative.... It necessarilyembodiesa conclusionaboutthe wrongfulness
ofa proposal."'93
Surely,then,ifa
proposedcourseof actionis wrongin itself,the conditionalproposal is coercive(at least where the recipientof the proposal
views the proposedactionas detrimentalto her own interests).
But normativeconcernsare not limitedto whethera proposalis
inherently
wrongfulin eitheran objectiveor conventionalsense;
theyextendas well to considerations
ofthe moralcharacterofan
actor'smotivesforadvancinga proposalthatis itselfmorallyambiguous.Althoughclaritymay sometimesbe enhancedby terming an immoralproposal"wrongful"
and an immorallymotivated
one "bad,""'twe shouldnotinsiston the distinction
at all costs.To
the contrary,inasmuchas the conditionaloffertends to reveal
"See note12.
9 Sullivan,102 HarvL Revat 1443(citedin note130).
See note150.
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thatthe actorwouldlack morallyadequate reasonsforengaging
in his threatenedcourseof conduct,a refusalto recognizethis
particularproposal-made by this particularactoron this particular occasion-as "wrongful"
beclouds more than it illuminates. Put otherwise,perhapswe should not rigidlyinsistthat
the moralcharacterof acts be judged independently
of the motivesbehindthem.'95
It followsthattheblackmailvictimis just as
coercedas theholdupvictim.Because people'sassumptionsabout
the intentionsand motivations
of othersare centralto the way
theyexperiencesocial intercourse,"9
victimsofblackmail,just as
muchas victimsof holdups,are likelyto view the threatener's
proposalas a "threat,"not an "offer,"
and to experiencethemselvesas actingunderduress.'97
In neithercase is thevictim'sacin a sense sufflciently
quiescence"voluntary"
robustto counsel
against societal interference
with his purportedtransactional
autonomy.
III.

TESTING THE EVIDENTIARY THEORY: THE CENTRAL CASE
AND BEYOND

Afterdemonstrating
that the evidentiarytheoryexplains
of a threatto expose an adulterer,the previous
criminalization
Sectionmovedquicklyto contendthat the theorygenerallysupportscriminalizing
threatsbyB to revealembarrassing
informationaboutA unlessA paysB to remainsilent.But thisparticular
conduct-whichmightbe called "centralcase" blackmail-far
fromexhausts the universeof potentialblackmail.The act a
blackmailerthreatensneed not be to discloseinformation.
The
blackmailerneed not demandmoney.Furthermore,
even central
case blackmail(as somewhatarbitrarilydefined)encompasses
numeroussubcategoriesthat perhaps warrantfurtherexploration.Shouldit matter,forexample,iftheinformation
B threatens
to revealis notmerelyembarrassingbut relatesto A's commis19"SeeStevenSverdlik,Motiveand Rightness,106 Ethics327, 327 (1996) (setting
forth,and criticizing,
the "verywidelyacceptedand rarelyquestioned"proposition
in
moraltheory
"thatthemotiveofan actionneverdetermines
whether
it is rightorwrong").
"See H.L.A.Hart,Punishment
and Responsibility
at 182 (citedin note134) (observing that "personsinterpret
each other'smovements
as manifestations
of intentionand
choices,and thesesubjectivefactorsare oftenmoreimportant
to theirsocial relations
thanthemovements
bywhichtheyare manifested
ortheireffects").
"Put otherwise,
theorists
whodenythatblackmailis coerciveor thatthe blackmail
victimactsunderduressfailto understand
or validatethevictim'sperspective
as participantin a particular
humandrama.Wereshe to articulatehersenseofbeingcoerced,the
victimwouldbe morelikelyto emphasizethe particularcomplaint
thatherblackmailer
oughtnottodo as he threatens,
notthemoreabstractobjection
thatwhattheblackmailer
threatens
oughtnotbe done.
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sion of a crime?Or what if B "demands"ofA no more than B
could get fromother marketactors forthe same information?
Questions like these have occupied,and at times confounded,
blackmailtheorists.Accordingly,
any adequate theoryof blackmail mustshowhowthe law shouldtreattheseand otherdistinctive cases. This Sectionexploresseveral of these variationsand
seeks to demonstratethat the evidentiarytheoryaccountswell
for commonmoral intuitionsregardingthe proper scope of a
criminalprohibition.
A. A BlackmailTest
As Feinberghas observed,everyblackmailproposalis a double conditionaloftheform"if-xtheny; and ifx then-y."The first
conditionalis a "threat,"the second an "offer";y is the "act
-ythe "act (offered)";
(threatened),"
x is the "demand."198In order
to explorefurtherthe validityand utilityofthe evidentiarytheory,this Section proposes a test to assess whetherany given
proposition
thatmeetsblackmail'sformalrequirements
shouldbe
deemed'blackmail"forpurposesofthe criminallaw. The testhas
foursteps.
First,assume the actorsimplyperformed
the act threatened
(y) and ask whetherthat actionis itselfcriminal.If the answeris
yes,thentheproposition
is just a threatto perform
a criminalact
and is not blackmail.There is nothingpuzzlingabout criminalizing a conditionalthreatto commita crime,and we would confusean alreadyconfusingsubjectbybringingsuch threatswithin
the rubricof blackmail.The propositionis usefullyand conventionallylabeled"extortion"
or "criminalcoercion."'99
Second, if the act, y, is not itselfcriminal,ask whetherit
causes or threatenslegallycognizableharm.Ifit does not,thenit
cannotbe made criminal(or at least not on the strengthof the
third criterionof criminalization).Certainly,one might be
temptedto call at least some propositionsthat fall out at this
stage "blackmail,"and the designationcould be appropriateso
longas we are speakingofmoralratherthan legal offenses.
However,the purposeofthisinquiryis to determinethe properscope
" Feinberg,
HarmlessWrongdoing
at 246-47(citedin note2).
"WAsFeinberghas explained,distinctions
betweensuch termsas "extortion"
and
"blackmail"have notbeen consistently
observed.Id at 240-42(classifying
extortionand
blackmailwithinthe broad genus of theft).The 'blackmail"label is best reservedfor
threatsto perform
a legal act,whilethreatsto commitan unlawfulact are either"extortion"(ifthethreatis to be carriedout in the future)or "robbery
by threat"(ifthe threatenedactionis immediate).See, forexample,Shavell,141 U Pa L Rev at 1877& n 1 (cited
in note23) (adoptinga similarnomenclature).
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when performing
the act
Accordingly,
of a criminalprohibition.
that societywould not
threatenedwould impose a "disutility"
deema legal harm,thisstepofthe testconcludesthatthepropositionis notblackmail.
If the act is notcriminalyetcauses harmthatis cognizable
forpurposesof the criminallaw, the next task is to explore
whethertheactorhas morallybad motives.The thirdstep,therefore,is to identifywhichparticularreason(s) foraction would
have made the actor'sharm-causingconductmorallyjustified.
notto perform
y
Thefourthstepis to ask whethertheactor'soffer
x makesit materiallyless likelythathe was actually
on condition
reasonsidentified
motivatedby any one ofthe morallyjustifying
If so (and ifthatperceivedlikelihoodis suffiin the thirdstep.2"0
cientlylow) the originalpropositionshould be condemnedas
blackmail.201
B's
As shouldbe expected,this test supportscriminalizing
threatto revealA's adulteryunlessA pays $1,000.The firststep
and to assumethatB simply
is to disregardthethreatand offer,
disclosedA's adultery.That is not a crime.Next,ask whether
thatact causes legallycognizableharm.It does.202Third,identify
themotivesB musthave had in orderto keephis disclosurefrom
Fourth,considerwhetherB's prebeing morallyblameworthy.
to preserveA's secretuponpaymentof$1,000makes
cedingoffer
it materiallyless likelythatB did in factact because ofthe moat the thirdstep.We have alreadyanswered
tiveshypothesized
thisquestionin theaffirmative.203
willbe warrantedwhentheapparentpurposeofthe
'Frequently,sucha conclusion
offer
is incommensurable
withthehypothetical
theact,y.
"legitimate"
purposesanimating
2 We are stillnotin a positionto specify
whatthethreshold
likelihood
shouldbe. See
note 152. The familiarstandardof proofin criminalcases mightsuggestthatconduct
shouldbe excludedfromthecriminalban unlessthefourth
steppermitsone to conclude
beyonda reasonabledoubtthattheactorwouldhave lackedmorally
justifying
motivesfor
engagingin acty. Thisformulation
wouldbe correct
werethequestionwhethertheactor
undera statutethatprohibits
ofharm-causing
conshouldbe convicted
the commission
ductwithmorallybad motives.The standardneed notbe so strict,however,
whenthe
questionis whetherspecificdefinablecategoriesofconductshouldbe prohibited
by the
in criminalizing
criminallaw,foroverbreadth
conductimplicatesdifferent
considerations
in convicting
thandoesoverbreadth
individuals.
So longas a criminallaw givesfairnotice
ofproscribed
and individualsare notconvicted
conduct,
undersucha statuteunlessthey
are foundto have engagedin theproscribed
conduct'beyonda reasonabledoubt,"criminalizationcan be justified
on a substantially
lessershowing.However,
becausewe willbe
unabletoprogress
farin articulating
theproperrequiredshowing
without
firstadoptinga
particular
generaljustifying
aim ofthecriminallaw,perhapsthebestwe can do at present is to toleratethisvaguelywordedtestand to focusnoton thebottom-line
likelihood
thatthe actorwouldhave possessedbad motiveshad he engagedin theconductthreatened,butratheron theprobative
weighttheoffer
lendstowardthatinquiry.
' See note160and accompanying
text.
"See notes173-78 and accompanying
text.
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This briefapplicationof the blackmailtest should suggest
that the test is simplya more formalized(thoughnot a purely
mechanistic)articulationof the evidentiarytheoryfromSection
II. As such, it does not demonstratethat eitherthe test or the
theoryis correct.A formalproofis, in any event,impossible.The
followingSection does the next best thing:attemptingto show
thattheresultsofthe evidentiary
theoryofblackmailand its test
conform
eitherto existingstronglyshared intuitions,or to judgmentsthatcan be accepteduponreflection.
B. Applications
This Section analyzes seven categories of conduct,both
withinand withoutthe centralcase ofblackmail,that challenge
eitherthe criminalization
ofblackmailin totoor the integrity
of
any unifiedexplanationofthe crime.These sevencategoriesare:
(1) "hard"commercialbargaining;(2) marketpriceblackmail;(3)
threatsto exposea crime;(4) threatsby the victimofthe person
blackmailed;(5) public interestblackmail;(6) noninformational
blackmail;and (7) bribery.The inquirythroughoutis whether
thisparticularcategoryofconductis criminalizableas a matterof
principlebecause it satisfiesthe twinrequirementsthat it ordinarilycause harmand ordinarily
be undertakenwithmorallybad
motives.Wheneverthe answer is no, one must ask whetherit
would be practicalto carve out an exceptionforthat category
froma generalblackmailban. Since thisArticleattemptsonlyto
answer the broad theoreticalquestionsregardingblackmail,it
does notexplorethe particularissues this secondquestionraises;
doingso wouldamountto proposinga modelblackmailstatute.
1. "Hard"bargains.
Explicitlyor implicitly,
everypotentialcommercialtransactionconforms
to the same doubleconditionalformas does blackmail. The propositionimplicitlyconveyedby yourlocal retailer,
forexample,is this: "Ifyou pay me the listed purchasepricefor
any goodin mystore,I will giveit to you;ifyou do not,I won't."
Aside froma formalstructuralsimilarity,this propositiondoes
not look much like blackmail.Thingsget a littlemurkier,however,in thecase ofthe"hardbargain,"like thatpresentedbyJeffrieMurphy'shypothetical
ownerofthe Babe Ruth-autographed
baseball.21

See text accompanyingnote 77.
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The hardbargaineris a sellerwhoopportunistically
jacks up
a would-bebuyerwithan unusually
his pricewhenhe encounters
great need or desireforthe seller'sgood. Consideran antique
dealerpossessedofa cheap and uglyvase that,despiteherbest
she has been unableto unloadforyears.One day she reefforts,
ceivesa visitfroman eccentricmultimillionaire
who announces
thatthevase is precisely
whathe needsto completehis collection
and cap a lifelongsearch.Whenhe asks the price,the dealeranswersthatshe willnotpartwithit fora pennyless than$10 milnota completefool,is flabbergasted.
lion. The collector,
"But it's
notworthanywherenearthatmuch!"he argues."Verytrue,"the
dealerresponds."Indeed,just beforeyouwalkedin, I was considit outto makespace forothermerchandise.
eringthrowing
But I
knowboththatyouwantit and thatyoucan afford
mynewprice.
Take it orleave it."
Whateverwe mightthinkofthe dealer'sbehavior,we could
not plausiblycondemnit as criminalso long as we (rightly)refrainfromimposingpricecontrolsor a ban on pricediscriminationin all its forms.Anysatisfactory
theoryofblackmailmust,
therefore,
coherently
explainwhythe hard bargainis notblackmail.The evidentiary
theoryprovidesjust suchan explanation.It
the act threatened-inthis case, to retain
beginsby considering
ownershipof the vase. Very simply,this action could not be
criminalized-nomatterwhatan observermightinferaboutthe
motivesofthe actor-because it wouldnot satisfythe harmrequirement.Plainly,thecollectorhas no legallyprotected
interest
in the vase; neitherdoes the public at large (thoughwe can
imaginesystemsofproperty
law underwhichit would).By withholdingfromthe collectora benefitin whichhe has no legal interest,the dealercannotinflictlegallycognizableharm.Because
the dealer'sreasonsforkeepingthe vase-or even fordestroying
it, were that her choice are legallyimmaterial,a conditional
threatto do eitherunlesspaid offcannotprovideanylegally relevant information.
Therefore,
the conditionalthreatshouldbe as
legal as the unconditional
performance
ofthe act. In termsofthe
evidentiaryblackmailtest, a "hard bargain" is not criminal
blackmailbecause,underthe secondstep fromSectionIII.A, the
acts threatened(to keepthevase or even to destroyit) wouldnot
inflictlegalharm.205
It is tellingthat the hard bargain"fails"the blackmailtest at the secondstep,
ratherthanthefourth.
Thehardbargainer
may(at leastin certaincases) actwithmotives
we mightwishto condemnas immoral,
thoughwe do notbelieveherconductshouldbe
made criminal.Put anotherway,thereis a reasonablesense in whichour hypothetical
millionaire
collectormightsputterwithoutrage,"Butthat'sblackmail!"eventhoughhe
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2. Marketpriceblackmail.
ImagineB possesses an embarrassingphotographof celebrityA, forwhicha supermarkettabloidwill pay $1,000. Assume
no externalfactorswouldmake B's agreementto sell the photoa
moralwrong(that is, forexample,B obtainedthe photowithout
an immoralact and has no priordutyofconfidentialcommitting
B
ity to A). approachesA withthis proposition:"If you pay me
$1,000, I'll give you this photographand its negative;if you do
not,I'll sell themon the openmarket."Theoristsare dividedover
whetherthisproposal-"marketpriceblackmail"-shouldbe lawfu1.2"This scholarlyuncertaintyis understandable.An evidentiaryanalysisreveals this to be one ofthe mostcomplexriddles
withintheblackmailpuzzle.
At firstblush,thismightappearan easy case. B's sale ofdamaboutA to tabloid(T) wouldbe no less hurtful
aginginformation
to A than ifB were to give the information
to T forfree.Consequently,that T wouldpay B forthe disclosureseems irrelevant.
In bothcases, B wouldhave morallyacceptablemotivesfordisclosingto T onlyif she were to act forthe purposeof achieving
what she (reasonably)perceivesto be a greatermoralgood.Her
offerto refrainfromdisclosingthe photographsto T if paid byA
suggeststhatherdisclosurewouldnotbe so motivated.The market pricepropositionto A thus has the same evidentiarysignificance as it wouldin the absenceofa market.Because B's offerto
A appears inconsistent
withthe assumptionthatB believespublicationwould serve a public interest,the conditionalproposition-at marketpriceor otherwise-revealsthe moralblameworthinessnecessaryformakingsuch "blackmail"criminal.
Thisargument
is soundso longas doubtaboutB's motivesconstitutesone sufficient
reasonnotto criminalize
B's sale to T in the
absence ofa blackmailoffertoA. Verylikely,we would attribute
publicspiritedmotivesto some such unconditionaldisclosuresknowsthatthe dealer'sproposition
is lawfuland believesthat it shouldremainso. See
Greenbelt
Cooperative
PublishingAssociation,
Inc v Bresler,398 US 6, 14 (1970) (noting
that accusinga hard bargainerofblackmailwas neitherslanderwhenspokennor libel
whenreportedbecause the implication
was so well understoodthat no one wouldhave
thought
thebargainerwas beingaccusedofa crime).
63 Monistat 164-65(citedin note2) (proposing
to decriminalize
'Compare Murphy,
blackmailwhenthe putativeblackmailerseeks onlythe goingmarketprice);Ginsburg
and Shechtman,141 U Pa L Rev at 1860 (citedin note 2) (same); Feinberg,Harmless
at 262-64(citedin note2) (deeming"[d]emandsforfaircompensation
Wrongdoing
forconsiderateoffersnotto publish"instancesof "[pilausiblyjustifiedblackmail"),withLindgren,141U Pa L Rev at 1987(citedin note3) (opiningthatmarketpriceblackmail"seems
likeclassicblackmail"and concluding
that,"[g]iventhelackofagreementovertherationale forblackmail,"
itscontinued
is sound).
criminalization
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act by,or characterflaw
principally
thosethatreveala wrongful
of,somepersonin a positionofpublictrust.In these cases, the
marketpriceblackmailer'sconditionalofferof silence has real
value. But mostdisclosuresthat mightbe leveraged
evidentiary
intomarketpriceblackmailare probablynotlike this.It is more
sold "onthe market"
likely,I think,thatthe bulkofinformation
consistsofthingslike photosofmoviestarM in the nude,or the
basketballgreatS is sleepingwitha ninerevelationthatformer
And thesesales are probablynotmotivatedby the
teen-year-old.
seller'sbeliefthat othermorallycompellinginterestsoutweigh
theharmcausedM or S. Instead,the seller'spurposeis to make
thatmakestheharm-causing
sale mora buck-not a motivation
allyjustifiable.
has littleor no
If thisis so, the marketpriceblackmailoffer
value, in whichcase the evidentiarytheorycannot
evidentiary
betweenthethreatand theact.Andiftheevidentiary
distinguish
theorycannotdistinguishmarketprice blackmailfrommarket
aboutcelebrities-because
pricepublicdisclosuresofinformation
with
is no morelikelythanthelatterto be undertaken
theformer
B's
one
of
two
conclusions
follows:
sale
motives-then
either
bad
or it shouldnotbe, butonlybeto T shouldbe made criminal,207
cause otherconsiderations
favorits legalizationnotwithstanding
wouldbejustifiableunderthethirdcritethatitscriminalization
rion.In fact,one strongreasonforallowingB to sell embarrassto
aboutpublicfiguresshouldjump immediately
inginformation
intermind:the FirstAmendment
probablyforbidsgovernment
The likelyupshot,
market.208
ventionin thistypeofinformation
is (1) B should be permittedto sell T reputationally
therefore,
"7SeeMurphy,
63 Monistat 165 (citedin note2) (discussingthemarketpriceblackmail ofpublicfiguresin the contextofa marketcreatedby magazinessuch as theNationalEnquirerand concluding
that "[i]fone reallywants to criminalizeeven this as
thenit doesseemto methat-in consistency-one
blackmail,
oughtalso to seektheprohibitionofthewidermarket").
'There is a separatepossibleexplanationforwhywe mighttoleratethe disclosure
notwithstanding
thebad motivessurmised.Insofaras publicfigureshave elicitedpublic
interest-thuscreatingthe marketnecessaryto producea marketprice-byvoluntarily
therealmofpublicattention,
entering
theyhave madetheirprivatelives,to someextent
and in someindistinct
sense,publiccommodities.
It couldbe argued,therefore,
thatby
seekingand achieving
celebrity,
publicfigures
have assumedtheriskofwidespreadinvasionsoftheirprivacy.
Arguably,
then,anyharmsuchinvasionsmaycause shouldnotbe
See Feinberg,
legallycognizable.
HarmlessWrongdoing
at xxviii(citedin note2) (defining
"wrongless
harms").Notably,thisargument
forlegalizingthedisclosurealso favorslegalizingthemarketpriceblackmail,whichturnsout to be just likethehardeconomicbargain:becauseit does notmatterforpurposesofthe criminallaw whetherone whosells
harmful
reputationally
information
abouta celebrity
to a publisheris motivatedby her
viewofthe publicinterestor just by narrowpecuniarygain,any potentialevidentiary
valueofthemarketpriceblackmailproposition
is legallyirrelevant.
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about publicfigureA, even though(2) the
harmfulinformation
class ofpersonswhomake the unconditionalsale to T are probathan thosewho make a condibly not less morallyblameworthy
toA.
tionaloffer
Shouldanyofthismatterforpurposesofdecidingwhetherto
Insofaras the third
prohibitmarketprice blackmail?Maybe.209
generaljustifyservesa retributivist
criterionofcriminalization
ing aim, the reasons for tolerating(presumptively)morally
to thirdparties are
blameworthysales of harmfulinformation
ofmarketpriceblackprobablyirrelevantto the criminalization
mail. Even if the average marketprice blackmaileris no more
blameworthy
(and verypossiblyless)210thanthe averageunconditionalseller,all thatmattersis whetherhis conductis ordinarily
As we have seen, it apharm-causingand morallyblameworthy.
conpears thatit is. That someotherharm-causingblameworthy
harmfulinformation
to T) remains
duct(the sale ofreputationally
legal is besidethepoint.
But to theextentthethirdcriterionservesa consequentialist
justifyingaim, the argumentfor decriminalizingmarketprice
blackmailseemsstrong.Afterall, themarketpriceblackmailerof
harmfulinforA differs
fromone who simplysells reputationally
he
a
offirstreT
right
mationto in one conspicuousrespect: gives
fusalto the personmostlikelyto be harmedbypublicationofthe
This seems like a decentthingto do. Insofaras we
information.
adopt the thirdcriterionof criminalizationin orderto reinforce
we riskdisservingthose normsby drawdesiredmoralnorms,211
distinguishtwocategoriesof
ing criminallines that prominently
' Even iftheydo notlead us to concludethatthisconductshouldbe decriminalized,
assumptionsmightnonethelessadvise againsttermingthe conduct"blackthe foregoing
the marketpricethreatwouldnotqualifyas
mail."Indeed,if point(2) aboveis correct,
whichspecifiesthat the actor'smotivesforenblackmailundermyproposeddefinition,
gagingin the threatenedact wouldbe opaque but forthe conditionaloffer.See textacnote 183. Of course,we couldkeep the marketpricethreatcriminal,call it
companying
the
But to do so wouldriskundermining
and revisemyproposeddefinition.
"blackmail,"
is the key to unlockingthe blackmailpuzzle.
threat'sevidentiarysignificance-which
ifthisconductis to remaincriminal,conceptualprecisionmightbe better
Consequently,
to includesome
and expandingthatdefinition
servedby deemingit a formofextortion,
actsthat,althoughlegal,couldbe madecriminalonfamiliarprinciples.
threatsto perform
210ne reasonwhyso manypeoplefavorlegalizingmarketpriceblackmailbecomes
mightlooklike:"I happen
clear byimaginingwhata marketpriceblackmailproposition
ofyou forwhicha tabloidis willingto pay $1,000.I'm inclinedto
to have a photograph
I knowthatifI sell it,its publication
willcause you
B begins,"however,
take themoney,"
I have no desireto cause you harm.So I'm willingto turnover
somedegreeofdiscomfort.
See, forexample,Feinberg,
the phototo youforthe same $1,000thetabloidhas offered."
at 263-64 (citedin note 2) (describingthe "faircompensation"
Harmless Wrongdoing
and "genero[us]").
"considerate,"
"thoughtful,"
benevolent,"
blackmaileras "commendably
211 See note144.
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less blameworconductbut discourageand punishthe seemingly
In short,then,the particularreasonsforlegalthyofthe two.2"2
sale byB to T should,on consequentialist
izingtheunconditional
reasoning,entailalso legalizingthe conditionalsale offerbyB to
A.213

3. Crimeexposureblackmail.
A secondspecial categorywithinthe centralcase is thought
B threatensto reveal would not
to arise whenthe information
merelyembarrassA, but wouldsubjecthimto criminalpenalty.
This variation,whichwe may inelegantlyterm'crime exposure
blackmail,"has provokedparticularattentionfromlaw and economicsscholars,whoquerywhetherpermitting
blackmailofthis
typewouldbenefitsocietyas a formofprivatelaw enforcement.
Theiranswersvary.214
212Perhapsthisanomalywouldnotsenda perversesocialmessageweretherestrong
reasonsforactuallyencouraging
(ratherthenmerelytolerating)
B's sale to T. But thisis
probably
notthecase,fortheFirstAmendment
interests
implicated
(in thecase ofpublic
whoare notpublicofficials)
figures
are morelikelyonesofprocessthanoutcome.That is,
thehealthofa freesocietydoesnotdependon whether
we see photosofFergietopless;it
mattersonlythatthegovernment
notdecidewhether
we do.
23 Legalizingmarketpriceblackmailneed notentaillegalizing"supramarketprice
blackmail"-theoffer
to sellA embarrassing
information
fora sumsubstantially
in excess
ofwhatT wouldpay(as in therecentBill Cosbycase). The statecan regulatethepriceB
maychargeA fornonpublication-capping
it at themarketprice-forthesamereasonthe
stateengagesin priceregulation
elsewhere.Priceregulation
is a commonwayoflimiting
the monopolist's
priceto a hypothetical
competitive
price.And the blackmailer(market
price,supra-market
mustbe a monopolist
price,or otherwise)
(or,at least,an oligopolist)
oftheinformation
he threatensto reveal,else his offer
ofsecrecywouldhave littlevalue.
However,
B's possessionofinformation
aboutA does notmakehimequallya monopolist
withrespectto therestoftheworldas it doeswithrespecttoA himself.IfB is theonly
personwithphotographs
ofA in a compromising
he is,bydefinition,
a monopolist
position,
supplier.But his monopoly
is economically
meaningful
onlyto the extentthereare no
adequatesubstitutes
forthosephotos.In thebroadermarketof"information
aboutpublic
figures,"
forB's photosofcelebrity
substitutes
A usuallydo exist-embarrassing
or scandalousinformation
(photographs,
interviews,
etc.)aboutcelebrities
C, D, andE. But these
are not substitutesas far as A is concerned.Consequently,
consistentwith wellestablished
foreconomic
justifications
regulation
ofmonopolies,
thestatecouldreasonably
decideto protect
A frommonopolistic
exploitation
byprohibiting
B fromcharging
A more
than the hypothetical
competitive
priceforthe information
in question-a priceadequatelyapproximated
bytheexistingmarketprice.Conceivably,
thestatecouldevenenforcethisrulethrough
thecriminallaw on thestrength
ofthefirstcriterion
ofcriminalization.See textaccompanying
note142.
214Compare,
forexample,Brown,141 U Pa L Rev at 1935 (citedin note12) (arguing
thatlegalizingblackmailofcriminals
wouldprobably
increasedeterrence
ofothercrimes),
withPosner,141 U Pa L Rev at 1823-27(citedin note2) (concluding
thattheeffects
are
ambiguous);
LandesandPosner,4 J LegalStudat 42-44(citedin note39) (same);Shavell,
141 U Pa L Rev at 1899-1900(citedin note23) (contending
thatit is moreefficient
to
maintaina ban on crimeexposureblackmail,supplemented
by publicauthority
to offer
rewardsfortheidentification
ofcriminals).

This content downloaded from 130.91.146.35 on Wed, 8 Oct 2014 19:25:29 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

1998]

TakingMotivesSeriously

861

a utilitarian(or wealthmaximization)
Whateveruncertainty
analysis mightengender,it is probablyobvious to most people
that crimeexposureblackmailshouldbe a crime.Indeed,under
the reductivist
approachofFeinbergand Gorr,the matteris simabouta crme,
to withholdinformation
ple: because it is wrongful
to offerto withholdit forpayment.2"5
Both
it is equallywrongful
the offerand the unconditionalperformanceof the act offered
maybe criminalized.In fact,however,the criminallaw treatsthe
conditionaloffersubstantiallymoreseverely.Underthe common
about a crime(inlaw, the mere failureto reportinformation
was a misdemeanorcalled
cludingtheidentityofthe perpetrator)
Modernstatuteshave tendedto ignoreit
misprisionoffelony.216
In contrast,the conditionalthreatto reportinformaentirely.217
The evidentiarytheory-based
tionabout a crme is blackmail.218
on the insightthat the blackmailpropositionis importantfor
what it tends to reveal about the reasons this particularactor
wouldhave forengagingin theact threatened-explainswhy.
The criticalstep is to explorewhythe law toleratesa failure
to exposea criminal.Plainly,silencecan cause substantialharm
to the public.It hampersefforts
to punishand detercrime,and it
can be a but forcause ofthe criminal'sfuturecrimes.Moreover,
of remainingsilentin this case also
the moralblameworthiness
seems apparent,at least initially,forit tendsto bespeak a disregardforthecommongoodand theconcreteinterestsofactual and
potential victims.But a moment'sreflectionreveals that we
should not quicklyattributebare selfishnessto the silent witHer silence may be motivatedlargelyby fearof retalianess.219
and loyaltytowardthe criminal,and byfearof
tion,byfriendship
the police. Our sympathyforthese motivationsprovidesan explanationforthelenienttreatment.220
216See

HarmlessWrongdoing
Feinberg,
at 243-45(citedin note2).
id at 243.
2'7
P.R. Glazebrook,
How Long,Then,Is TheArmOf The Law To Be?, 25 Mod L
Rev 301, 307 n 51 (1962) (No courtin the UnitedStates has been preparedto adoptthe
Englishdoctrinein its simplicity,
and holdthata merefailureto discloseknowledgeofa
felonyis itselfan offence.").
However,throughthe offenseof 'compounding,"
the Model
Penal Code wouldmakeit a misdemeanor
to acceptmoneyin consideration
forfailingto
reportto law enforcement
authoritiesinformation
aboutthe suspectedcommission
of a
crime.MPC ? 242.5.
218 See, forexample,
MPC ? 223.4(2) (defining
as guiltyof"theftby extortion"
anyone
who "purposelyobtainsproperty
of anotherby threateningto . . . accuse anyoneof a
criminaloffense").
219 Here theterm"witness"
referslooselyto anyonewhohas knowledgerelevantto the
ofa crimeor the captureand conviction
discovery
ofthe culprit,no matterthe natureof
theinformation
orthemannerin whichit was obtained.
This seems to be the verysentimentunderlying
ChiefJusticeMarshall'sfamous
in Marburyv Brooks,20 US (7 Wheat)556, 575-76(1822): "It maybe the
pronouncement
216
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Considernowthe threat.Had the witnessthreatenedto expose the criminalunless paid off,we inferthat her motivesfor
violatinghercivicdutyhad nothingto do witheitherlove or fear
ofthecriminal(eitherofwhichwouldbe a morallymitigating
factor).Rather,we can infer,she was motivated
by pureselfishness.
The factof her blackmailproposalprovidescircumstantial
evidenceas to hermentalstate:we nowbelievethatshe was in fact
activatedbymoreculpablemotivesthan,absentthisevidence,we
her.
had hypothesized
mighthavemotivated
The evidentiary
test(whenappliedwithslightvariation)reaffirmsthis conclusion.The variationis to reversethe roles of
in theanalysis.Assume,then,thattheactorperthreatand offer
formed
theact offered
(-y).The mereact ofremainingsilentis not
a crime,or,ifa crime,is a fairlytrivialone (step 1). The act does,
however,cause cognizableharmto the public(step 2). The effective legalizationofthe act is due to a surmisethat the actoris
motivatedmoreby fear or loyaltythan by selfishness(step 3).
Considerationof the threat("I'll tell unless you pay") strongly
crimeexposureblackmail
undermines
thishypothesis.
Therefore,
should be botha crimeand a more seriousoffensethan mere
offelony.
misprision
4. Victimblackmail.
Should the precedinganalysis of crimeexposureblackmail
changeif the individualwho threatensto exposeA's crimewas
A's victim?What if B threatensto file a criminalcomplaint
forthe
againstA unlessA providesB reasonablecompensation
The Model Penal Code specifiesthat
harmsB actuallysuffered?
it shouldbe an affirmative
defenseto a prosecution
forthreatening to "accuseanyoneofa criminaloffense. . . thatthe property
obtainedbythreatofaccusation. . . was honestlyclaimedas restitutionor indemnification
forharmdonein thecircumstances
to
This defensewas added "in
whichsuchaccusation... relates."221
dutyofa citizentoaccuseeveryoffender,
and to proclaim
everyoffence
whichcomestohis
knowledge;
butthelawwhichwouldpunishhimin everycase fornotperforming
thisduty
is tooharshforman."The immediately
preceding
sentenceprovidesrevealingcontextfor
theotherwise
cryptic
qualifierin everycase: 'The onlyfeaturein thetransaction
to which
blameis attached,"
theCourtexplained,"is theattemptofa father-in-law
to concealthe
ofa son-in-law,
forgeries
bypayingoffthenoteshe had forged."
See also Haupt v United
States,330 US 631,64142 (1947) (holdingin a treasonprosecution
that [i]t was forthe
juryto weighthe evidencethatthe acts proceededfromparentalsolicitudeagainstthe
evidenceofadherence
totheGermancause"and thatthejurycoulddisbelievedefendant's
contention
thathe 'merelyhad themisfortune
to sirea traitorand all he didwas to act as
an indulgent
fathertowarda disloyalson").
221
MPC ? 223.4.
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orderto assure that one who had a civil complaintfordamages
against anothercould not be convictedofextortionforthreatening duringnegotiationsto filea criminalcharge"-conduct"many
regardas legitimatenegotiating
tactics."222
Such a negotiatingploy would not be legitimateunder an
The purpose of the criminallaw is not
evidentiaryanalysis.223
It serves retributive,
principallycompensatory.
deterrent,incapacitative,and rehabilitativegoals that are not comparablywell
served by monetary(let alone confidential)settlementbetween
ifwe believethatall members
offender
and victim.Consequently,
ofthe community
have a civicdutyto reportcrime,thenit cannot
be morallyacceptablefora victimto offerto ignoreherobligation
forpersonalgain-ven if that gain is in some sense compensatory.This is notto claimit makes no moraldifference
whetherB
is A's victim(ratherthan a merewitnesstoA's crime)and is demandingarguably"reasonable"compensation
(ratherthan an excessive"penalty").It is onlyto concludethat the difference
is not
such as to make B's conductmorallyjustified.The factorsthe
Model Penal Code identifiescan properlybe consideredmitigating;theyshouldnotconstitutean affirmative
defense.
In contrastto the criminallaw, victimcompensationis the
chiefpurposeof tortlaw. The evidentiarytest reinforces
the intuitionthatB may threatento sue A unlessA compensatesB for
the injuriesand losses that A has caused to B. Assume B files
suit againstA. This actionis moraland lawfulon the presumption(step 3) thatB is motivatedby a goodfaithbeliefthathe has
a legallyenforceableclaimfordamages againstA. Now consider
the factthatB had offered
notto sue ifA paid B's damages.This
evidenceis consistentwiththe motivationwe previouslyascribed
to B: eitherway,B's (morallyacceptable)objectiveis to be made
whole.

Id at comment
(f).
2 The ethicalrules governing
attorneyconductlikewisereveal such actionto be of
questionablelegitimacy.
The 1969ModelCode ofProfessional
Responsibility
Disciplinary
Rules providesthat"[a] lawyershallnotpresent,participatein presenting,
or threatento
presentcriminalchargessolelyto obtainan advantagein a civilmatter."ModelCode of
ProfessionalResponsibility
and Code of JudicialConductDR 7-105A(ABA 1982). The
1983 Model Rules of ProfessionalConductlack any such specificproscription.
Instead,
theygenericallybar criminalconduct"thatreflectsadverselyon the lawyer'shonesty,
trustworthiness
orfitnessas a lawyerin otherrespects."ModelRulesofProfessional
ConductRule 8.4(b) (ABA 1983).As a result,threatening
to filea criminalcomplaintwould
constitute
an ethicalviolationonlyinjurisdictions
whereit wouldviolatethecriminallaw.
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5. Publicinterestblackmail.
The typicalblackmailerdemands fromhis victima cash
paymentto whichhe has no legitimateclaim. But the blackmailerneed not demandmoney.Nor need he even seek private
question,accordingly,
advantage(narrowlydefined).A recurring
is whetherblackmailshould be criminalizedwhen the blackmailer'sostensibleobjectiveis a public,ratherthanprivate,good.
approach,theansweris clear:it depends.
Undertheevidentiary
of "publicinterestblackmail"by exsolve
the
puzzle
We can
aminingwhatis presumedto be one ofthe mostcommonblackAssumeB threatensto
mail threats,"homosexualblackmail."224
(or homosexualacts) unlessA pays B
exposeA's homosexuality
case ofcriminalblackmail.And
$1,000.This is an unproblematic
test explainswhy.The key
quick applicationof the evidentiary
reasonsB mighthave
themorallyjustifying
(step3) is to identify
inhave
will
widelydiffering
observers
A.
Different
forexposing
tuitionsregardingwhichreasonsdo in factsupplymoraljustificationforoutingA. Mostpersons,I suspect,wouldrecognizefew
if any motivesas morallylegitimatebeyondprotectinga benightedspouse or suitor.Othersmightendorsea moregeneral
perhapsas a meansto discourinterestin exposinghomosexuals,
ofsilence(step4)
B's conditionaloffer
age homosexualactivity.225
whofallnear
to
individuals
have
evidentiary
significance
should
eitherpole,however.B's willingnessto remainsilentforpersonal
gain suggeststhat his motivesforexposingA wouldsatisfyneitherthesocialliberalnortheculturalconservative.
The publicinterestvarianton homosexualblackmailarises
whenB threatensto outA unlessA takes some specifiedaction
favorableto homosexualinterests.Imaginethata gay rightsorunlesshe
ganizationthreatenstoouta closetedgayCongressman
an
evidenUnder
abandonshis supportforanti-gaylegislation.226
ofsuchthreats,see Posner,141
thepossiblygreatfrequency
Forevidenceregarding
U Pa L Revat 1843n 47 (citedin note2).
= Some peoplemightconcludethat outingis categorically
This view
unjustifiable.
theory.One whobelievesthereare no mortheevidentiary
undermine
doesnot,however,
should,I submit,favor
allyacceptablereasonsforexposingan individual'shomosexuality
Theycan then
makingoutingillegal(on the secondor thirdcriteriaofcriminalization).
homosexualblackmailon thegroundsthatit is (or shouldbe) simapprovecriminalizing
pleextortion.
nationalmagazine,threatened
a gay-oriented
T In thesummerof1996,theAdvocate,
JamesKolbebecauseofhis supportfortheDefenseofMarto outArizonaCongressman
in
riageAct,whichprovidesthatstatesneednotrecognizesame-sexmarriagesperformed
in advance
hishomosexuality
theAdvocatebyannouncing
anotherstate.Kolbepreempted
He Is Gay,WashPostA8 (Aug
ofthemagazine.See JohnE. Yang,Rep.KolbeAnnounces
3, 1996).
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tiaryanalysis,this proposalshould be legal because the threat
provideslittlesupportforan inferencethat,werethe threateners
moto exposethe legislator,theywoulddo so withblameworthy
test extives.Again,the thirdand fourthstepsofthe evidentiary
plain this conclusion.Were the gay rightsactiviststo out the
wouldbe to exposethe latCongressman,theirlikelymotivation
The acter as a (probable)hypocriteand politicalopportunist.227
tivists'offerto keep the legislator'shomosexualitysecret if he
supportsgay politicalinterestsis potentiallyconsistentwiththis
hypothesis:the activists'(arguably)morallyacceptablereasonfor
outingthe legislatordisappears if the basis upon whichvoters
is eliminated.This does
mightsuspectthe legislatorofhypocrisy
notmean,however,thatall blackmailputativelyin the publicinterestshouldbe permissible.If membersof Greenpeacewere to
threatento out the same closetedCongressmanunless he wereto
vote against NAFTA,thenthe blackmailers'beliefthat theyare
the public interestshould be legally irrelevant.The
furthering
particularcontentof theiroffertends to discredit,ratherthan
the suppositionthattheyharbormorallyacceptablemoconfirm,
tivesforexposingthe politician'shomosexuality.
This discussionreveals that Feinbergis only half rightin
admonishingthat a coherentblackmailtheorymust survey"the
varioustypesofthreatsin additionto threatsto reveal information;... thevarioustypesofdemandsin additionto demandsfor
and ... the varioustypesofmeans employed
moneyor property;
Threats,dein additionto single-shotrandomopportunism."228
be
assessed in
must
not
But
all
matter.
they
mands,and means
isolation.The lesson ofpublicinterestblackmailis that a threatener should not be entitledto escape a criminalprohibitionon
blackmailjust because he seeks to achieve what he mightreasonablybelieveis a publicinterest,ratherthanhis own(narrow)
self-interest.This is appropriate:a modern-dayRobin Hood
wouldhave no defenseto chargesofburglaryor robbery,and few
would criticizethis result.Wherethe act threatened,y, and the
conditiondemanded,x, would serve the same public interest,
I

therationaleespousedbytheAdvocatein the Kolbecase. See id.
This was precisely
This is notto say the suspicionis correct.A homosexualpoliticiancan opposea pieceof
just as an Africanlegislationwithoutbeing hypocritical,
(ostensibly)gay-friendly
opposelegislationconsideredto benefitAfricanAmericanpoliticiancan withintegrity
Americansas a wholeora Jewishpoliticiancan opposepoliciesfavorableto Israel.Indeed,
BarneyFrank,an openlygay CongressmanfromMassachusetts,declaredthat he apbut did notthinkKolbe'swas such a case.
provesofouting"in cases ofgrosshypocrisy,"
See Kolbe Won'tBe Gay Rights "PosterBoy",WorcesterTelegram& Gaz A10 (Aug 4,
1996).
' Feinberg,
at 258 (citedin note2).
HarmlessWrongdoing
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be excepted
wouldproperly
however,the conditionalproposition
froma blackmailban.
blackmail.
6. Noninformational
Blackmaildoes notinvariablyinvolvea threatto discloseinblackmailmaybe unWhilecases ofnoninformational
formation.
to imagine.ProfessorLeo Katz has
usual, theyare not difficult
composeda varietyofexamples:
"Pay me $10,000, or I will seduce your fiance";"Pay me
$10,000,or I will persuadeyourson that it is his patriotic
dutyto volunteerforcombatin Vietnam";"Pay me $10,000,
risk-addicted19-year-old
or I will give your high-spirited,
forChristmas";"Payme $10,000,or I
daughtera motorcycle
willhastenourailingfather'sdeathby leavingthe Catholic
Church."229

As the evidentiary
theoryexplains,all ofthesethreatsare clear
cases ofcriminalblackmail.
blackmail,as in all
The acts threatenedin noninformational
legal. But theyalso cause (or risk)cogniblackmail,are perfectly
zable harm.Indeed,threeofthefourexamplesaboveinvolveimposingsubstantialriskof death upon another.Nonetheless,the
acts themselvesare tolerated,perhapsencouraged,because we
assume that the peoplewho committhemhave goodreasonsto
forexample,is thatwhenB
riskharm.The ordinaryassumption,
encouragesA to enlist,she does so becauseshe believesthatit is
A's dutyor thatA will profitfromthe experience.Here,as elseB's ofsignificance:
threathas evidentiary
where,theconditional
fernottoencourageA toenlistifB receivesa suitableboonseems
inconsistentwithour initial assumption.The offerreveals B's
willingnesstoriskA's death,and notforgoodmotives.Hence,the
threatshouldbe madecriminal.
While the evidentiarytheorysupportsKatz's view that
Katz's examples
blackmailneed notbe a crimeofinformation,230
Katz,141U Pa L Revat 1567-68(citedin note92).
blackmailshouldbe treatedas
that looks like noninformational
Not everything
tricky
case:B's threatto
to a deceptively
such.Nozick,amongothers,has drawnattention
A, unlessA paysB
on his landthatwillblocktheviewofhis neighbor
builda structure
withthe
State,and Utopiaat 84-85(citedin note2). Consistent
$1,000.Nozick,Anarchy,
that
theory,B's proposalshouldbe criminal(assuming,counterfactually,
evidentiary
has substantialprobative
blocking
A's viewis a legallycognizableharm)onlyiftheoffer
interest
in building
thatB wouldhaveno actual,legitimate
weighttowarddemonstrating
butat someBut doesit?Is it notjust as likelythatB valuesthestructure,
thestructure.
oftencalled"spitefences"(at least
whatless than$1,000?Andwhyare suchstructures
of
suggestthat,in thiscategory
whentheyare,indeed,fences)?Doesn'tthisnomenclature
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likewise supportthe claim of the evidentiarytheorythat the
threat has evidentiaryvalue only. Imagine this variation on
B leaves the CatholicChurch;B's father
Katz's last hypothetical:
dies; B returnsto the CatholicChurch.Add a fewmorefacts-a
longhistoryofanimositybetweenB and herfather,or a substantial inheritance- and the inferencethat B leftthe Churchpreciselyin orderto hastenher father'sdeath is easy to make. If so,
B's actionsmightsuddenlylook like a rare (but potentiallyeffecAt the
tive)methodofhomicide-murderbyreligiousconversion.
same time,the blackmailthreatwouldno longerlooklike a morallyaggravatingfactor.23'
7. Bribery.
A finalpuzzle is whatProfessorSidneyDeLong calls the secthatwouldbe
ondparadoxofblackmail:whyis a conditionaloffer
illegalifproposedbythe blackmailerlegal ifinitiatedby the vicbetweenblackmail
tim?232
DeLong locates the moral difference
and "bribery"
(a proposalinitiatedby a potentialblackmailvictim)in the social meaningofthe narrativesparadigmaticof the
respectivetransactions.'[T]he purposeof the law of blackmail,"
DeLong proposesin a vein similarto Fletcher's,"is to protectthe
against the conspiratorialagreementof blackmailer
community
and victim,whichisolates and subjectshimto a submissiverelaIn contrast,"[t]hrough
bribery,
tionshipwiththe blackmailer."233
the menaceintoan ally whosecooperation
the victimtransforms
preservesthevictim'splace in thelargercommunity."234
between
No doubtthisexplanationtoucheson one distinction
as DeLong
blackmailand bribery.But it does notcut as forcefully
his vulnerability
suggests.Afterall, the briberriskshighlighting
to disclosure,therebyincreasingthe riskthatthe recipientofhis
bribewill returnformore next time as a blackmailer.In any
event,the "puzzle"DeLong seeks to solve is not verypuzzling.
thereis notthe slightestbaBriberyis legal because, ordinarily,
it.
sis forcriminalizing
offerifactingfrombad motivesis
thatB wouldmakea conditional
cases,theprobability
inference?
denyingtheevidentiary
actuallyless thanifactingfromgoodmotives-thereby
note175.
See note179 and textaccompanying
' This conclusion
shouldnotsoundbizarre.Recallthe robberwhosays,"Yourmoney
or yourlife"to inducehis victimto hand overher money,and comparehim to the man
whoapproachesa strangeron thestreet,pullsa gun,declares,"Yourlife,"and shootshim
ofmurder.
themurderer
ofrobbery,
dead.The robbercan onlybe convicted
"2DeLong,141U Pa L Rev at 1663(citedin note11).
2Id at 1691.
2Id

at 1692.
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When the act the bribersolicitsis itselfclearlywrongful,
thereis nothingperplexingabout makingthe bribeillegal and
punishingboththe giverand the receiver-hencethe common
a government
law crimesof "bribery"
officialpayment
(offering
forfavorabletreatment)and "extortion
undercolorofpublicoffice"(solicitationor acceptanceby a publicofficial
ofpayment).235
Similarly,the Model Penal Code makes it separatelycriminal
bothto offerto pay a witnessto a crimeto remainsilentand for
the supthe witnessto accept such a payment.236
Accordingly,
posed puzzle ofbriberyarises onlywhenthe moralcharacterof
B
the act the bribersolicitsis indeterminate-aswhenA offers
$1,000forB's promisenotto tellA's wifeaboutA's extramarital
or notto givea motorcycle
toA's risk-addicted
affair,
daughter.
In thesecases, theso-calledbribeis legal,and shouldremain
so, because it satisfies neitherfundamentalprerequisitefor
criminalization
at least). It inflictsno
(underthe thirdcriterion,
legallycognizableharm,and it revealsno morallyblameworthy
motives.The briber'smotivation
in each case is quite apparent,
and is no different
fromthatofthe driverwhoparkshis car in a
roughneighborhood
and offers
to pay someguysloitering
nearby
to "keepan eyeon it."Blackmailis criminal,accordingto theevidentiarytheory,because the blackmailerthreatensan act that,
were he to engage in it, would be blameworthy,
harm-causing
conduct.Bribery,on the otherhand,is lawfulbecause thebriber
seeks to stave offpotentialharm(to himselfor to someoneelse)
and becausehe maywellhave morallyacceptablemotives.
All thatseemsstraightforward.
The moredifficult
questionis
whetherit shouldbe criminalto accept the bribe.If the nominal
bribereallyis just a payoff
bya blackmailvictimto a blackmailer
savvyenoughto conveyhis threatbyinnuendo,thereis no reason
ofthetransaction;
whythelaw mustrespecttheformalstructure
so longas a factfinder
concludesthatthe nominalbribetakerintendedto communicatea blackmailthreat,it is reasonableto
treathimas a blackmailerand to punishhimaccordingly.
But whatifthe idea ofthebribereallydid originatewiththe
maker?Here,theevidentiary
analysisrequiresus to examinetwo
questions:(1) does thebribetakercause legallycognizableharm?
and (2) ifso, does he have morallyblameworthy
motives?Receipt
ofbribes(outsideofthe specialcases notedabove) is, and should

' See James Lindgren,The Theory,History,and Practice of the Bribery-Extortion
Distinction,141 U Pa L Rev 1695, 1698-1700 (1993). See also MPC ? 240.1.
'See MPC ?? 242.3, 242.5.
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remain,lawfulon an evidentiaryapproachbecause the answerto
bothquestionsis (ordinarily)no.
Consideran earlierexample:B acceptsA's offerof$1,000 in
Disreexchangefora promisenotto tellA's wifeofhis infidelity.
suggardingthe payment,and ignoringcausationcomplications
distinction,we mightagree that B
gested by the act/omission
"causes"A's wifeto (continueto) be deceivedas to her husband's
This is probablynotlegallycognizableharm.Even if
faithfulness.
it were, we would be compelledto examine B's motives.Why
motives
mightB refrainfromspeakingout?Morallyblameworthy
that
the
in
knowledge
B
takes
pleasure
are imaginable-perhaps
A's wifehas been made an objectofridiculein the communityB acts outofa habitualdisinclibut seemunlikely.Mostprobably,
nation"toget involved."If pressedto explainhimself,though,he
would probablyfirstinvoke a general presumptionthat one
shouldnot undertaketo "do good"unless one can be reasonably
confidentthat one's interventionwill producemore good than
harm,thenobservethathe remainsignorantoftoo manypotenHe mightwonder,
tiallyrelevantfactorstojustifyintermeddling.
"Isn'tit possiblethat unmaskingA as an adultererwould serve
principallyto cause A's wifesubstantialand unnecessarymental
anguish?"This seems a whollymoralmotivationforB's inaction:
first,do no harm.
Not much changes once we considerB's acceptanceof the
is
payofffromA. It is still likelythat B believesintermeddling
B's
He mightalso believe thatA is a cad (or worse).
unjustified.
willingnessto profitat A's expensedoes notmake it substantially
less likelythatB wouldhave remainedsilenteven absenta payment,and thatin eithercase (paid or notpaid) his silenceis principallyanimatedbya concernthathe notcause harm.One might
propose,though,thatB is nowcausingharmtoA (ratherthanA's
motives.But
wife),and thathe does so withmorallyblameworthy
A
it is hard to see how B, by acceptinga payment voluntarily
made, is causingA a "harm"withwhichthe law shouldbe conIn short,one who refrainsfromthe type of action a
cerned.237
bribemakermightwish to forestallis not likelyenoughto have
motivesas tojustifycriminal
(in)actedwithmorallyblameworthy
punishmentin accord with the third criterion.This is true
True,A would
in these circumstances.
"7It is fairto call A's payment"voluntary"
ratherB did notknowabouthis affair(in whichcase therewouldbe no reasonat all for
without
himto payB), butthis factalone cannotsufficeto makeA's offer"involuntary"
actionall but meaningless.RecallthatifA's offeris in
makingtheconceptof"voluntary"
and B is properly
responseto B's hintedthreatof disclosure,A's offeris notvoluntary,
treatedas a blackmailer.
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and has accepted,paymentfor
whetheror notB has beenoffered,
forbearance.238
IV.

IMPLICATIONS

Blackmailis a seriouscrime.Moreover,it exertsa grasp on
to its
the popularimaginationalmost surelyout of proportion
For thesereasonsalone,seekingto explainandjustify
frequency.
its criminalization
wouldbe a worthwhile
endeavor.But thereis
more,forthosebittenby the blackmailbug have longsuspected
that a solutionto the blackmailpuzzle would help to resolve
otherpuzzles bothwithinand beyondthe criminallaw.239
This
Section exploresthat suspicionby offering
a few preliminary
thoughtsregarding
theevidentiary
theory'spossibleimplications.
A. Motiveand Mens Rea in theCriminalLaw
At firstblush,the evidentiary
theorymightseem to suggest
an answerto arguablythemostprofound
and persistentproblem
Alplaguingcriminaltheory-the"true"meaningofmensrea.240
thoughProfessorFrancis Sayre concludedin his pathbreaking
This is a generalclaim.Theremaybe contextsin whichthe bribetaker'sinaction
doescause legallycognizableharmandin whichthefactofthebribeprovidessufficiently
strongcircumstantial
evidencethat the bribetaker'smotivesforinactionare morally
in ordertojustifycriminalization.
For example:A harmsC bypublishing
blameworthy
a
falsehood.
B is in possessionofinformation
thedefamatory
utdefamatory
thatdisproves
terance.It is plausiblethatB's failureto disclosethatinformation
"causes"C legallycognizableharm.Nonetheless,
uncertainty
aboutB's reasonsforremaining
silentmightbe
greatenoughto counselagainstmakingB's silencecriminal.
Naturally,
B's silencewould
be morally
justifiable
werehe ignorant
ofthefactofthedefamation,
oroftheexonerating
character
oftheinformation
in his ownpossession.B's fearofretaliation
byA mightalso
make it morallyexcusableforB to remainmute.All of thesehypotheses,
however,are
undermined
strongly
by thefactofB's acceptanceofa payoff
to remainsilent.Here,B's
bribetakingdoes suggestselfishmotivesforengagingin knowing
conduct.
harm-causing
Consistent
withthe evidentiary
analysis,then,thisparticulartypeofbribetaking-the
proverbial
exception
thatprovestherule-couldbe madecriminal.
In the (admittedly
partisan)estimationof Katz and Lindgren,
"one cannotthink
aboutcoercion,
contracts,
consent,robbery,
nuclearderape,unconstitutional
conditions,
terrence,
assumptionof risk,the greater-includes-the-lesser
arguments,
plea bargains,
settlements,
sexual harassment,insidertrading,bribery,
domination,
secrecy,privacy,
law enforcement,
utilitarianism
and deontology
withoutbeingtrippedup repeatedlyby
theparadoxofblackmail."
Leo Katz andJamesLindgren,
Insteadofa Preface,141U Pa L
Rev 1565,1565(1993).
MartinR. Gardner,TheMensRea Enigma:Observations
"See generally
on theRole
ofMotivein theCriminalLaw Past and Present,1993Utah L Rev635. See also id at 637
& n 5 (claimingthat"fewconceptualpursuitsin anyarea ofthelaw have provenso beguilingas the attemptto give an accurateaccountof the so-calledmentalelementrequiredforcriminalliability");
FrancisBowesSayre,MensRea, 45 Harv L Rev 974, 974
(1932) ("No problemof criminallaw is of morefundamental
or has proved
importance
morebaffling
through
thecenturiesthanthedetermination
oftheprecisementalelement
ormensrea necessaryforcrime.").
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ofmeanearlystudythatthe termembraceda wide multiplicity
ings,24'it has becomecommon,at least since the AmericanLaw
Institutecompletedits Model Penal Code overa generationago,
different
to distinguishbetweentwo fundamentally
conceptions.
As ProfessorMartinGardnersuccinctlyput it in his exhaustive
recentstudy:
The firstand historicallyoriginalconceptembodiedan explicitlynormativerequirementthat the offender
notonlyintentionallycommita criminalact, but also do so out of evil
motivation.The second and currentlymore predominant
traditionadopts an essentiallynonnormative
approachthat
findssufficient
groundforliabilityin the presenceof particularstates ofmindwithoutevaluatingor even appealing
to themotivesunderlying
the offender's
actions.242
Plainly, the classical conceptionof mens rea-which Sayre
equates with "little more than a general immoralityof motive"243-closely
approximates,or even mirrors,the notion of
moral blameworthiness
that underpinsthe evidentiarytheory.
insofaras the evidentiarytheory'sutilityin solving
Accordingly,
the blackmailpuzzle amountsto a powerfulpragmaticvote in
supportof my thirdcriterionof criminalization,
it mightweigh
equally heavilyin favorof the classical understandingof mens
rea. This wouldbe ofmorethan theoreticalinterest.It is a commonplaceassertionthat therecan be no crimeabsentthe coincidenceofactus reus and mensrea.2" If mens rea "really"requires
moralblameworthiness,
tangibleconsequencesmustfollow-such

that"[t]heold con24'See Sayre,45 HarvL Rev at 1026(citedin note240) (concluding
thenewconceptionofmensrea mustbe discarded,and in its place mustbe substituted
ceptionofmentesreae").
"2 Gardner,
1993UtahL Rev at 640 (citedin note240).
ofMensRea in theCriminalLaw, in
Signification
23 FrancisBowesSayre,ThePresent
Roscoe Pound,ed, HarvardLegal Essays 399, 411-12 (Harvard 1934). See also United
States v Thomas,459 F2d 1172,1176-77(DC Cir 1972) (discussingthe necessityofa re... act,one involving
evilintentor a bad purpose'
quirement"beyonda mereintentional
Mullenv UnitedStates,263 F2d 275, 276 (DC Cir 1959) (defining
in juryinstructions);
mens rea as "evilstateofmind");Sayre,45 Harv L Rev at 1019 (citedin note240) (obofmensrea was based
century,
"theconception
servingthatas late as themid-nineteenth
For an argumentthat Sayre overstatesthe signifilargelyon moralblameworthiness").
see Hall, GeneralPrinciplesat 138-49(citedin
cance ofmotivein the earlyconceptions,
note150).
maximfrequently
tracedto Coke,actusnonfacitreum,nisi
Considertheoft-quoted
menssit rea. See EdwardCoke,The ThirdPart oftheInstitutesof theLaws ofEngland
*107 (1641). The translationis "an act does notmake [the doerofit] guilty,unless the
be criminal."Black'sLaw Dictionary36 (West
mindbe guilty;thatis, unlesstheintention
6thed 1990).
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of an ignoas abolitionof strictliabilitycrimesand recognition
ranceoflaw defenseforall mala prohibitacrimes.245
whetherthe evidentiary
though,it is doubtful
On reflection,
to say aboutmens rea.
theoryalone has anythingofimportance
The evidentiary
thatthefactthat
theoryappearsto demonstrate
particularconductordinarilycauses harm and reflectsmoral
forcrimiconstitutesa primafaciejustification
blameworthiness
thatthecoincidence
nalization.However,it does notdemonstrate
is necessaryforparticularconductto be crimioftheseconditions
nalized. More likely,all threecriteriaare valid bases forcrimiofconductis jusevenwhencriminalization
nalization.Moreover,
tifiedon the strengthof the thirdcriterionalone, moralblameworthinessis still not necessarilyrequiredto justifyimposing
in a givencase. To be sure,ifthethirdcriterion
rests
punishment
on a retributivist
general justifyingaim, then no individual
forhis ofshouldbe punishedunless he is morallyblameworthy
in generaljustifying
fense.As H.L.A. Hart noted,retributivism
in distribution.2'But it is not certain
a entailsretributivism
foundation.
that the thirdcriteriondoes rest on a retributivist
Whilea retributivist
aim wouldalmostcertainlyyield
justifying
or something
thethirdcriterion
verymuchlikeit,so mighta conAnd if criminalizing(ordinarily)
sequentialistjustifyingaim.247
harm-causingconductis justifiedon consequenblameworthy,
ofpunishingone whoviolates
tialistgrounds,thenthe propriety
butis notmorallyblameworthy
theresultingcriminalprohibition
himselfmust remainan open question,dependentmore upon
contestableempiricalassumptionsthanon logicaldeduction.
It seems,in short,thatcautionis warrantedwhenassessing
oftheevidentiary
thesignificance
theoryforcriminallaw in general. The instantsolutionto the blackmailpuzzle (if correct)
mightentail the classical conceptionof mens rea, but it might
not.
This is not the end ofthe matter,however,forat least one
ofthe evidentiary
theoryis clear. Contraryto the faimplication
miliarcontention
that "motiveis immaterialin the substantive
criminallaw,"2481amotivehas substantialrelevance.First,as the
observes,themotives
equallyfamiliarobjectionto thiscontention
of
ofan individualdefendant
can provecriticalforthesatisfaction

discussionoftheimplications
oftheclassicalconception,
X Fora thoughtful
see H.L.A.
Hart,23 Law & ContempProbat 412-27(citedin note142).
and Responsibility
H.L.A.Hart,Punishment
at 9 (citedin note134).See note142.
2 See note 144.
'Wayne R. LaFave and AustinW. Scott,Jr.,CriminalLaw 227 (West2d ed 1986).
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ative defenses or for purposes of sentencing.249
various af
Moreover,as the evidentiarytheoryreveals, the criminallaw
does seem to care at least sometimes about the motivesofthe
to reclass of potentialdefendantsas a whole. Previousefforts
solve the blackmailpuzzle reflectone or the otherofthe customarily competingjustificationsfor the state to criminalizeconduct-that the conductreduceutility(or its roughproxy,wealth),
or that it be inherently
wrongful.The conspicuouslesson of the
evidentiarytheoryis to focusnot on consequences,nor on acts,
ifnotnecbut on actors(at least at the stage ofoffensedefinition,
essarilywhen assessing liability).If criminallaw theoriststake
this simplelesson seriously,I believe,the instantproposedsolutionto theblackmailpuzzle will indeedfacilitatea deeperunderstanding of the criminallaw and might resolve a varietyof
seeminglyintractablepuzzles.
B. Governmental
Motives:Understanding
Unconstitutional
Conditions
One concreteexample of the evidentiarytheory'spotential
relevance,outsidethe criminallaw, is providedby the so-called
unconstitutionalconditionsdoctrine-that is, the question of
fora government
to condition
whenit shouldbe unconstitutional
a benefitit is not compelledto provideon the recipientrelinright.Althoughgovernmentsattempt
quishinga constitutional
this maneuverfrequently
and in manycontexts,courtshave yet
to provideclear rulesforwhenthe principlethat a state maynot
do indirectlywhat it is prohibitedfromdoing directlyshould
trumpthe principlethatthe greaterpower(to withholdthe benefitentirely)includesthe lesser power(to grantit on condition).
Enormousscholarlycommentary
on the subjecthas not clarified
matters.250
While scholarswidelyagree that the conditionalten"9Thetraditionalview regardingmotiveis challengedin Douglas N. Husak,Motive
1989) (notingthe familiar
and CriminalLiability,8 CrimJustEthics3 (Winter/Spring
of
decisionsand the significance
theroleofmotivein sentencing
qualifications
regarding
specificintentcrimes,and arguingthatan actor'smotivesare also centralto thecriminal
and someexcuses).Althougha valuableconofeuthanasia,justification,
law's treatment
in its ownright,Husak'sessay is betterread to initiatea debatethanto offera
tribution
visionofthe roleofmotivein the criminallaw. Unfortunately,
competing
well-developed
"the
work... remainsto be done"respecting
Husak's conclusionthat "muchimportant
ofmotivesto criminalliability,"
id at 12,is as apt nowas it was nearlya decsignificance
ade ago.
are Sullivan, 102 Harv L Rev 1413
contributions
2"Amongthe most illuminating
Conditions,State
(cited in note 130); RichardA. Epstein,Foreword:Unconstitutional
Allocational
Power,and theLimitsofConsent,102 Harv L Rev 4 (1988); Seth F. Kreimer,
Sanctions:The Problemof NegativeRightsin a PositiveState, 132 U Pa L Rev 1293
Distinctionin Constitu(1984); WilliamVan Alstyne,The Demise of theRight-Privilege
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derofgovernmental
benefitsshouldsometimes
be heldlegitimate
and sometimesunconstitutional,
thereis almostuniversaldisagreementoverwhereand whyto drawtheline.
The evidentiary
theoryofblackmailsuggestsan obviousanswer:motivematters.Althoughit is sometimessaid thatthe motivesbehindstateactionare constitutionally
irrelevant,25'
thatis
a demonstrablemisstatementof existing constitutionaldocIn severaldisparateareas ofthe law,a "bad"governmentrine.252
tal motivewill proveper se fatal to state action.253
In various
a bad motivewillprovokestrictscrutiny.2"
othercontexts,
Whena constitutional
violation(orlevelofscrutiny)
turnson
shouldersthe burdenofprovgovernmental
motive,the plaintiff
task can be
ing that it was illegitimate.In theory,this difficult
in severalways.255
accomplished
Assume,forexample,a nontenuredpublicschoolteacheris fired,and thatthe teachersuspects
and
Conditions
tionalLaw, 81 HarvL Rev 1439(1968); RobertL. Hale, Unconstitutional
Constitutional
Rights,35 ColumL Rev321 (1935).
2 See, forexample,UnitedStatesv O'Brien,391 US 367,383-84(1968);AlexanderM.
Bickel,TheLeastDangerousBranch:The SupremeCourtat theBar ofPolitics208 (Yale
1962).
on therelevanceofmotivein publicand private
rumination
"For a recentthoughtful
see LaurenceH. Tribe,The Mystery
ofMotive,Privateand Public:SomeNotes
contexts,
ofHate Crimeand AnimalSacrifice,1993S Ct Rev 1. The classic
InspiredbytheProblems
law,ofstateactors'motithepropersignificance,
forconstitutional
arguments
regarding
An Approachto theProblemof Unconstituvationsare Paul Brest,Palmerv Thompson:
and Administrative
Motive,1971S Ct Rev95; JohnHartEly,Legislative
tionalLegislative
in Constitutional
Motivation
Law, 79 Yale L J 1205(1970).
class will
actionmotivated
to disadvantagea protected
Forexample,governmental
of Massachusettsv
violatethe Equal ProtectionClause. See PersonnelAdministrator
to advancereligionviolatestheEstabFeeney,442 US 256, 279 (1979).Actionmotivated
actionbyanyof
lishment
Clause.See Stonev Graham,449 US 39,40-41(1980).Similarly,
forprotecClause ifundertaken
theseveralstatesrunsafouloftheDormantCommerce
tionistpurposes.See Baldwinv GAFSeelig,Inc, 294 US 511,522 (1935).Andcivilincarprotections
against
cerationanimatedby a punitivepurposemightviolateconstitutional
doublejeopardyand ex postfactolaws. See Kansas v Hendricks,117 S Ct 2072, 2090
(1997) (Breyerdissenting)(notingthat althoughthe majorityfoundthat Kansas's civil
law was notpunitive,
commitment
agreesthatthe[Ex Post Facto]Clause
"[t]hemajority
'forbids
theapplicationofanynewpunitivemeasureto a crimealreadyconsummated'),
v Morales,514US 499,505 (1995).
Deptartment
ofCorrections
quotingCalifornia
forexample,the courtsapply
'Under rapidlychangingvotingrightsjurisprudence,
to redistricting
appear to have "subordistrictscrutiny
decisionswhenthe linedrawers
districting
principlesto race. See Bush v Vera,116 S Ct 1941,
nated"other,legitimate
(arguingthat strictscrutiny
1951 (1996). See also id at 1972-73(Thomasconcurring)
should apply wheneverredistricters
considerrace). Likewise,under ordinaryFirst
ifadoptedfor
Amendment
doctrine,
faciallyneutrallaws are subjectedto strictscrutiny
or disfavoring
the purposeoffavoring
speechofa particularcontent.See TurnerBroadcastingSystemv FCC, 512 US 622,641-42,645-46(1994);HarryT. Edwardsand Mitchell
N. Berman,RegulatingViolenceon Television,
89 Nw U L Rev 1487,1512-13(1995) (discussingthisaspectofTurner).
See VillageofArlington
Corp,429 US 252,
Heightsv MetroHousingDevelopment
265-68(1977).
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she was terminatedbecause ofthe schoolboard'shostilityto her
communistsympathies.It is well settledboththat her termination would violatethe FirstAmendmentif it were so motivated
and thattheburdenrestson theteacherto establishthatmotivation.256
The teachercouldsatisfyher burden(thus shiftingto the
school the burdento demonstratethat it would have firedthe
her political leanings) in numerous
teacher notwithstanding
ways. She couldhope to relyon statisticalevidenceoffiings by
the schoolboard of othercommunistteachersthat shows a dramaticcorrelation
betweena teacher'spoliticsand herjob history.
Or she could introduceminutesfroma schoolboard meetingin
whichboard membersexpressedhostilityto her because of her
politicalviews. Alternativelyor additionally,she could testify
to renewher contract,but onlyif
thatherschoolprincipaloffered
she resignedher positionon the board ofthe AmericanCommunistParty.This examplesuggeststhat a governmental
condition
evidencethat mighthelp
is just anotherpiece of circumstantial
establishmotivein a givencase.
an evidentiaryanalysis mightresolve the unAccordingly,
constitutionalconditionsdoctrineas follows:if and only if the
particularcondition("resignfrompositionin communistorganiinconsistent
withany ofthe permiszation")appears sufficiently
the benefitat
sible reasonsthe state mighthave forwithholding
was unsatisfactory,
or
issue (that the teacher'sjob performance
that the schoolwas eliminatingthe teacher'spositionforbudgetary or curricularreasons),then the factof the offersupportsa
the
motiveforwithholding
that the state's(but-for)
presuimption
in whicheventthe courtis regratuitousbenefitwas improper,257
quiredeitherto holdthe stateactioninvalidper se or to subjectit
to the appropriatelevel ofheightenedscrutiny.Indeed,this solution closelyapproximatesthat advanced over sixtyyears ago by
'See, forexample,Mt. HealthyCitySchoolDistrictv Doyle,429 US 274, 287 (1977);
408 US 593,598 (1972).
Perryv Sindermann,
case,
is notironclad.In the termination
"7Asin the blackmailcontext,the inference
the teachersolelybecause of her poorjob perthe state couldargue that it terminated
ofcontinuedemployment
offer
It couldthentryto explainawaytheconditional
formance.
that
forclass and chronically
overtired,
byarguing,say,thattheteacherwas ill-prepared
the schoolboard suspectedthese problemswere due to the factthat she devotedmany
in theCommunistparty,and that,because she showed
hourseach day to herofficership
promiseas a teacher,theboardwas willingto givehera secondchanceiftheycouldhave
time to her teachingduties. Of
adequate confidencethat she would devotesufficient
ofbad motiveis notopen
course,a comparableargumentintendedto rebutthe inference
Whetherit shouldbe availableto
to the ordinarydefendantin a blackmailprosecution.
case dependsuponwhethertheinquiry
conditions
in an unconstitutional
thegovernment
or (as in theblackmailsituation)ex ante
intomotivesis made ex postand particularistic
and categorical-aquestionbeyondthescopeofthepresentdiscussion.
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ProfessorRobert Hale.258Unfortunately,
though, subsequent
have eitheroverlookedor misunderstood
Hale's
commentators
The evidentiarytheorysuggests that attentionto
analysis.259
Hale's thesis mightproveprofitableif we can articulatemore
preciselythan Hale did how the notionsof "germaneness"and
'impermissiblemotive"can do real work.Because the governmentalproposalinvolvedin cases in whichthe doctrinemight
formofall blackmailproposiapplysharesthedoubleconditional
tions (if x then -y;if -x theny), the evidentiarytest will be of
promisingutilityin resolvingthe mysteryof unconstitutional
conditions.
CONCLUSION

It is a safebet thatblackmail'scriminalization
does notappear puzzlingto the casual observer.Not onlydoes it resemble
Hale beginsbyinsisting
that"thereis no logicalincongruity
in holdingthatthevalidityofa state'sexerciseofpowermaydependuponthe purposeforwhichit is exerted;
thata powerwhichis validwhenexertedformostpurposesmaybe invalidwhenexerted
forothers."Hale,35 ColumL Revat 322 (citedin note250).Afterexamining
a hostofunconditions
constitutional
thevalidityofa condicases,he opinesthat,when'determining
theSupremeCourtwouldlikelybe influenced
tionalburden,"
"byitsviewsas to whether
or notthecondition
is germaneto thepurposeforwhichthegovernment
mightnormally
conditions."
Id at 352.
imposetheburden,without
9The mostthorough
critiqueofHale's argument
comesfromSullivan.Her analysis
proceedsin threesteps.First,she demonstrates
persuasively
thatheightened
scrutiny
is
whenevergovernment
not invariablyappropriate
attachesa conditionto a gratuitous
benefitthatis notgermaneto the legitimatepurposesthe government
mighthave for
thebenefit
withholding
andunconditionally.
categorically
See Sullivan,102 HarvL Revat
1461n 196(citedin note130).Second,she assertsthatbecausegermaneness
perse is not
dispositive,
"[s]ometheoryofappropriate
legislativeprocesswouldseemnecessaryto exto the"germaneness"
ofgovernmental
plain"attention
Id at 1468.Third,she
conditions.
canvassesthe threeprincipalcontending
theoriesof legislativeprocess-interest
group
pluralism,civicrepublicanism,
and publicchoice-en routeto arguingthateach either
failsto explainany concernwithgerrnaneness
ofconditions
and benefitsor reflects
too
tounconstitutional
tenuousa relationship
conditions
tobe useful.Id at 1468-76.
problems
The upshotis that"germaneness
theoriesfailto resolveunconstitutional
conditions
problems."Id at 1476.
from
Sullivan'sanalysissuffers
twodefects.
First,it restson an ungenerous
readingof
Hale couldno doubthavebeenclearer,he is betterunderstood,
I think,to
Hale. Although
ofgovernmental
recognizethatit is illegitimacy
between
purpose,notnongermaneness
and benefit
condition
is
per se, thatraisesconstitutional
problems.
Lack ofgermaneness
significant
onlyinsofaras itoftenallowscourtstoinferthatthelegislature
was motivated
byillegitimate
purposes.Second,evenifthiswerenotHale's view,it is one thatdeserved
As notedabove,see notes250-59and accompanying
consideration.
text,existingconstituidentifies
somegovernmental
tionaldoctrine
motivesas substantively
illegitimate
(absowithoutitselfrestingupon any particularmodelof normative
lutelyor presumptively)
governmental
process.Sullivan'scritiqueofHale is infirm
becauseit nevergivesadequate
attention
tothetheory
thatsomegovernmental
motivesare simplyillegitimate
(nomatter
the legislativeprocessthateffectuates
are usethem),and thatnongermane
conditions
whensuch improper
motiveswereat
ful-thoughnot dispositive-toolsforidentifying
work.
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ofwhichrarelyraises
othervarietiesoftheft,the criminalization
eyebrows,but blackmailjust smellslikes a nastypractice.Theoristsfroma wide range ofdisciplines,however,have longidentifieda puzzle-that it is illegalto threatenwhat it is legal to doand have workedvigorously
to proposesolutions.
Those solutionshave been oftwobroadtypes.Some scholars,
includingmanyofa law and economicsbent,have proposedthat
tolerationofblackmailwouldproducea varietyofadverse social
consequencesnot arising in a regimethat permitsthe acts a
blackmailerthreatens.Other writers,more deontologicallyinclined, have argued that the blackmail threat is inherently
in a waythatthe acts threatenedare not.But all extant
wrongful
theoriessufferfromseriousfailings.Blackmail does not always
producethe consequencesthat the firstset of theoristsallege,
and claimsabout the moraldifference
betweenblackmailthreats
and the acts threatenedproveunconvincing.
This Articlehas originatedfroma whollydifferent
perspective. Whereas prior theories have proceeded on the express
premise,or implicitassumption,that criminalizingparticular
conductis justifiedon one oftwocompetinggrounds eitherthat
it yieldsnet adversesocial consequencesor thatit is wrongin itself-this Articlehas supposedthat criminalization
ofconductis
primafaciejustifiedwhenit is likelyto cause harmand to be undertakenby a morallyblameworthy
actor.This simple proposition,whichmightrest on eitherconsequentialistor retributivist
conceptions(or both)ofthe generaljustifyingaim ofthe institution ofcriminalpunishment,explainswhyblackmailis criminal
even thoughthe acts a blackmailerthreatensare not. It is probable that one who simplyundertakesan act ofthe sorta blackmailermightthreatenlacks morallybad motives.Therefore,
the
unconditionalact should not be criminal.But more evidence
conclusion.In particular,it is probable
mightwarranta different
that one who undertakesthe same act, but onlyafteroffering
to
if
acts
with
the
act
bad
motives.
The
threathas eviforego
paid,
if the actorhad goodmotivesforengaging
dentiarysignificance:
in the act, he likelywouldnothave offered
his abstention.If this
inferenceis sound(and its strengthwillvarydependinguponthe
thenthis particularact couldbe made
totalityofcircumstances),
criminalas harm-causing,morallyblameworthyconduct.And
blackmail-the threat to commit a harm-causing,morally
act-could be criminalizedtoo.
blameworthy
The twofundamentalbases of the evidentiarytheory,then,
are these:(1) motivesmatter,and (2) conditionalthreatscan offer
powerful(albeit not conclusive)circumstantialevidence of im-
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thesetwoprinciples,
thisArtipermissiblemotive.By employing
cle has attemptedto resolveone stubbornpuzzle ofthelaw. That
of
is, it has soughtto explainand to justifythe criminalization
"core cases ofblackmail,as well as to suggesta reconsideration
of the contoursof the crime.Finally,it also has providedsome
reason forhope that the principlesunderlyingthe evidentiary
theorymight(whethersinglyor in tandem)have broadexplanatoryreachbothwithinand withoutthecriminallaw.
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